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*
Dr. Nancie “Nan” Palmer has a rich background of over forty-three years
experience in public social service, child welfare, and mental health where she developed a
specialty in clinical practice with child and adult survivors of trauma and currently animal
assisted therapy. Nan is a tenured full Professor of Social Work at Washburn University,
Department of Social Work. She has served as Department Chair twice and was one of the
initiating faculty in creating a dual MSW/JD degree between the Department of Social Work
and School of Law at Washburn University. Dr. Palmer was on the teaching faculty at the
National Victims Assistance Academy for many years. Dr. Palmer has published in numerous
journals of law on issues such as human trafficking, water as a human right, and sexual
orientation and gender identity. Nan extends her deepest appreciation and gratitude for the
enduring and enriching collaborative relationship over twenty years with Charlene Smith,
Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center and former
Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law.
*
Professor Charlene L. Smith has an extensive background in the human
rights area. She is the Executive Director of the Inter-American Center for Human Rights,
which is located at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The InterAmerican Center for Human Rights is a response to the profound need in South Florida for an
organization that is committed to furthering the civil and human rights of our diverse
communities and people. Located at the crossroads of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the
United States, as well as the hub of unique Haitian, Cuban, and other émigré communities,
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“Human beings are an amalgam of identities—race and economic
status, etc., etc. We [do not] live our lives as demographics or as
political statements. We simply live.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The law is stuck on binary or categorical approaches.2 One is either
this or that—heterosexual or homosexual; male or female; black or white;
and the list can go on and on.3 This article posits that this approach should
not be the way in which we categorize people’s personhood.4 To give the
best example of why the law should rid itself of the binary approach we
purposely focus on transsexuals. They offer the best opportunity to
experience how the law so often punishes them because they do not fit into
one category.5 While the United States is slowly accepting gay and lesbian
requests for justice, that particular happenstance does not solve the problem
for transsexuals.6 Such a transformation for gays and lesbians can take place
because it is obvious that if you are gay or a lesbian, then you are not a
heterosexual, which allows the law to keep the binary approach.7 In order to
fully understand intersections of identity and the binary approach to law, it is
necessary to first look at how classifications are brought about in the social,
psychological, and biological world.8 To bring life to these heady subjects,
this Article shares with the reader actual stories of people who have to exist
in a world enamored with categories.9 Lastly, this Article explores how the

1.
Bob Minzesheimer, This Is Ayana Mathis: And When She Heard ‘This Is
Oprah Winfrey,’ Everything Changed for Debut Novelist, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2013, at D1.
2.
See Eric Engle, Aristotle, Law and Justice: The Tragic Hero, 35 N. KY. L.
REV. 1, 5–6, 9 n.71 (2008). Aristotle was clearly a dialectician. Id. at 2. Inequalities are
presumed unless you belong into the categories. See id. at 5–6, 10–11. The binary approach
is Aristotle’s legacy, which permeates the law as well as other disciplines. Id. at 9 n.71.
Others have suggested a new approach, however, still accept the binary approach but just
broaden it. See Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A
Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917,
919–20 (2002).
3.
See id. at 922.
4.
See infra Part XI.
5.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 920–21.
6.
See Emily Greenhouse, Dropping the “T”: Trans Rights in the Marriage
Era, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/droppingthe-t-trans-rights-in-the-marriage-era.
7.
See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 921.
8.
See infra Parts II–IV.
9.
See infra Part V.
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law approaches transsexual identity. 10 It will be apparent that we should
jettison the various identity categories and treat everyone as persons.11
II.

DEFINITIONS

Since this Article, unlike most articles, will not focus on a single
category of people, it is necessary to provide the reader with the vocabulary
that will be used. Transsexual or transgender includes many variations.12
Various politically motivated groups use the word transsexuals as an
organizing function so that the public will have a label to refer to a group of
people advocating for their rights. 13 That group, however, may have a
contingent of the following: Male-to-Female (“MTF”).14 These folks are
born with male genitalia but prefer to be considered female.15 Within that
group are those who have gone through gender reassignment surgery
(“GRS”).16 Of course, there is also Female-to-Male (“FTM”) for the women
who identify as men.17 There are also people who are transvestites, who
dress in the manner of the opposite gender from what they are.18 Included in
this group are drag kings and drag queens. 19 One of the main points to
remember is that gender identity, birth sex, and sexual orientation are
different.20 Because these variations exist on a sliding scale, there are those
10.
See infra Part VI.
11.
See infra Part XI. Making a person identify themselves has pitfalls in that
it makes a person classify themselves. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Comment, Law as a Reflection of
Her/His-Story: Current Institutional Perceptions of, and Possibilities for, Protecting
Transsexuals’ Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 165 (2002).
The authors are not suggesting that anyone has to identify himself or herself; only to say that
they are a person. See infra Part VI. Thus, gender or sexual orientation is not the question
asked. See infra Part VI. Also, some say that allowing transsexuals to decide would
undermine the law’s consistency. Madeira, supra note 11, at 171. Such observations seem to
be based on when a person could decide. Id. It is not necessary to pinpoint when the person
who is self-identifying makes the decision. See id. at 172. Subjectively, the person should
have the power to decide. Contra id. at 171. Yes, it is true judges would, at first, need
training in this area. See id. at 172–73.
12.
Laura E. Kuper et al., Exploring the Diversity of Gender and Sexual
Orientation Identities in an Online Sample of Transgender Individuals, 49 J. SEX RES. 244,
244 (2012).
13.
Id.
14.
Transgendered Definitions, CONN. OUTREACH SOC’Y, http://
www.ctoutreach.org/faq.pdf.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Transgendered Definitions, supra note 14.
20.
Madeira, supra note 11, at 171; see also JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL.,
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
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who would prefer to adopt a name that is more inclusive of everyone.21 For
instance, QUILTBAG—an acronym that stands for “Queer/Questioning,
Undecided, Intersex, Lesbian, Transgender/Transsexual, Bisexual,
Allied/Asexual, Gay/Genderqueer”—has been suggested.22 “It is meant to
be a more inclusive term than [Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender/LesbianGay-Bisexual-Transexual
(“GLBT/LGBT”)]
and
to
be
more
pronounceable—and memorable—than some of the other variations or
extensions on the GLBT/LGBT abbreviation.”23 In one study, it was found
that the younger generation prefers not to put their identity in any category.24
They instead champion the idea of identity being fluid and contextual.25 This
group also challenges “the assumption that their sexual orientation is a core
feature of their sense of self.”26
The authors, however, will be using the term transsexuals as the
generic term, but with the caution that all of the above folks should be
included.27 Indeed, the Article will show that in many instances—depending
where you are on the scale of gender identity and sexual orientation—the law
may be particularly tricky.28
III.

SOCIETY’S TREATMENT OF IDENTITY

While race classification has received considerable discussion and
legal attention for decades, sex and gender classification systems have only
recently become the subject of litigation.29 As such, the traditional approach
has been one of adopting a binary sex classification system instead of one
that would deconstruct such a limited means of addressing human rights and
privileges.30 Of particular concern are people who are transsexual, who are
SURVEY 24 (2011), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDS_Report.pdf. The authors
stated that the survey respondents were sixty percent assigned male at birth, but twenty-nine
percent now said male was their identity. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25. Forty-two
percent said they were female. Id.
21.
See Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 248.
22.
QUILTBAG, QUEER DICTIONARY, (Mar. 16, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://
queerdictionary.tumblr.com/post/3899608042/quiltbag.
23.
Id.
24.
Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250; GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25.
Twenty-nine percent of the respondents said they were something else other than just male or
female. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25. Also, the younger respondents identified as
gender non-conforming. Id.
25.
Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250.
26.
Id.
27.
See supra Part II.
28.
See infra Part III.
29.
See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 919.
30.
Id. at 919–20.
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forced to live in a rather twilight zone of factors that create a formidable
chasm even with some gays, lesbians and bi-sexuals who “fear that inclusion
of transgendered individuals may result in . . . rejection of legislation that
would protect GLBs from sexual orientation discrimination.”31 Given the
pervasive oppression and discrimination that has threaded its way through
decades, the “manner in which a person’s sex[ual] [orientation] is defined
has . . . significant legal consequences.”32 Therein lies the compelling need
to re-examine the issues and infuse hope in addressing urgent human needs.33
“Transsexuals pose a dilemma in the law both in their pre-operative
and post-operative states. . . . Remedying this situation requires far-reaching
changes in social perceptions and understanding[].” 34 The complexities
challenge legal scholars and practitioners to move beyond looking at the
issue through a traditional lens to one that provides a greater view of the
human landscape in everyday expression.35 Our humanness compels us to do
this if all of us are to reach our full potential as human beings. Reaching full
potential inherently means that social equality and justice are infused
throughout the lifespan of every person. In so doing, the legal system should
consider the broader lens to inform.36
“Critics of bipolar categories have called for their restructuring in the
hope[] of creating more inclusive categories that reflect people’s true
identities.” 37 Yet, the very use of categories continues to perpetuate a
hierarchy of power that controls the allocation, or lack thereof, of rights and
privileges.38 In contrast, Labman posits that “far-reaching changes in social
perceptions and understandings” are needed, and further that “[t]he law has
the ability to both mirror and construct social norms.” 39 In essence, sex
becomes a fluid concept which “dissolves and simply [a] relationship[]
remain[s].”40
31.
Id. at 920–21.
32.
Id. at 928.
33.
See id.
34.
Shauna Labman, Left in Legal Limbo: Transsexual Identity and the Law,
7 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 66, 66 (2001).
35.
See id. at 66–67.
36.
See id. at 67, 72.
37.
Rachel Haynes, Book Note, Bisexual Jurisprudence:
A Tripolar
Approach to Law and Society, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 229 (1999) (reviewing RUTH
COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
(1996)). Others such as Ruth Colker champion the concept of hybrid, which is used to
describe people who lie between bipolar legal categories. Id.
38.
See id. at 231. Colker’s belief was that without categories there would be
anarchy. Id. at 238.
39.
Labman, supra note 34, at 66.
40.
Id. at 72.
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Reconceptualizing the Issues From a Humanistic Point of View

Relationship. It is the central life force that connects us as human
beings. 41 Margaret S. Mahler, a world-renowned child psychoanalyst,
introduced scholars of human behavior to the concept of a second birth.42
That is, the emergence of a “psychological being possessing selfhood and
separate identity.”43 Therein is a journey of navigating life, incorporating
both a sense of oneness or attachment to others as well as sense of self or
who we are as individuals. 44 Beyond the legal arguments regarding the
biology of sex and gender lie more substantial reasons for the need to look at
the importance of relationships as the lynchpin of addressing the issues,
rather than simply creating categories of race, sex, and gender.45 In order to
examine this vast and complex realm of humanness, it is helpful to have a
workable framework that helps one to make sense out of this complexity.46
One effective approach is use of the biopsychosocial model.47 The
biopsychosocial model was introduced in the 1950s by Roy Grinker, a
neurologist and psychiatrist, who coined the term.48 However, this model is
“associated indelibly with the name of George Engel, the internist,
psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst” who “preached the indissoluble nature of
mind-body links.”49 “Engel championed his ideas . . . [in part] to reverse the
dehumanization of medicine and disempowerment of patients.”50 The model
presented the philosophical view that “material lesions, life experiences, and
current social situation[s] all matter in the presentation of illness.” 51 The
elegant, powerful, and versatile nature of this model is such that other
professions—including social work—adopted the framework to address the
41.
See LOUISE J. KAPLAN, ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS: FROM INFANT TO
INDIVIDUAL 16–17 (1978).
42.
Id. at 15–16.
43.
Id. at 15. Mahler’s work remains a cornerstone of child development
theory. See id. at 15, 19. Kaplan was an understudy of Mahler. See id. at 11.
44.
Kaplan, supra note 41, at 16–17.
45.
See Labman, supra note 34, at 66; Haynes, supra note 37, at 230.
46.
See Haynes, supra note 37, at 230.
47.
Edward Shorter, The History of the Biopsychosocial Approach in
Medicine: Before and After Engel in BIOPHYSICAL MEDICINE: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
UNDERSTANDING ILLNESS 1, 1 (Peter White ed., 2005).
48.
S. Nassir Ghaemi, The Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial Model, 195
BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2009).
49.
Shorter, supra note 47, at 3; see also George L. Engel, The Need for a
New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129, 132–33 (1977).
50.
Francesce Borrell-Carrió et al., The Biopsychosocial Model 25 Years
Later: Principles, Practice, and Scientific Inquiry, 2 ANNALS FAM. MED. 576, 576 (2004).
51.
Shorter, supra note 47, at 2.
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complex issues of person-in-environment.52 Social work has a long-standing
history in social reform and social justice, valuing the worth and dignity of
every human being, the importance of human relationships, and
empowerment.53
B.

Attachment: The Essence of Humanness

“Attachment theory is indispensable for understanding” the
biopsychosocial interplay between person and environment. 54 The theory
was developed by psychiatrist John Bowlby through his work with the World
Health Organization concerning health implications of homelessness in
children. 55 He concluded that the crucial element in mental health is
predicated on a “warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with a
caregiver.”56 Human biology fosters this crucial need.57 Paul MacLean, a
pioneer in the study of the human brain, contends that biology of attachment
“goes back 180 million years [ago], originating with the earliest mammals”
and even nesting birds.58 Indeed, we are biologically wired for connection.59
For example, when an infant is in distress, the child emits a particular cry
that brings caregiver protection, safety, and nurturing.60
The biological need for attachment crosses all geography and
cultures. 61 Central to attachment is the need for a consistent and secure
base.62 “The importance of having a secure base cannot be overstated. As
52.
See Tina Maschi & Robert Youdin, SOCIAL WORKER AS RESEARCHER:
INTEGRATING RESEARCH WITH ADVOCACY 3 (2010).
53.
See id. at 11. Social worker Jane Addams, most famously associated with
Hull House in Chicago, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Id. at 6, 12, 25. Hull House was
an innovative settlement house that was developed in the slums of poor migrant people in the
late 1880s. Id. at 9, 25. Leymah Gbowee—also a social worker, founder, and president of the
Monrovia-based Gbowee Peace Foundation, Africa, Liberia—was selected Nobel Peace Prize
winner in 2011 for her work on behalf of advancing women’s rights, conflict resolution, and
working with ex-soldiers and victims of gender-based violence. See Gender, War &
Peacebuilding Study Guide, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 1, 10, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
files/NPECSG12.pdf.
54.
JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: A GUIDE TO SELF-UNDERSTANDING
35–36 (1995).
55.
Id. at 36.
56.
Id.
57.
See id. at 36–37.
58.
Id. at 37; see also PAUL D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION:
ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS 8–9 (1990); M. Alan Kazlev, The Triune Brain, KHEPER,
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intelligence/MacLean.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2003).
59.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–37.
60.
Id. at 36.
61.
See id. at 38.
62.
Id. at 37.
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Bowlby says, our survival as a species has depended on it.”63 A secure base
is required in order for a human being to develop both individually and
socially. 64 Without this consistent secure base, infants and children have
tremendous challenges in normal psychological social development. 65 In
fact, attachment is critical to self-regulation, or the ability to manage one’s
physiology.66 Witness the child in distress who runs to mother or proximate
caregiver.67 Recall human reaction to catastrophic events, such as natural
disaster, terrorist attacks, and the like.68 The most compelling need in these
instances is to connect with loved ones, friends, or people who represent
safety. 69
Connection and proximity have a calming effect both
psychologically and physically. 70 Through attachment, comes interaction
with the mother or primary caregiver and others in the social environment.71
This interaction has often been referred to as mirroring.72 Heinz Kohut’s
original studies illuminated this concept.73 If this interaction is positive over
time, then a sense of self or self-cohesion develops. 74 “Over time, these
[positive interactions] lead to the child’s capacity to feel pride and take
pleasure in his or her accomplishments—to feel a sense of competence and
efficacy.” 75 When interaction is inconsistent, violent, rejecting, and
destructive, the sense of self is compromised. 76 As a result, children
“become arrested in their development of an internal sense of confidence and
competence. . . . [H]e mistrusts and disrespects his own internal signals and
states; he doubts his own self-worth and competence.”77
63.
Id.
64.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37–38.
65.
Id. at 36, 38.
66.
See id. at 36, 46.
67.
See id. at 46.
68.
See id. at 37, 47.
69.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37. In coping with any traumatic event, safety is
critical. Id. at 47. Even inanimate objects can provide a measure of protection and safety. Id.
“This phenomenon of bonding to places [is referred to as] site attachment.” Id.
70.
Id. at 36.
71.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36.
72.
David B. Wexler, The Broken Mirror: A Self Psychological Treatment
Perspective for Relationship Violence, 8 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 129, 130 (1999).
73.
See Jamie McLean, Psychotherapy with a Narcissistic Patient Using
Kohut’s Self Psychology Model, PSYCHIATRY (EDGMONT), Oct. 2007, at 40, 41,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2860525.
74.
See Wexler, supra note 72, at 130, 137.
75.
Id. at 130.
76.
See id.
77.
Id. Children then often mirror in adulthood the very traits they
experienced from negative interactions in their growing years. See id. “While insisting [the]
men [and women] take full responsibility for their . . . behavior,” Wexler and others have used
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Our need for attachment continues throughout our lifetime. 78
Interestingly, the “methods that enable one human being to enslave another
are remarkably consistent.” 79 A universal method used to control human
beings is the destruction of attachments and isolation.80 “The destruction of
attachments requires not only the isolation of the victim from others, but also
the destruction of her internal images of connection to others.”81 Thus, our
biology of attachment is in play throughout the life span.82 Attachment and
social connection provide a nurturing stream of affirmation and belonging.83
The fact that perpetrators of power universally use isolation as a weapon of
control speaks to our continuing vulnerability as human beings.84 Fostering
attachment and affirmation is the phenomenon of mirroring and witnessing.85
These two interpersonal interactions are essential to the formation of selfidentity and to a sense of one’s place in the family, the community, the
culture, and indeed, the larger social environment.86 Consider the following:
C.

Who Am I? The Personal and Social-Cultural Self

“Western societies, in which most of this theorizing and research has
been carried out, can be characterized as cultural contexts with a strong
emphasis on personal identities and individual achievements.” 87
Contributing to identity development is “a substantial body of research
reporting on phenomena that illustrate the powerful impact of people’s social

self-psychological principles in working with clients who have battered their family members.
Wexler, supra note 72, at 140. Treatment programs such as Domestic Violence 2000 and
Foundations for Violence-Free Living integrate these concepts. Id. That is not to say that all
children experiencing deficient parenting will become abusive or neglectful. See id. at 131.
The journey to positive adulthood is that much more arduous. See id. at 130.
78.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44.
79.
JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 76 (1997). “The accounts of
hostages, political prisoners, and survivors of concentrations camps” as well as survivors of
domestic violence “from every corner of the globe have an uncanny sameness.” Id. at 76–77.
80.
Id. at 77.
81.
Id. at 80. “Inevitably, in the absence of any other point of view, the victim
will come to see the world through the eyes of the perpetrator.” Id. at 81.
82.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44.
83.
Id. at 44.
84.
See HERMAN, supra note 79, at 80–81.
85.
Aaron H. Devor, Witnessing and Mirroring: A Fourteen Stage Model of
Transsexual Identity Formation, 8 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, no. 1-2, 2004 at 41,
46.
86.
See id. at 46–47.
87.
Naomi Ellemers et al., Self and Social Identity, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
161, 162 (2002) (citation omitted).
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identities on their perceptions, emotions, and behavior.”88 Biology—with its
compelling forces for our need of attachment—moves us into the
psychological and social arenas, which are also essential elements of human
development.89 Biology of attachment is but one powerful factor in human
development. 90 In addition to the universal need for attachment, the last
thirty years of research indicate that human beings have “a strong biosocial
preparedness for emotion expression and emotional communication in
infancy.”91 Herein, the phenomena of witnessing and mirroring come into
play.92
1.

Witnessing: Observing and Affirmation

“Witness: [O]bserver . . . watcher . . . provid[ing] or furnish[ing] . . .
confirm[ing], corroborat[ing] . . . behold[ing].”93 The concept of witnessing
flows from both outside—e.g. an eyewitness providing testimony—to being
watched.94 In both directions, powerful forces emerge that shape the self.95
Survivors of domestic violence, oppression, political imprisonment, and
torture “describe being forced to stand by helplessly while witnessing
atrocities committed against people they love.”96 Witnessing can take on a
different hue in the struggle for survival.97 The death camps of the Holocaust
offer such a perspective.98 In the midst of terror, deprivation, and violence—
direct or indirect—the need to have others know of such human experiences
is paramount. 99 Why? “Terror dissolves the self into silence, but its
aftermath . . . . Horror arises and in its presence men and women are seized

88.
Id. at 163.
89.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 46, 50.
90.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
91.
György Gergely & John S. Watson, The Social Biofeedback Theory of
Parental Affect-Mirroring: The Development of Emotional Self-Awareness and Self-Control
in Infancy, 77 INT’L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1181, 1186 (1996). Cross-cultural research
demonstrates that there are universal facial expressions including “anger, fear, sadness,
disgust, and surprise.” Id.
92.
Id. at 1188.
93.
THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS 511 (1996).
94.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
95.
Id.
96.
HERMAN, supra note 79, at 83.
97.
See TERRENCE DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE
DEATH CAMPS 32–33 (1976).
98.
See id.
99.
See id. at 33.
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by an involuntary outburst of feeling which is very much like a scream . . . .
And in this crude cry the will to bear witness is born . . . .”100
Yet another view incorporates witnessing as essential to a sense of
101
self.
“The effectiveness of witnesses, in part, derives from the fact that
they are not like oneself and can look at us from outside of our categories of
self-definition.” 102 Devor argues that when another person provides
“appraisals which conform to one’s own sense of self, it leaves one with a
feeling of having been accurately seen by others who can be assumed to be
impartial.”103 Devor believes that this is a critical issue for people who are
transsexual.104 In all of these instances, the threading element is the presence
of, or being present with, other human beings.105
2.

Mirroring: Reflection of Self-Identity

Mirror: Reflection, reproduction, representation;106 the concept of
mirroring is an inextricable facet of human development.107 The validation
and affirmation of human expression in infancy enables the developing child
to develop a sense of cohesion within the self and self-expression.108 In the
process of attachment and calming, affirming the presence of others’ regard
for, and sacredness of one’s humanness and that of others is manifested.109
Mirroring may also be regarded as “seeing oneself in the eyes of others like
oneself.”110 From a psychosocial perspective, infants are sensitive to face-toface affective communication and “are, to a large extent, dependent on their
parent’s affect-regulative interactions as a means of emotional self-

100.
Id. at 33. The compelling desire for those in a life and death struggle is to
bear witness. Id. To tell the world. DES PRES, supra note 97, at 33. Des Pres accounts that
[i]t took months and months of preparation, cutting down the suicides, insisting that
survival even in such a place is not without value. Their purpose—strong enough
to lift the spirit from truly inhuman depths—was to destroy the camp and allow at
least one man or woman to escape and bear the tale.

Id. at 32–33.
101.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
102.
Id. Devor makes the distinction between witnessing and mirroring. Id.
The former is critical in that the “[w]itness[] can be presumed to have some distance and
therefore . . . objectivity.” Id. at 46. That is, validation is from someone not like oneself. Id.
103.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
104.
See id.
105.
See id. at 46–47.
106.
THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS, supra note 93, at 253.
107.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 46; Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at
1186–88.
108.
See Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1186–88.
109.
Id. at 1188.
110.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
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regulation.”111 Thus, requisite to human development over the life span is a
continual need of attachment or sense of belonging, the influence of
significant others in providing feedback and affirmation, and the presence of
a safe supportive environment in which to grow in self-understanding and
expression.112 “Each of us are social beings and as such we live in a sea of
other humans with whom we interact during most of the waking hours of our
lives.”113
These concepts are powerfully illustrated in the lives of people who
are transgender, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and intersex.114 There is, inherently,
an immense role that society and the legal system plays in the struggle for
their survival, struggle to be oneself, and have a valued place in the human
sea.115
3.

Identity Formation

“Although societal awareness of the existence of lesbian and gay
people has increased dramatically over the past decade or so, most lesbians
and gay men still grow up within a context of pervasive environmental and
internalized homophobia and expectation to be heterosexual.”116 Likewise,
while biological considerations are significant, “all people live within social
environments which give meanings to the realities of their bodies and
psyches,” 117 including people who are transgender and intersex. 118
Interestingly, the study of identity remains primarily of interest to those most
affected by discrimination and oppression and “little interest to members of
the dominant group.”119 While there are different issues regarding ethnicity
and racial identity with those of differing sexual orientation and gender
expression, there is nonetheless agreement that one’s identity is critical to
psychological functioning as an individual and a person-in-environment.120

111.
Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188.
112.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–38, 43; Devor, supra note 85, at 46;
Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188–89.
113.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
114.
See id.; Susan R. McCarn & Ruth E. Fassinger, Revisioning Sexual
Minority Identity Formation: A New Model of Lesbian Identity and Its Implications for
Counseling and Research, 24 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 508, 508 (1996).
115.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 46–47.
116.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 508.
117.
Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
118.
Id. at 42, 47.
119.
Jean S. Phinney, Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of
Research, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 499 (1990).
120.
Id.
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It is not within the scope of this article to compare and contrast all of
the various models of identity development.121 Each person is special and
unique, as is one’s life journey and circumstance. Thus, no one model can
apply to all individuals in the same manner. However, there is some
consistency in using a stage model to explain a highly complex process.122
Frequently referenced among models of identity development was the stage
model developed by Vivienne C. Cass in 1979. 123 The model has been
revised and conceptually reworked by various researchers throughout the
years. 124 In reviewing the history of sexual minority identity formation,
McCarn and Fassinger postulate that Coleman included another dimension
that focused on the “force of social pressure at different stages of the coming
out process.”125 Further, according to McCarn and Fassinger, the concept of
identity development was again modified by Troiden, who “noted the critical
importance of a supportive lesbian [or] gay environment in facilitating selfdefinition and self-acceptance within the context of social stigma.”126 Devor
proposes a fourteen-stage model of transsexual identity formation in order to
more faithfully address needs and processes of transsexed people. 127
However, there are limitations with all of these models and research studies
attempting to understand the very complex and myriad process of comingout. 128 “More research is needed for inclusion of racially, ethnically,
culturally, and economically diverse samples.”129

121.
See id. at 501–03.
122.
See, e.g., Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity Formation: A
Theoretical Model, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 219, 235 (1979).
123.
See id. at 219–20. Cass intended the model to apply to both men and
women. Id. at 220. The model includes such dimensions as one’s cognitions—thoughts and
beliefs—and affective and behavioral features into a six-stage process. Id. at 221. Stage one
features identity confusion and questioning. Id. at 222. This stage may be accompanied by
anxiety and discomfort. See Cass, supra note 122, at 223. Other stages include identity
comparison, which often evokes feelings of isolation and alienation. Id. at 225. Final stages
include acceptance of oneself and eventually pride. Id. at 231, 233.
124.
Id. at 219–21; Eli Coleman, Developmental Stages of the Coming Out
Process, in HOMOSEXUALITY & PSYCHOTHERAPY 1982, at 31, 31 (7 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, No. 3,
1982).
125.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Coleman, supra
note 124, at 31.
126.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Richard R. Troiden,
The Formation of Homosexual Identities, 17 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 48–49 (1989).
127.
Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
128.
See Chad M. Mosher, The Social Implications of Sexual Identity
Formation and the Coming-Out Process: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical
Literature, 9 FAM. J. 164, 172 (2001).
129.
Id.
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C.
Intersectionality: Human Beings, the Struggle for Self, Society, and
the Legal System
An emerging concept in the study of human behavior, particularly
from a perspective of social justice, is that of intersectionality, which
“underscores the complex nature of cultural and personal identities and
human experiences that cannot be [divided] simply by one dimension of
inequality or difference—either race or gender or sexual orientation or
ability.”130 The sense of identity—who one is and one’s place with other
human beings—is a central theme among scholars of race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation and gender, and gender expression.131 It is the driving force of
human expression to be authentically oneself.132 If the struggle to become
the authentic self takes place in a social environment that is fraught with
messages and practices of oppression, destruction, and life threats, then the
consequences to countless human beings is devastating.133 Such conditions
are much like the forces prisoners of domestic violence and war
experience. 134 To be sure, such forces are often invisible, yet just as
damaging to self and life.135
It is at this intersection of person-and-environment that courts must
emerge as vigilantes and protectors of human life and expression. 136 As
Labman so aptly observed, “[t]he law has the ability to both mirror and
construct social norms.”137 When society is inhumane and oppressive, the
courts must move from a place of continuing to reflect on oppression to a
place of constructing social norms such that all human beings may become
their authentic selves. The need for belonging, for attachment to meaningful
human relationships without terror or fear of annihilation, the creating of safe
and affirming environments, and regarding of the sanctity of our humanness
should be the mission of the legal system.
IV.

SUMMARY

“Contemporary adolescents are coming of age in a world that is
considerably more multicultural than the world in which their parents and
130.
YVETTE MURPHY ET AL., INCORPORATING INTERSECTIONALITY IN SOCIAL
WORK PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EDUCATION 42 (2009).
131.
See Mosher, supra note 128, at 164; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499.
132.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 128.
133.
See id. at 137–42; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499, 511.
134.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 137–42; HERMAN, supra note 79, at 51–52.
135.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 127–28, 137–42.
136.
See Labman, supra note 34, at 66.
137.
Id.
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grandparents grew up.” 138 The presence of the Internet and global
communication has sped up globalization at an unprecedented pace.139 For
the youth of today, developing a cultural identity is much more inclusive and
complex.140 As a consequence, growing up is at a time of more pronounced
openness and diversity.141 This is no less true for people who are exploring
or experiencing an identity that is fluid and affirming of the authentic self.
To categorize or to make distinctions is to impose a hierarchy of power and
perpetuate oppression. Whether binary or a range of categories—no matter
how humane—the intension is in and of itself creating barriers to the flow of
human development. The world is moving and changing at a speed unlike
any other in time. There is a moral imperative for the courts to respond to
the inevitable growing flexibility and fluidity of human expression and
authenticity.
V.

PERSONAL STORIES: SERAFIMA METZ AND KRYSTA CASCIO

In order to avoid talking about people who deserve legal recognition
in the abstract, their stories will be told. Since self-identity is key to finding
out how society and the law in particular treat any person, the first portion of
this Part will examine how each person self-identified.142 These stories are a
product of reaching out to the transsexual community and asking for
volunteers to tell their stories. 143 Those transcripts and recordings will
become part of a project at Shepard Broad Law Center to archive stories of
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex (“LGBTI”) community
entitled: The Harris L. Kimball Memorial Digital Archive of Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Florida Legal Oral History.144

138.
Lene Arnett Jensen, Coming of Age in a Multicultural World:
Globalization and Adolescent Cultural Identity Formation, 7 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI.
189, 189 (2003), http://www.lenearnettjensen.com/files/2012/05/2003-ADS-Jensen-Comingof-Age-Multicultural-World.pdf.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 191.
142.
See infra Part V.A–B.
143.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 8,
2013) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library);
Interview with Serafima Metz, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 1, 2013) (on file with Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library).
144.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
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Identity

Serafima Metz said that even though she was born a male, that over
the process of both mental and physical development, she now considers
herself female.145 She found it problematic when it came to the law because
she has observed that while she considers herself a female, the law might
come to a different opinion.146 Serafima was quite willing to accept labels
when it came to identity. 147 She observed that when labeled as
transgendered, she embraced it.148
Krysta Cascio had a different approach.149 First, she said she did not
like labels. 150 However, when pressed, she now considers herself as a
“pansexual, intersex, post-op trans-woman.” 151 Interestingly, Krysta also
said that she liked the definition of pansexual, which she understands as
meaning gender blind.152 She noted that pansexual is different from being
bi-sexual, which means you are equally attracted to men and women.153 But,
bi-sexual leaves out, according to Krysta, all the trans-men, trans-women,
and those who considered themselves two-spirited. 154 Thus, according to
Krysta, gender is not binary.155 Rather she sees it as a “huge scale of gray,
and . . . you can fall in love with anyone on that scale of gray.”156 Krysta
adds that she is blind to race, religion or disability.157 “[I]f I meet somebody
and I connect with them and we click and then [that is] all that should matter.
The rest is irrelevant.”158

145.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also GRANT ET
supra note 20, at 24. The National Transgender Discrimination Survey has extensive
information about transgendered people. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 20–32.
146.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
Seventy-five percent of respondents identified themselves as
transgendered. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24. Interesting that forty-seven percent of that
number identified as MTF, while only twenty-eight percent identified as FTM. Id.
149.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 16.
153.
Id.
154.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16. “Gender identity and
expression are complex and layered characteristics, with almost as many variations as there
are individuals.” GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24.
155.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16.
156.
Id. Of those surveyed, fourteen percent identified themselves as gender
non-conforming. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24.
157.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16.
158.
Id.
AL.,
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Growing Up

Serafima’s redefined identity began at an early age.159 According to
her, when she was “very young [she did not] fit in with the rest of the males”
when she was at school. 160 The other boys teased her constantly.161 She
considered herself different.162 She really had no role models and it was not
until she was nineteen years old that she even met another transgendered
person.163 At that time, she realized that “it was actually quite acceptable
thing to do at . . . my own moral code.”164 She knew she had the genitalia of
a boy, but her identity was nebulous.165 While she felt contrary to her body,
she was happy with her life being a woman.166
Krysta had some of the same experiences.167 When she was about
four or five years old she said she recalls not falling into the gender
binary.168 She remembers dressing up as Wonder Woman every day.169 She
would come home and watch Linda Carter spin around and become Wonder
Woman.170 So, Krysta would spin around hoping that she would become a
woman.171
Krysta’s growing up phase differed from Serafima’s.172 First, Krysta
went to a Christian school that only had six students in class.173 Since the
class was so small, the students really did not divide into gender specific
roles.174 For instance, to play football, they all joined in.175 It was not until
she started going through puberty that she realized something was not quite
right.176 While she devoted her spare time to science fiction, reading comic
159.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
160.
Id.
161.
Id. at 2. Seventy-eight percent reported harassment, thirty-five percent
physical assault, and twelve percent sexual violence when in grades kindergarten through
twelfth. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 3. Unfortunately, teachers were not very helpful
and, in fact, thirty-one percent said that teachers and staff also harassed them. Id. at 33.
162.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2.
163.
Id. at 1.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 1–2.
166.
Id. at 2.
167.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Compare Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1, with
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2.
173.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
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books, and becoming a gaming geek, she suddenly also developed breasts.177
She thought she was a mutant.178 She hid the factor, never revealing it to
anybody.179 She made sure she did not do anything that would show that she
had breasts.180 This meant she stopped swimming and wore heavy jackets to
school. 181 Given that she lived in Miami, she was the target of ridicule
because of her apparel. 182 She described herself as an outcast. 183 Even
though she was an outcast, she had both girlfriends and boyfriends.184 She
had no name for her orientation.185
When Serafima was in high school, she began wearing women’s
clothing now and then.186 Her take on it was that punk shows were popular
at the time, so she was just following that style.187 In fact, she went to many
punk shows and always wore dresses, and it made her feel good. 188
Additionally, Serafima had a very supporting family.189 While she found it
difficult to fully come out to them, she felt they were enlightened and liberal
and “really put the effort to try and understand” what she was confiding in
them.190 Regardless of their support, Serafima attempted suicide when she
was eighteen. 191 Her parents encouraged her to go to a treatment center
because she was suffering from major depression.192 When she got out, she
went back to the university she was attending, but again, she was so
depressed, she tried to commit suicide again.193 As a result, she went to
another treatment center, which was a three-month program for patients who
177.
Id.
178.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 1–2.
181.
Id. at 2.
182.
Id.
183.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 2.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio (Apr. 12, 2013) (on file with Charlene Smith); see also Debra Cassens Weiss,
Report: ‘Staggering’ Rate of Attempted Suicides by Transgenders Highlights Injustices, ABA
J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/staggering_rate_
of_attempted_suicides_by_transgenders_highlights_injustices. Forty-one percent of those
who responded to a survey said they had attempted suicide in comparison to a 1.6% of the
general population. Weiss, supra note 191.
192.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191.
193.
Id.
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had been diagnosed with mental illness.194 She was also there for substance
abuse.195 After she got out, she lived with her parents for a short amount of
time and eventually went to live in a house that was established for queer and
trans people.196 It was the first time she had ever interacted with trans or
queer people.197 As Serafima put it, “I began to feel comfortable questioning
and exploring my gender identity.” 198 She started her transition with
hormones, and as her body started changing, she began wearing women’s
clothing all the time.199
C.

Relationships

Serafima considers herself a lesbian and is in a committed
relationship with another woman. 200 She rejects the idea that she is bisexual.201 She said she was always attracted to women and that has remained
the same throughout her life.202
Krysta noted that relationships are tough for trans folks. 203 If
somebody was with a person before the transition, it’s rough. 204 For
instance, Krysta knew a couple that had been together for fifteen years but,
right after the surgery, the wife left.205 The hormonal treatment is also a
factor. 206 Because the person seeking to become the opposite gender has
many emotional changes, the partner cannot handle the ups and downs.207
Then, after the change is completed, finding a partner who is understanding
is almost impossible.208 According to Krysta, when you are trying to find
someone, you go stealth, and it becomes very awkward to tell the new
person.209 Additionally, the newly trans person tends to fall for the wrong
person.210
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191.
198.
Id.
199.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3–4.
200.
Id. at 4.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 18.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 19.
206.
Id.
207.
See id.
208.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 19.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
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Legal and Societal Difficulties

Before getting her name changed, Serafima applied to the university
where she is currently a student.211 To get the university to change her first
name was an uphill struggle.212 Her problem was that she would be on the
teacher’s roster with a male name.213 She encountered a massive amount of
bureaucracy to get her name on all the university’s collection of her data
corrected. 214 However, while the university changed her name, they still
have her listed as a male.215 She was able to change her driver’s license by
getting a letter from her doctor.216 However, that was a very difficult task.217
Serafima found very little information on how to go about this process.218
The people who work at the Department of Motor Vehicles were not
helpful.219 Her experience with Social Security was even more stressful.220
They eventually informed her that until her birth certificate was changed,
they would not change the name on her Social Security card.221 Naturally,
that has made getting jobs very difficult for Serafima.222 If it were not for
True Group, 223 she would not have known the steps to take. 224 They
provided all the forms she needed.225 The process was not cheap; it cost
Serafima over four hundred dollars in court costs to complete as many
documents as she had. 226 She estimates that it takes about three to four
months to complete the process, because many of the items required her to
appear in court.227

211.
212.
213.
214.

Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5.
See id.
Id.
Id. She notes that the university is huge, so that might explain some part

of it. Id.
215.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.
218.
Id.
219.
See id.
220.
See Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5–6.
221.
Id.
222.
Id. at 6.
223.
This Miami based group provides information on their website on how to
go about changing your name/gender on legal documents.
224.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6; Legal Name &
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223.
225.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6–7; Legal Name &
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223.
226.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 7.
227.
Id.
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Krysta’s experience regarding the law mirrors much of what
Serafima explained.228 For instance, she said she spent a “whole day waiting
at the wrong courthouse.” 229 This happened because when she searched
online, it gave the information that she could go to any courthouse within the
county.230 She said that she mostly ran in circles because she did not have a
clue as to what to do. 231 Anybody she asked who had been through the
experience had outdated information. 232 “[T]he name change alone was
seven months of legal crap and fighting.”233 The whole process is different
in every county.234 Krysta thoughtfully documented her experience, and then
put up a website to help others.235
Further, Krysta’s situation was different from other trans.236 Because
she had Crohn’s disease, it was more complicated.237 For instance, because
she needs Medicare assistance, Medicare gets information from Social
Security, which gets its information from her birth certificate.238 She needed
to change her gender on official documents—including her birth certificate—
because when she went to the pharmacy to get her medicine, if they did not
see the correct gender, they would not give her the medicine she needed.239
That differs from many trans folks because if they get their driver’s license
changed, then a private insurer will accept that as being the proof they need
for gender identification. 240 Unfortunately, in Florida, you must have the
surgery before you can change your birth certificate.241
VI.

THE LAW AND HOW TRANS RIGHTS ARE LARGELY IGNORED

There are many rights and privileges afforded to U.S. citizens who
fit into the legal dichotomy of either male or female. 242 Individuals who
identify with the biological sex he or she was born into, take for granted
certain rights and protections. Unfortunately, the law creates distinct
228.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143 at 5–7.
229.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
See id.
233.
Id. at 7.
234.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7.
235.
Id.
236.
See id. at 3–5.
237.
See id.
238.
Id. at 8–9.
239.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9.
240.
Id.
241.
Id. at 9.
242.
See infra Part VII.
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categories of male and female, rendering individuals who do not fit into this
binary sex classification outside the scope of certain laws.243
The narrow binary sex classification system fails to take into
consideration the difference between sex and gender.244 The language and
scope of the law makes the unfortunate and detrimental assumption that the
biological sex a person is born with will match the gender they identify
with. 245 There is a compelling need to reshape the law to incorporate
individuals whose sex does not match their gender, because for trans people
it is not as simple as penis equals male, and vagina equals female.246 The
trans community faces a great battle in their fight to gain equality and
reshape the law to address the human rights and privileges currently denied
to them.247
America is not always at the forefront of human rights, and is
actually lagging behind other countries with respect to reaching equality for
transgender people. Laws and policies followed in other countries would
eliminate many of the issues discussed in this article. 248 For example,
Argentina recently passed a gender-identity law, which enables people to
change their name and sex on official documents without judicial or medical
approval. 249 The Netherlands has also taken an illustrative step toward
equality by removing the surgery requirement to changing the gender marker
on official documents.250 As this Article illustrates, America still has a long
way to go in achieving equality and providing human rights to every person,
irrespective of sexual orientation or gender identity.
243.
See infra Part VII. As Serafima Metz recognized, even though she
personally identifies as a female, the law will not necessarily agree. Interview with Serafima
Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also supra Part V.A. Krysta Cascio also disagrees with the
binary sex classification of the law, rejecting the black and white view of gender, believing
instead in a huge scale of gray. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16; see also
supra Part V.A.
244.
See supra Part III.
245.
See infra Part VII.
246.
See infra Part VII. Serafima and Krysta were both born male, but from a
very young age knew that the biological sex they were born into did not fit with the gender
they identified with. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1–2; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1–2.
247.
See Jessica Sideways, The Unique Issues that Transexuals Face,
HUBPAGES,
http://jessicasideways.hubpages.com/hub/The-Unique-Issues-that-TransexualsFace (last updated Feb. 9, 2014).
248.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/netherlands-victorytransgender-rights; Michael Warren, Argentina’s Gender ID Law Takes Effect, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 5, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/05/argentinagender-identity-law-takes-effect_n_1570830.html.
249.
Warren, supra note 248.
250.
The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
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Within the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) community, the fight
to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination in areas such as marriage,
raising children, and employment is ongoing and slowly moving in a positive
direction.251 However, gender identity and sexual orientation are different,
and the binary approach to the law creates even bigger hurdles for trans
people in reaching equality.252 The myriad of issues faced by trans people
begins with their legal identity, and includes much of the discrimination
experienced by the LGB community. 253 Thus, although LGBT is often
grouped together, the trans community faces legal issues distinct from LGBs,
relating to gender identity rather than sexual orientation.254
This portion of the Article focuses on some of the major issues faced
by transsexuals resulting from the law’s categorical approach of defining
sex.255 These topics include: States’ varying approaches for defining legal
sex, processes of amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses,
protections provided by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, access
to healthcare, the right to marry, and the right to raise children.256
VII.

LEGAL IDENTITY

The protections, rights, and benefits denied to the transgender
community stem from the lack of recognition of their self-identified name
and sex.257 Trans people face legal obstacles at all stages and facets of their
life and “the ability to live fully in their post-transition name and sex can be
vitally important to their safety, gender transition, and family security.”258
As discussed in this Article, the legal identity of a transsexual affects the
protections afforded to them under state and federal anti-discrimination
statutes, the right to marry, and the right to raise children, to name just a
few.259 Further, the basic need of a trans person’s recognition of the legal
sex he or she identifies with is essential to his or her access to appropriate

251.
See Sideways, supra note 247.
252.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
253.
Sideways, supra note 247; see also The Netherlands: Victory for
Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
254.
See Sideways, supra note 247.
255.
See infra Parts VII–X.
256.
Id.
257.
Janson Wu & Kylar W. Broadus, Recognition of Name and Sex, in
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 16, 16 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
258.
Id.
259.
See infra Parts VII–X.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

38

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

IDENTITY

141

public accommodations, such as prisons, shelters, and restrooms.260 The first
step in achieving equality is to legally recognize a transsexual’s gender
identity by providing simple legal mechanisms under which a transsexual
may change his or her name, amend his or her birth certificate, driver’s
license, and any other official documents.261
A.

How the States Define Legal Sex

An individual’s sex is defined by his or her physical attributes,
including sexual and reproductive anatomy, hormones, and chromosomes, as
well as his or her gender identity, which is the individual’s actual or
perceived gender.262 Generally, a person’s biological sex and gender identity
“line up, making the shorthand use of one’s birth genitalia to identify sex
unproblematic. Particularly for transsexual and intersexed persons, gender
identity and the physical characteristics of sex in some way[s] conflict.”263
When there is a conflict, the states vary on the approach taken in determining
the legal sex of a transgendered person.264 Unfortunately, most jurisdictions
take the essentialist approach and define sex as immutable and fixed at

260.
See D. MORGAN BASSICHIS, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN
HERE”: A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK
STATE MEN’S PRISONS 12 (Dean Spade ed., 2007).
261.
The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248; see
also Warren, supra note 248. This can be achieved by following the approach taken by
countries like Argentina, which allow transgender people to change their names and amend
official documents without having to go through painful and intensive surgery or obtaining
judicial approval. The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
Serafima’s experience provides an example of the complicated and expensive process that
transsexuals go through when attempting to amend official documents. See supra Part V. She
was unable to change her driver’s license without a letter from her doctor, and Social Security
would not change her Social Security card until her birth certificate was changed. See supra
Part V.D. After about three to four months, and over four hundred dollars in court costs and
multiple court appearances, she was able to amend her birth certificate and obtain congruent
documents. See supra Part V.D.
262.
See Taylor Flynn, The Ties That (Don’t) Bind: Transgender Family Law
and the Unmaking of Families, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 32, 34 (Paisley Currah et al. eds.,
2006).
263.
Id. (alteration in original). Intersexed individuals are born with “a
reproductive or sexual anatomy that [does not] seem to fit the typical definitions of female or
male. For example, a person might be born appearing to be female on the outside, but having
mostly male-typical anatomy on the inside.” What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
264.
Compare Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999)
(finding sex to be immutable and fixed at birth), with M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (finding gender identity essential in determining legal sex of a
transsexual).
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birth. 265 A minority of jurisdictions have found gender identity to be
determinative, or at least an essential factor, to defining legal sex.266 The
gender identity approach to defining legal sex is urged because, if followed
by all states, it would not only provide consistency to the law, but also would
reflect the current medical and psychological understanding of sex, and most
importantly, would respect an individual’s autonomy.267
As a normative matter, this framework of autonomy-preserving
guarantees—including the rights to privacy, freedom of
expression, and bodily integrity—creates constitutional space for
an as-of-yet-unarticulated right, the right to self-determination of
sexual identity. . . . Such an approach would attempt not only to
reclaim a rights-protecting view of the Constitution but also
envisions a world free of our current investment in policing a
boundary between—or among—the sexes.268

1.

The Biological Test to Defining Legal Sex

Unfortunately, a majority of states, such as Ohio, Texas, and Florida,
follow the approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth.269 These states
use a rigid biological test to define legal sex, refusing to depart from the
narrow black and white view of sex and gender.270 For instance, in Ohio, the
court refused to issue an order finding a post-operative MTF transsexual to
be female for legal purposes. 271 The court found that a person’s sex is
determined at birth and denied the transsexual’s request to amend her birth
certificate.272 The holding rested solely on biological characteristics stating
that “[t]here was no evidence that [the] applicant at birth had any physical
characteristics other than those of a male and he was thus correctly
designated Boy on his birth certificate. There also was no laboratory
documentation that the applicant had other than male chromosomes.”273

265.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104
(Eng.); Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
266.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
267.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–35.
268.
Id. at 34.
269.
See Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella,
in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 17 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
270.
See In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987).
271.
Id.
272.
Id. at 832.
273.
Id.
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Further, in Littleton v. Prange,274 the legal question addressed by the
Court of Appeals of Texas was: “[C]an a physician change the gender of a
person with a scalpel, drugs, and counseling, or is a person’s gender
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”275 The litigant was born male but
identified as female from the time she was three or four years old.276 After
receiving the appropriate treatments and undergoing complete sex
reassignment surgery (“SRS”), she became a true MTF transsexual.277 In
reaching its conclusion on her legal sex, the court focused solely on the
biological and sexual reproductive organs of the transsexual litigant.278 The
court held Christie to be a male, stating that even though “[s]ome physicians
would consider Christie [to be] female; . . . [h]er female anatomy . . . is all
man made. The body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied.”279
2.

Dual Test of Anatomy & Gender

The legal system, as well as society, needs to recognize that the
question of whether someone is a male or a female is not as simple as
whether that person has a pair of XX or XY chromosomes and the genitalia
he or she was born with.280 The Superior Court of New Jersey understands
this critical realization and the essential role of gender identity in
determining sex.281 Unlike the essentialist approach, the Superior Court of
New Jersey recognized the complexities of sex and took into consideration
factors other than mere biology.282 The court determined that a MTF postoperative transsexual was considered to be legally female. 283 Despite
recognition of jurisdictions following the essentialist approach to sex, this
court found that:
The evidence and authority which we have examined . . . show[s]
that a person’s sex or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender,
that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or emotional
sense of sexual identity and character. Indeed, it has been

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 225.
See id. at 230–31.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
Id. at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
See id.; Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
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observed that the psychological sex of an individual, while not
serviceable for all purposes, is practical, realistic, and humane.284

Although the decision in M.T. v. J.T.285 was favorable and the court’s
recognition of the importance of gender identify is noteworthy, the court
engaged in a body-parts checklist approach.286 The reasoning of the court
contained a detailed discussion of the expert testimony of a doctor pertaining
to J.T.’s post-operative genitalia including its cosmetic appearance, whether
it “could function as any female vagina,” and also whether she is capable of
“traditional penile/vaginal intercourse.”287 This hypersexualization of a trans
person’s post-operative sexual anatomy falls short of the approach that
should govern defining legal sex—that of gender identity.288 While it is true
that the New Jersey court found gender identity significant, the court’s
conclusion reveals an unnecessary emphasis of sexual anatomy focused on
finding that the “transsexual’s gender and genitalia are no longer discordant;
they have been harmonized through medical treatment.”289
B.

Legal Name Changes

Often the first step that a transsexual takes in obtaining legal
recognition of his or her true self is a legal name change because “a name
change sends an important message to the world, a message solidified and
made official with a court’s approval.”290 All states have statutes addressing
the process for changing a person’s name, with varying procedural
requirements.291 Some states also allow common law changes, which take
effect by simply using the new name.292 Almost all state statutes governing
legal name change contain requirements designed to prevent an individual
from changing his or her name for fraudulent purposes. 293 Therefore, a
transsexual who wishes to change his or her name to reflect his or her true
identity should not be denied the right to do so. Unfortunately, some state
courts continue to make what should be a simple process more difficult and
284.
Id. at 209; Douglas K. Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex
Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 969–70 (1971).
285.
355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
286.
See id. at 206; Flynn, supra note 262, at 37.
287.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 206.
288.
Id. at 206–07.
289.
Id. at 211.
290.
ALLY WINDSOR HOWELL, TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND THE LAW 16–17
(2013).
291.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2013).
292.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 17; see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Hansford, 580
N.W.2d 171, 173 (Wis. 1998).
293.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07(3)(j).
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burdensome for transsexuals by requiring medical documents or doctors’
notes providing the reason for the name change.294
C.

Birth Certificate Amendments

One way in which transsexuals attempt to obtain equal rights and
protections of the law that conform to their self-identity, is through a birth
certificate amendment. 295 Most jurisdictions in the United States have
regulations, statutes, or policies governing birth certificate amendment
procedures to change a person’s sex designation.296 While almost all of these
jurisdictions have straightforward procedures for making an amendment to
fix a mistake or change a person’s name, the policies governing a
transsexual’s ability to amend the sex designation on his or her birth
certificate are unpredictable, expensive, and unnecessarily intrusive.297 State
policies vary on the ability to change the sex designation on a birth certificate
and the procedural requirements for doing so.298 States that do permit such a
change on a person’s birth certificate may issue an amended or a new birth
certificate, requiring proof of either complete SRS or just necessary medical
treatments, and the state may or may not require a court order for changing
the birth certificate.299
Some states confine the ability to change a person’s sex designation
to circumstances where there was a mistake in the declaration on the birth
certificate of either boy or girl, as determined at the time of birth.300 For
example, the Ohio Probate Court held that an individual who was born male,
who is now a post-operative female, could not amend her birth certificate.301
The court interpreted Ohio’s birth certificate statute as “strictly a correction

294.
Transgender Man Denied Name Change by Virginia Judge,
LGBTQNATION (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2013/04/transgender-mandenied-name-change-by-virginia-judge/. For Krysta, just the process of changing her name
took seven months. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7.
295.
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 2014).
296.
See Kristin Wenstrom, Comment, “What the Birth Certificate Shows”:
An Argument to Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment Policies,
17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 131, 131–33 (2008).
297.
Id.
298.
Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/changing-birth-certificate-sexdesignations-state-by-state-guidelines (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
299.
Id.
300.
E.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828, 831–32 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987).
301.
Id.
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type statute,” permitting a change only when an error was made in the
designation of sex at the time of birth.302
Tennessee actually goes as far as statutorily prohibiting a birth
certificate amendment to reflect a transsexual’s self-identified sex, even postSRS. 303 Similarly, Idaho has a general statute permitting birth certificate
amendments; but the Idaho Office of Vital Statistics shows that Idaho does
not permit birth certificate amendments for post-operative transsexuals.304
States, such as Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho, that do not permit an
amendment to the sex designation on birth certificates, follow the approach
that a “person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by
the birth attendant” and restrict such amendments—absent a showing of error
or inaccuracy—at the time of recording the gender.305 What these states fail
to recognize is the importance of a transsexual’s internal sense of gender
identity. Transsexuals often feel “incongruencies of assigned birth sex,
physical body, and gender identity.”306 In essence, the sex designation on
their birth certificate, as recorded at the time of their birth, is inaccurate.307
Preventing a person from obtaining congruent identity documents reflecting
the appropriate sex, inhibits that person from living as his or her authentic
self and from receiving equal rights and protections under the law.308
Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and New York City
allow sex designation amendments or changes to a person’s birth
certificate.309 Almost all of these birth certificate amendment policies require
proof that the applicant has undergone SRS, 310 and many states require a

302.
Id. at 831.
303.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2014) (stating “[t]he sex of an
individual [will] not be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change
surgery”).
304.
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.02.08.201 (2013); Changing Birth Certificate
Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
305.
In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832; Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
306.
Benjamin L. Jerner, Culturally Competent Representation, in
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 1, 3 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
307.
See id.
308.
Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 16–17; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at
132–33. But see In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
309.
Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 19─20; see also Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State by State Guidelines, supra note 298 (demonstrating state
statutes that allow birth certificate amendments with proof of sex reassignment surgery).
310.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014) (requiring “a certified copy
of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in
this state has been changed by surgical procedure”); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3,
.6 (2014).
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court order as a prerequisite to amending a birth certificate.311 Although the
majority of states require complete SRS,312 other states do not specify the
extent of surgery that is required. 313 The particular surgical requirements
outlined by states are critical because the treatment and surgery that
transsexuals undergo “range from relatively minor cosmetic procedures, such
as facial hair removal or breast augmentation for [MTF] patients, to complete
genital reconstructive surgery . . . for patients of both sexes.”314 There are
many reasons why a transsexual would decide not to undergo complete
SRS.315 For instance, there may be health risks associated with surgery, the
transsexual may not be able to afford surgery, and “others simply object to
the idea that the only way to belong to a particular gender is to have anatomy
that conforms to that gender.”316
Furthermore, current understandings of transgender health indicate
the personalized and unique process of gender transition. 317 A statutory
requirement of SRS—as a pre-requisite to amending the sex designation on
one’s birth certificate—is incongruent with transgender health and is unduly
intrusive.318 The more appropriate birth amendment policy that should be
followed by states is one that only requires proof that the transsexual has
completed the treatments necessary for his or her personal transition.319
Virginia was the first state that allowed birth certificate amendments
to a trans person’s proper gender without requiring sex-reassignment
surgery. 320 Prior to 2002, Virginia’s requirements conformed with the
majority of the states, requiring complete genital reconstructive surgery to
amend birth certificates.321 However, Lambda Legal educated the Virginia
Office of Vital Records on the various treatments that trans people undergo
during their transition, and Virginia has changed its amendment requirement
from complete SRS to necessary gender transition treatments.322
311.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115.
312.
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13(e) (2014); see also Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
313.
Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
supra note 298.
314.
Audrey C. Stirnitzke, Note, Transsexuality, Marriage, and the Myth of
True Sex, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 288 (2011); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3, .6.
315.
Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 288.
316.
Id.
317.
Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 132–33.
318.
Id. 132–34.
319.
Id. at 133–34; see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014).
320.
12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142.
But see Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note
298.
321.
See Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142.
322.
Id.
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Driver’s License Amendments

Each state also has its own policies and regulations for changing
name and sex designation on driver’s licenses.323 In order to change one’s
name on a driver’s license, all that is generally required is the court order
documenting the name change. 324 However, in order to change the sex
designation on a driver’s license, the state may require proof from a
physician or psychologist certifying the change of sex.325
States should follow Virginia’s lead and become educated about
transsexual health and the various procedures that transsexuals choose to
undergo other than SRS.326 In moving towards equality, legislatures need to
understand the critical need of transsexuals to live authentic lives in their
self-identified gender and realize that extensive surgical requirements create
a painful, expensive, life-changing, and potentially unnecessary barrier for a
transsexual to obtain congruent documents reflecting their true identity.327
Countries outside of the United States, such as Argentina and the
Netherlands, have acknowledged this need, as evidenced by the recent
legislation enabling transsexuals to change the sex on official documents
without prior judicial or medical approval.328 A transsexual woman from
Buenos Aires, Argentina, expressed her feelings after taking advantage of
Argentina’s new gender-identity law, stating that “‘[it is] important to have
the freedom to decide by myself and not have anyone deciding it instead of
me. . . . [N]o one is authorized to say who I am, but me.’”329
Transsexuals should have access to more efficient methods for
amending their name and sex designation on official documents.330 It is time
for the states to remove the barriers that are preventing the people in our
323.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender
DEP’T.
OF
MOTOR
VEHICLES,
on
a
DMV
Photo
Document,
N.Y.
http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/405/~/change-of-sex-or-gender-on-admv-photo-document (last updated Aug. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM).
324.
E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506(b).
325.
Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document, supra note 323.
326.
See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014); Wenstrom, supra note 296,
at 142.
327.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248;
Warren, supra note 248.
328.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248;
Warren, supra note 248.
329.
Warren, supra note 248.
330.
Obtaining congruent documents is critically important for transsexuals in
reaching equality and recognition of their true identity. See supra Part V.A–D. Inconsistent
documents can make getting jobs difficult, and for Krysta, any inconsistency on her official
documents meant that she would not receive medicine from the pharmacy to treat her Crohn’s
disease. See supra Part V.A–D.
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country from being who they are, in order for our nation to move closer to
achieving equality for all.331
E.

Public Accommodations

Could you imagine if a stressful part of your day was dealing with
public bathroom accommodations you are permitted to use? A decision to
use a public restroom, something that is a seemingly mindless decision to
most, is often “one of the most difficult and stressful parts of a transgender
person’s day.”332 Particularly for trans people who may be in the early stages
of their transition, utilizing the restroom that corresponds to their gender
identity has a potential to create “difficulty, anxiety, and even safety
risks.” 333 There are numerous examples of transgender individuals being
arrested, fined, or charged for using the restroom of his or her self-identified
gender.334
Many cities and counties have public accommodation
nondiscrimination ordinances, some of which include gender identity or
expression.335 However, most of these ordinances do not address the use of
public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers. 336 The ordinances that do
address the use of public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers generally state
that the nondiscrimination ordinance does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex or gender in these facilities.337 Only a select few provide express
protection for transitioned transsexuals against discrimination in the use of
public restrooms.338
Furthermore, institutions with sex segregation policies, in organizing
their accommodation programs, create great difficulty for trans people. 339
For example, U.S. prisons that place people in a facility based on their birth
331.
PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 15–16 (Sean Cahill et al. eds., 2000). But see
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document,
supra note 323.
332.
Jerner, supra note 306, at 9.
333.
Id.
334.
See, e.g., Transgender Woman Charged with Trespassing, Banned from
Idaho Supermarket for Using Women’s Bathroom, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2013, 2:43
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/transgender-woman-banned-idaho-storewomen-restroom-article-1.1315827.
335.
E.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 49.70 (2014).
336.
See, e.g., id.
337.
E.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16 1/2, art. II, §
34.1 (2014).
338.
E.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE ch. 12-1-1, 12-1-4(c) (2013).
339.
See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 752–53
(2008).
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sex can pose great danger for a trans person.340 A transgendered woman,
who was born as a man but looks and identifies as a woman, is subject to
high rates of extreme physical and sexual abuse from other inmates. 341
Under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prisons are required
to provide for inmate’s safety.342 “A prison official’s deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm . . . violates the Eighth Amendment.”343
Often the abuse is so great that the transgendered inmate is placed in solitary
confinement or is segregated for their protection.344
Fortunately, the Prison Rape Elimination Act 345 (“PREA”) was
enacted in 2003 in response to the high rate of sexual abuse in prisons,
particularly against homosexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming
individuals.346 The PREA mandates a screening process in federal prisons in
determining whether to assign a trans person to a federal facility with male or
female inmates.347 The U.S. Department of Justice issued final regulations to
implement PREA in May 2012, and will hopefully prove to be effective in
remedying the difficulties faced by the trans population in prison.348 The
PREA is a positive step towards providing transgenders—as well as other atrisk groups—necessary protection, and demonstrates an understanding that
the decision of where to assign a transgender person cannot be based solely
on birth sex. 349 Chelsea Manning, an army soldier previously known as
Bradley Manning, announced that she was a female living in the wrong body
after she was convicted for leaking classified documents.350 Chelsea will be
sent to an all male prison and made a statement that, “[g]iven the way that I
feel and have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon

340.
BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 17–18.
341.
Id.
342.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
343.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.
344.
See id. at 830; BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 22–23.
345.
42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2012).
346.
LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 2012), http://www.transequality.org/Resources/PREA_
July2012.pdf.
347.
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(a), (c) (2013).
348.
LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, supra note 346.
349.
See 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c); LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination
Act, supra note 346.
350.
Adam Gabbatt, ‘I am Chelsea Manning,’ Says Jailed Soldier Formerly
Known
as
Bradley,
GUARDIAN (Aug.
22,
2013,
12:35 EDT),
http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-genderreassignment.
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as possible.”351 While in prison, she is prepared to take her plea for receiving
gender reassignment treatment to court.352
Similar sex segregation issues exist with the placement of trans
individuals in homeless shelters.353 The majority of homeless shelters and
other social service shelters house people according to his or her birth sex.354
These policies often lead to harassment and assault against the transgender
person by others housed in the facility. 355 The potential harassment and
violence results in trans people avoiding homeless shelters. 356 Homeless
shelters in a minority of jurisdictions, including San Francisco, Boston,
Washington, D.C., and New York City, have policies permitting transgender
people to be housed according to their self-identified gender.357 Homeless
shelters are in place to assist those in need; consequently, sex segregation
policies that have the effect of transgender individuals avoiding such
facilities clearly should be changed.358
Every person deserves equal access to appropriate public
accommodations, such as restrooms, prisons, and homeless shelters, without
fear of harassment or physical violence. No person should be afraid to use
the restroom of their self-identified gender, and sex segregation policies
should be changed in prisons and homeless shelters in order to prevent the
harassment or violence that results when a transgender person is placed with
his or her birth sex rather than his or her self-identified gender.359
VIII.

STATE/LOCAL & FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

Transsexuals experience severe discrimination and are in dire need
of legislative protection in areas such as: healthcare, employment, education,
housing, public accommodations, law enforcement, and in many other
areas.360 In order to reach equality and provide transsexuals with the same

351.
Id.
352.
Denver Nicks, Chelsea Manning Prepared to Take Gender Reassignment
Plea to Court, TIME (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nation.time.com/2013/11/01/chelseamanning-prepared-to-take-gender-reassignment-plea-to-court/.
353.
Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53.
354.
Id. at 753.
355.
Id.
356.
Id.
357.
Id. at 736.
358.
See Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53.
359.
See Jerner, supra note 306, at 9; Spade, supra note 339, at 753; Gabbatt,
supra note 350.
360.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16.
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rights and privileges as any other citizen, legislators and policymakers must
remedy these injustices through trans-protective legislation.361
Many states have laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
and sexual orientation; however, these laws do not provide protection for the
trans community.362 Where society has failed and remains close-minded to
those who are perceived as not normal, the law must step up and provide
protection.363 Unfortunately, for trans people, where society has failed, so
too has the law.364
A.

Anti-Discrimination Laws at the State Level

Activists continue to fight for equal civil rights protections, and the
greatest impact and progress has been at the local and state level.365 “By
adding or amending definitions of sex, gender, or even sexual orientation, or
by adding a new category, usually gender identity, legislation can make it
clear to the courts that nondiscrimination laws should and do include gender
nonconforming people.” 366 In 1993, Minnesota became the first state to
enact a statute prohibiting discrimination against trans people by defining
sexual orientation to include “having or being perceived as having . . . a selfimage or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness
or femaleness.”367 Luckily, other states followed suit, and in the years that
followed, states such as California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Missouri, and Vermont began introducing non-discrimination laws for trans
people.368
States that have extended anti-discrimination protection to
transsexuals have done so in a number of ways. 369 Some states have
explicitly included gender identity as protected under anti-discrimination

361.
Id.
362.
See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(10), (11), (27) (consol. 2014); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a) (banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, and public accommodations, but gender identity is not protected); 2009
Md. Laws 540, 552–53, 558–59 (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation).
363.
See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16.
364.
See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999).
365.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15.
366.
Currah, supra note 269, at 21.
367.
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2013); see also CURRAH & MINTER, supra
note 331, at 15.
368.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15.
369.
Id. at 15–16; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7) (2014); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2014).
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statutes, 370 other states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
and include gender identity or expression within the definition of sexual
orientation,371 and a few states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex,
and include gender identity within the statutory definition of sex.372
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination provides a good example
of an ideal trans-inclusive anti-discrimination law.373 In New Jersey, “[a]ll
persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of
public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other
real property without discrimination because of . . . gender identity or
expression.” 374 Further, transgender youth are protected in school from
harassment, intimidation or bullying based on gender identity.375
States, such as Colorado, which have extended anti-discrimination
protection to trans people through an expanded statutory definition of sexual
orientation or sex is an improvement, but there is still room for
misinterpretation.376 In order to prevent any ambiguity or misinterpretation,
gender identity should be expressly placed alongside other protected
categories.377 California has recognized this distinction, as evidenced by the
recent amendment to its existing anti-discrimination law, which previously
defined gender identity within the protected class of sexual orientation.378
The law was amended in 2012, distinctly making gender identity and gender
expression their own protected classes. 379 This decision was based on
confusion that existed among employers and landlords about whether trans

370.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.c (The New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or
expression in employment, housing, public accommodation, credit and business contracts).
371.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7).
372.
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
373.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.
374.
Id. (emphasis added).
375.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14.
376.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7).
377.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2434-402(1)(a)–(b).
378.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5) (West 2012); see also Assemb. B. 887,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
379.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5); see also Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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people were protected under the law.380 The amendment removed any such
confusion and strengthened the state’s anti-discrimination law.381
Currently, sixteen states and the District of Columbia have laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression.382
The extent of protection within these laws vary, encompassing all or a few of
categories including employment, public accommodations, housing, credit,
and education.383 States should continue to strive to provide comprehensive
protections for trans people in all aspects of life.
B.

Healthcare

The trans community faces unfortunate health care discrimination by
being denied equal access to health care services. 384 Transsexuals face
discrimination and hostility from medical professionals and insurance
providers. 385 Most private insurance plans deny coverage for transitionrelated treatment, and many state Medicaid and Medicare programs exclude
such coverage as well.386
States that participate in the Medicaid program receive grants from
the federal government to assist state health care services in providing
necessary medical services to qualified state residents. 387 Although each
state sets its own qualifying guidelines, “[t]he Medicaid agency may not
arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required
service . . . to an otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the

380.
See Ari Rosenstein, California Passes AB 887:
The Gender
Nondiscrimination Act, CPEHR BLOG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.smallbizhrblog.com/
california-passes-ab-887-the-gender-nondiscrimination-act.html; see also Cal. Assemb. B.
887.
381.
Rosenstein, supra note 380; see also Cal. Assemb. B. 887.
382.
Non-Discrimination Laws That Include Gender Identity and Expression,
TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST., http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/#jurisdictions (last
updated Feb. 1, 2012); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO
LAWS THAT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, NAT’L RES. CTR. ON
LGBT
AGING
2–3
(2010),
http://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/
StateLawsThatProhibitDiscriminationAgainstTransPeople.pdf.
383.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 382, at 3–4.
384.
TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, TRANSGENDER HEALTH AND THE
LAW: IDENTIFYING AND FIGHTING HEALTH CARE DISCRIMINATION (2004), available at
http://www.thecentersd.org/pdf/health-advocacy/identifying-transgender.pdf.
385.
Id.
386.
Id.; KELLAN BAKER & ANDREW CRAY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHY
GENDER-IDENTITY NONDISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE MAKES SENSE 1–2 (2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BakerNondiscrimination
Insurance-6.pdf.
387.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
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diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”388 Additionally, private insurance
plans have even denied coverage to trans people for medical needs unrelated
to gender transition.389 For example, an insurance company might argue that
a medical concern—such as liver damage—resulted from transition related
hormone treatment.390
Many state Medicaid programs explicitly deny coverage for
transition-related treatment; however, a few state courts have struck down
such blanket exclusions. 391 States that explicitly deny coverage for trans
people justify these denials on the belief that such services are not medically
necessary, or that such treatment is cosmetic. 392 These justifications are
unfounded because mental health professionals may deem gender transition
treatment—which may include surgery, hormone therapy, or medication—to
be medically necessary for a trans person. 393 Therefore, the states that
participate in the Medicaid program that deny necessary medical services to
qualified state residents violate federal law.394
For example, in Iowa, procedures for treating gender identity
disorder are specifically excluded from Medicaid coverage.395 In Smith v.
Rasmussen,396 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this blanket denial
of transition related treatment under its Medicaid program. 397 The court
found the blanket prohibition on funding for sex reassignment surgery to be
reasonable and consistent with the Medicaid Act due to the “evolving nature
of the diagnosis and treatment of gender identity disorder and the
disagreement regarding the efficacy of sex reassignment surgery.”398
Fortunately, there are states that have struck down total trans-related
treatment exclusions from coverage. 399 In Doe v. Department of Public
Welfare,400 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the “total exclusion of
transsexual surgery from eligibility for [medical assistance payments was] . .
388.
42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2012).
389.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2; TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS
PROJECT, supra note 384.
390.
TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 384.
391.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 1–2; see also, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (“[T]otal exclusion of transsexual surgery
from eligibility for M.A. benefits . . . is void.”).
392.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2.
393.
Id. at 2, 5.
394.
See id. at 3.
395.
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b)(2) (2014).
396.
249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001).
397.
Id. at 761–62.
398.
Id. at 761; see also Medicaid Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79
Stat. 186, 343 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3201 (2012)).
399.
E.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977).
400.
257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
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. void.” 401 In reaching this decision, the court discussed transsexualism
generally and found that in certain cases, “[t]he only medical procedure
known to be successful in treating . . . transsexualism is the radical sex
conversion surgical procedure.”402 Therefore, a total exclusion of transsexual
surgery from benefits under the medical assistance program is improper, and
future determinations of the medical necessity of an applicant “must be
considered individually, on a case-by-case basis.”403
Removing exclusions for transition-related treatment is critical in
providing the trans community with equal access to health care. 404
“[C]ategorical exclusions are based on the false premise that the health care
services that transgender people need are not medically necessary.” 405 In
reality, there are unfortunate consequences for trans people who are denied
necessary health care and treatment.406 Lack of access to gender-transition
medical care is linked with health consequences that include depression,
anxiety, suicide, infections—such as HIV—and other health risks associated
with seeking treatment on the black market.407
A few other states have made progress and are taking steps in the
direction of achieving the goal of equal access to healthcare.408 For example,
in 2012, California became the first state to expressly “prohibit insurance
discrimination against transgender people.”409 The California Department of
Insurance issued guidelines and regulations that ensure equal health care
insurance coverage to the trans community. 410 Similarly, Colorado, 411
Oregon, 412 and Vermont 413 have all issued bulletins prohibiting insurance
discrimination based on gender identity or expression.414
401.
Id. at 820.
402.
Id. at 819.
403.
Id. at 820.
404.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2.
405.
Id. at 2.
406.
Id. at 2.
407.
Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class
Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People,
SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y: J. OF NSRC, Dec. 2007, at 7, 15. Access to gender transition
treatments is critical for transgender people. Before Serafima began her transition treatments
she experienced depression and attempted suicide on two occasions. See supra text
accompanying notes 191–93.
408.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
409.
Id.
410.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5(a)–(e) (West 2014).
411.
DIV. OF INS., COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, BULL. NO. B-4.49,
INSURANCE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2013).
412.
OR. INS. DIV., DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., BULL. INS 2012-1,
APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 2 (2007 LEGISLATIVE SESSION) TO GENDER IDENTITY ISSUES IN
THE TRANSACTION AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN OREGON (2012).
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Although a few states have struck down blanket exclusions that
discriminate against trans people, 415 or have issued regulations against
insurance discrimination based on gender,416 the majority of the nation has a
long way to go in providing transsexuals with equal access to the health care
services they need.417
Private and public health insurance programs should not arbitrarily
deny coverage to transsexuals for medically necessary treatment. 418 The
remaining majority of the states should model the legislative decisions of
states—such as California—by removing blanket exclusions of transitionrelated treatment and enacting regulations prohibiting insurance
discrimination against trans people.419
C.

Anti-Discrimination Laws and Protections at the Federal Level

Although progress has been slower at the federal level, there have
been some positive changes and protections in certain areas of the law that
have been extended to reach the transgender community.420 For example, in
2009 the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act
was signed into federal law, expanding federal hate crime legislation to
protect transgender people.421
Further, Title IX of the Education Amendments—which protects
people from sex discrimination in education programs—has been extended to
protect transgender students through a settlement agreement.422 However, by
far the most progress has been made in providing the trans community with
much needed protection from employment discrimination.423

413.
DIV. OF INS., VT. DEP’T OF FIN. REGULATION, BULL. NO. 174, GUIDANCE
REGARDING PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY INCLUDING
MEDICALLY NECESSARY GENDER DYSPHORIA SURGERY AND RELATED HEALTH CARE (2013).
414.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
415.
E.g., J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1978) (striking
down Medi-Cal’s blanket policy excluding coverage for transition-related treatment).
416.
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 (West 2014).
417.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
418.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5.
419.
E.g., id.
420.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).
421.
Id. § 249(a)(2).
422.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012); see also Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995, at *6 n.6 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
423.
See Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

55

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

158

NOVA LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 39

Employment—Title VII

Another major area of discrimination faced by the trans community
is in employment. 424 Trans people face discrimination in various
circumstances concerning employment.425 A trans person may not be hired,
may be fired if going through transition while employed, or may be fired if
his or her transgender status is discovered.426
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”427 Originally, Title VII was interpreted to protect employees from
sex discrimination and did not protect employment discrimination against
trans employees. 428 However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 429 the
“Supreme Court [of the United States] concluded that gender stereotyping is
sex discrimination under Title VII.”430 The Court held that, under Title VII,
an employer may not discriminate against employees based on gender
stereotypes, stating “we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group.”431
The Price Waterhouse decision:
[U]nlock[s] the shackles that tether personality, mannerisms,
preferences, and tastes to a particular biological container. After
Price Waterhouse, because a body is branded female does not
mean that she performs as the charm school graduate, “walk[s] . . .
femininely, talk[s] . . . femininely, dress[es] . . . femininely,” . . .
[and] a body, branded male need not be aggressive or macho.432

Although Price Waterhouse did not involve a trans individual, this
case illustrates the catch 22 experienced by trans people in the workplace.433
A trans person who is just trying to be his or her self faces discrimination
424.
Kylar W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination
Protections for Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93, 93 (Paisley Currah et al.
eds., 2006).
425.
Id.
426.
Id.
427.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
428.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
429.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
430.
Amy D. Ronner, Let’s Get the “Trans” and “Sex” Out of It and Free Us
All, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 859, 866 (2013); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–
51.
431.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
432.
Ronner, supra note 430, at 874 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
235).
433.
Id. at 890; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 251.
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both pre-transition, for failing to conform to gender stereotypes, and posttransition for being a fraud.434
Fortunately, after Price Waterhouse, more cases continued to
favorably interpret Title VII and provide protection for trans people in the
workplace.435 In a recent ruling, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)—a federal agency authorized to enforce federal laws
that prohibit workplace discrimination—held that transgender people are
protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.436 Based on the
rulings in federal court cases involving the interpretation of Title VII and
transgender discrimination, the EEOC “conclude[d] that intentional
discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is
transgender is, by definition, discrimination based on . . . sex, and such
discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”437
Although these precedential rulings interpreting Title VII to provide
protection for transgender people in the workplace are favorable, ultimately
specific federal legislation embodying protection for transgender people is
the most impactful. 438 Luckily, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(“ENDA”), which was introduced in Congress in June of 2009, was finally
passed by the Senate on November 7, 2013. 439 This “major civil rights
legislation . . . protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and for the first time ever,
transgender Americans from discrimination in the workplace.”440
ENDA extends federal employment discrimination protection
currently provided under Title VII to sexual orientation and gender
identity.441 The passage of this Act is a huge achievement and provides trans
people equal rights and protection against discrimination in the workplace.442

434.
435.
436.

See Ronner, supra note 430 at 890–92.
E.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572–75 (6th Cir. 2004).
Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20,

2012).
437.
Id.; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that Title VII prohibits gender stereotyping); Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75 (holding that
discrimination based on sex encompasses gender discrimination); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the term sex includes both the biological
differences between males and females as well as gender).
438.
See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–74; Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11; Lauren
Fox, Senate Passes ENDA in Bipartisan Vote, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 7, 2013,
3:05
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/07/senate-passes-enda-inbipartisan-vote.
439.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013); see also Fox, supra note 438.
440.
Fox, supra note 438.
441.
S. 815 § 4(a)(1).
442.
See id.; Fox, supra note 438.
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MARRIAGE

The recognition or authorization of a trans person’s marriage
depends on three primary factors: (1) how that state defines the legal sex of
trans individuals; (2) what the sex of the trans person’s partner is; and (3)
what the state’s law is on same-sex marriage. 443 The marriage of a trans
person is further affected by the individual’s status as either post-transition or
pre-transition.444
In the minority of states that have legalized same-sex marriage, a
trans individual can marry—regardless of that state’s determination of his or
her legal sex—because both same-sex and opposite-sex couples are afforded
the right to marry. 445 Whether a trans person is pre-transition or posttransition prior to entering into the marriage would have no effect, since the
legal sex of the individual is not a determining factor in the legality of the
marriage. 446 Further, a marriage would not be invalidated if a trans
individual went through a transition and had a legal sex change after the
marriage.447 In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize samesex marriage, effectively creating marriage equality for all couples,
irrespective of sex.448 To date, same-sex marriage is legal in thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia. 449 While these states have recognized the
importance of marriage equality for all-sex couples, the minority of the
United States continues to prohibit same-sex marriage.450
The trans community faces great obstacles in the ability to marry in
states that prohibit same-sex marriage.451 A trans person living in a state that
443.
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder, Relationship Recognition and Protections,
in TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 36, 36 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
444.
Id.
445.
See id. at 37–38; Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/2013/05/28/us/same-sex-marriage-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 24,
2015).
446.
Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 37–38.
447.
Id.
448.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948, 961 (Mass.
2003); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445.
449.
Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445. Same-sex marriage is
legal in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id.
450.
See id.
451.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL
23097095, at *1, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

58

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

IDENTITY

161

prohibits same-sex marriage may face difficulty prior to entering into a
marriage or, alternatively, his or her spouse or a third party may challenge
the validity of an existing marriage.452 Additionally, Congress’ enactment of
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) creates issues for same-sex couples
who are legally married.453
A.

DOMA’s Effect at the State Level

Due to Congress’ enactment of DOMA, each state, at its option, can
choose to reject a legalized same-sex marriage from another state.454 DOMA
states: “No [s]tate . . . of the United States . . . shall be required to give effect
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other [s]tate . . .
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other [s]tate . . . .”455 Essentially, section 2
of DOMA grants the states an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
by allowing a state to not recognize the legal same-sex marriage granted to a
couple in another state.456
To illustrate the impact of section 2, attorneys for the National
Center for Lesbian Rights (“NCLR”), an advocacy organization for the
LGBT community, has noted that “within the space of a day’s travel across
state lines, the same two individuals may be legally married in one state,
demoted to domestic partners in another, and treated as complete legal
strangers in a third.”457
Section 2 of DOMA will not affect a post-transition marriage
between two individuals if they were determined to be opposite-sex spouses
at the time of the marriage.458 DOMA only relates to interstate recognition
of marriages between same-sex couples. 459 Thus, once again, the state’s
determination of a trans person’s legal sex for the purpose of marriage comes
into effect in determining whether the couple is a same-sex or opposite-sex
452.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121–22, 136; In re Application for
a Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, *9.
453.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), declared unconstitutional by United States v.
Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
454.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
455.
Id.
456.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
457.
Shannon Minter & Christopher Stoll, Legal Developments in Marriage
Law for Same-Sex Couples, GEN. PRAC. SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV., Jan.Feb. 2010, at 30, 31–
32; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2.
458.
See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2; Monnin-Browder, supra note
443, at 39–40.
459.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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couple.460 If determined to be a same-sex couple, section 2 of DOMA will
affect them by giving other states the power not to recognize the individuals
as a legally married same-sex couple. 461 Essentially, states that prohibit
same-sex marriage do not have to give full faith and credit to a legally
married same-sex couple from another state.462
B.

DOMA’s Effect at the Federal Level

Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage for federal purposes as: “[A]
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.”463 This definition of marriage prevents legal same-sex marriages from
being recognized at a federal level, irrespective of the validity of that
marriage at the state level.464
In United States v. Windsor, 465 the Supreme Court was presented
with the question of “[w]hether [s]ection 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons
of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their [s]tate.”466 In
this case, Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer had a legally recognized marriage in
the state of New York.467 Upon Spyer’s death, Windsor as sole beneficiary
of Spyer’s estate was required to pay $365,053 in federal estate tax because
“their marriage was not respected by the federal government.”468
The Supreme Court found Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional “as
a deprivation of the [equal] liberty of . . . person[s] [that is] protected by the
Fifth Amendment.”469 Under Section 3 of DOMA, the federal government
was infringing on the authority of states to define and regulate marriage

460.
Monnin-Browder supra note 443, at 36.
461.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
462.
Id.
463.
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7, declared
unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
464.
See id.
465.
No. 12-307, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 26, 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2884 (2013).
466.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307,
slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013), 2013 WL 3991414; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 §
3.
467.
Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 2–3.
468.
Marriage at the Supreme Court in 2013, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/supreme-court (last visited Aug. 25, 2015);
see also Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 3.
469.
Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 25; see also Defense of Marriage Act of
1996 § 3.
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within their laws. 470 The federal government’s restrictions of benefits to
same-sex couples was “directed to a class of persons that the laws of New
York, and . . . [eleven] other [s]tates, have sought to protect.” 471 This
decision had the effect of providing married same-sex couples—living in
states where same-sex marriage was legal—over 1100 federal benefits that
were previously denied to them through DOMA.472
In a similar victory, California’s Proposition 8, which amended the
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, 473 was ruled
unconstitutional by a district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.474 The Supreme Court ruled that the proponents of Proposition 8 did
not have standing to appeal the decision and sent the case back to the appeals
court with instructions to dismiss the appeal.475 Although the Supreme Court
allowed the lower court ruling that invalidated Proposition 8 to stand, its
ruling was narrow, having the effect of striking down California’s
Proposition 8, but dodging the substantive issues of the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage.476
Therefore, the Supreme Court has yet to reach a substantive
conclusion about the constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex
marriage.477 Instead of sending the case back to the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court should have used this appeal as an opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage
prohibitions directly conflict with the legal conclusions and principles set
forth in Loving v. Virginia.478 The Supreme Court struck down the Virginia
law that prohibited marriages between people of different racial classes.479
The Court held the law unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stating that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State.”480 This decision was monumental for the civil rights
470.
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3; see also Windsor, No 12-307, slip
op. at 18–19.
471.
Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 16.
472.
Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 23, 25; Marriage at the Supreme Court in
2013, supra note 468; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
473.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
474.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding Proposition
8 unconstitutional).
475.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
476.
See id.
477.
See id.
478.
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Julian Bond, Why Prop 8 Must Fall: Civil Rights,
USA TODAY (June 10, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
forum/2011-06-10-In-wake-of-Loving-decision-Prop-8-cannot-stand_n.htm.
479.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12.
480.
Id. at 12.
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movement, and the Lovings’ struggle to achieve marriage equality in 1967, is
deeply connected to the fight for civil rights experienced by same-sex
couples today.481 Just like the Supreme Court ruled in Loving, that “[t]he
freedom to marry. . . . a person of another race resides with the individual,”
so too should the Court conclude today, that the freedom to marry a person
of the same-sex resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the
State.482
As Mildred Loving reflected on the impact of her case, she stated:
I am proud that Richard’s and my name is on a court case
that can help reinforce the love, the commitment, the fairness, and
the family that so many people, black or white, young or old, gay
or straight seek in life. I support the freedom to marry for all.
....
That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.483

C.

States That Ban Same-Sex Marriage

In states that limit the right to marry to heterosexual couples, the
states’ identification of a trans individual’s legal sex is the key-determining
factor in a trans’ ability to marry. 484 That determination leads into the
question of whether the state perceives the proposed marriage to be between
same-sex or different-sex individuals. 485 As discussed above, in certain
states a trans person can legally change his or her sex.486 Accordingly, what
may have been perceived as a same-sex couple pre-transition, would be an
opposite-sex couple post-transition and legal sex change. 487 Nevertheless,
there are states that do not recognize a trans individual’s changed sex for the
purposes of marriage.488
As discussed above, states vary in their determination of legal sex
and the ability of trans people to change their legal sex to reflect their gender
identity.489 States are further divided on their recognition of a trans person’s
legal sex specifically for the purposes of marriage.490
481.
Id.; Bond, supra note 478.
482.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
483.
Bond, supra note 478.
484.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
485.
Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40.
486.
See supra Part V.A–D.
487.
See Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40.
488.
See, e.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
489.
See supra text accompanying notes 262–68.
490.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–34.
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There are two opposing standards utilized by courts in determining
the validity of post-transition marriages: (1) the state finds sex as immutable
and fixed at birth, refusing to acknowledge sex-reassignment surgery,
psychological factors of gender identity, or birth certificate amendments for
the purpose of marriage;491 or (2) the state acknowledges a change to a birth
certificate and recognizes that legal sex change for the purpose of
marriage.492
For the purpose of marriage,
[d]ifferent jurisdictions . . . can and have come to different
conclusions about how to determine legal sex: most take the
essentialist approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth, while
a small minority recognizes the complexities of sex and looks to a
person’s gender identity as the primary determinant of legal sex.493

1.

Biological Approach—Sex Is Immutable and Fixed at Birth

The issue of legal sex for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a
transsexual marriage was first analyzed in Corbett v. Corbett, 494 a 1970
British case.495 The issue in this case was a determination of the true sex of
April Ashley, a post-operative MTF transsexual, for the purpose of
concluding whether the marriage she entered into with Arthur Corbett was
valid.496 In assessing the legal sex of April, the court analyzed chromosomal
factors, gonadal factors, genital factors, and psychological factors. 497
However, the court failed to discuss the psychological factors for assessing
April’s legal sex, and stated that the essential criteria must be biological.498
The court further stated that the “biological sexual constitution of an
individual is fixed at birth—at the latest—and cannot be changed . . . by
medical or surgical means.” 499 Therefore, the court concluded that the
marriage between April and Arthur was void, since April “is not a woman
for the purposes of marriage.”500 The narrow biological test and principles
set forth in Corbett have been followed by courts that have concluded that

491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
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See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
E.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
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sex is immutable, unchanged by psychological identity, SRS, or amended
birth certificates.501
Courts that have followed the conclusions of Corbett, disregarding
the critical psychological and social factors in determining a person’s sex,
have both denied marriage licenses and invalidated existing marriages.502 As
previously mentioned, the majority of the states allow sex designation
amendments to an individual’s birth certificate upon proof of the
transsexual’s completed SRS. 503 Surprisingly, even an amended birth
certificate, reflecting the transsexual’s true, self-identified sex, does not
guarantee the security of a transsexual’s marriage, because courts have
refused to recognize a transsexual’s post-transition sex for the purposes of
marriage, notwithstanding the existence of an amended birth certificate.504
In In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 505 an Ohio
appellate court denied a marriage license to a post-operative FTM
transsexual with a female. 506 Nash, the FTM transsexual, successfully
amended his out-of-state birth certificate to reflect a change in sex from
female to male after undergoing SRS.507 However, the Ohio court refused to
give full faith and credit to his amended birth certificate, and denied the
marriage license, stating that Ohio “has a clear public policy that authorizes
and recognizes marriages only between members of the opposite sex.” 508
The court would not interpret male in the state’s marriage statute, to include
a FTM post-operative transsexual.509
Moreover, the complex issues and varied interpretations of legal sex
for the purpose of marriage has had the effect of erasing marriages through
court invalidation, and for all legal purposes, it is as if the marriage never
existed.510 The invalidation of a marriage can have unfortunate consequences
on the right to claim an inheritance when a spouse dies intestate.511 The
Supreme Court of Kansas invalidated the marriage of J’Noel, a posttransition MTF transsexual, to a male, after the husband had died intestate.512
501.
See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 227, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999);
Corbett, P. 83 at 106.
502.
See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; Corbett, P.83 at 106.
503.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014).
504.
E.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149,
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, 4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
505.
Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003).
506.
Id. at *9.
507.
Id. at *1.
508.
Id. at *5.
509.
Id. at *6.
510.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 39–40.
511.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 123 (Kan. 2002).
512.
Id. at 123, 137.
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After his father died, the son challenged the validity of the marriage between
his father and J’Noel because J’Noel was born a man.513
Like in In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, the
Supreme Court of Kansas refused to give full faith and credit to J’Noel’s
amended Wisconsin birth certificate for the purpose of upholding the
marriage to her husband.514 However, in J’Noel’s case, it actually had the
effect of invalidating the marriage between J’Noel and her deceased
husband.515
The court concluded that J’Noel was not a woman within the
meaning of Kansas’s marriage statute, and therefore affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that their marriage was void.516 Consequently, the marriage
between J’Noel and her deceased husband was erased; the son was named
the sole heir, and inherited everything.517
Like the MTF transsexual widow in In re Estate of Gardiner,518 an
MTF transsexual widow in Texas also became a legal stranger to her
deceased husband through court invalidation of her marriage.519 In Littleton
v. Prange,520 the court granted a motion for summary judgment, holding that
Christie, an MTF post-transition transsexual, was legally a male and
therefore the marriage between Christie and another male was invalid. 521
Due to the court invalidating the marriage, Christie was unable to bring a
claim under the wrongful death and survival statute because she was no
longer considered the surviving spouse.522 The court held that Christie is a
male even though she had successfully amended the name and sex on her
birth certificate.523 “The trial court . . . granted the petition to amend the
birth certificate” due to an affidavit presented by an “expert stating that
Christie is a female.”524 As the dissent in the case correctly questioned:
How then can the majority conclude that Christie is a male? If
Christie’s evidence that she was female was satisfactory enough
for the trial court to issue an order to amend her original birth
certificate to change both her name and her gender, why is it not
513.
514.

Id. at 123.
Id.; In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095,

515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136–37.
Id.
Id. at 123, 137.
42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id. at 225, 230–31.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.

at *9.
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satisfactory enough to raise a genuine question of material fact on
a motion for summary judgment?525

2.

Biological and Psychological Approach

There is another line of cases that have moved away from the rigid
biological test set forth in Corbett, applying an approach to defining legal sex
for the purpose of marriage that incorporates the psychological, emotional,
and social sense of an individual’s gender identity.526 These courts recognize
the ability to change one’s sex and recognize that change of sex in upholding
post-transition marriages.527
In M.T., the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized the role that
gender identity plays in determining sex.528 The court upheld the marriage of
a post-operative MTF transsexual by ruling that she is legally female.529 In
this case, the court rejects the notion that “sex is somehow irrevocably cast at
the moment of birth” and found that the determination involves an analysis
of several criteria. 530 Notably, the court found that “a person’s sex or
sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, . . . one’s self image, the deep
psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character.”531
Critical in the court’s determination was finding that there had been
a harmonization between the trans-person’s gender identity and physiology
through SRS. 532 The court stated that she “has become physically and
psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with
her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy. Consequently,
plaintiff should be considered a member of the female sex for marital
purposes.”533
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota recognized the many components in determining an
individual’s sex and upheld a post-transition marriage. 534 Prior to
525.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
526.
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1976). But see
Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 106 (Eng.).
527.
E.g., M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
528.
Id. at 209.
529.
See id. at 211.
530.
Id. at 209.
531.
Id.
532.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
533.
Id. Similarly, a trial court in California upheld a post-transition marriage,
recognizing the transsexual as their post-operative sex. Flynn, supra note 262, at 36. The
California court based its ruling on a California statute which permits an individual to receive
a new birth certificate after having undergone SRS to reflect his or her new sex. Id.
534.
See Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local #638 Health,
Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1036 (D. Minn. 2012).
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Minnesota’s legalization of same-sex marriage in August 2013, the sex of an
individual—for purposes of marriage—was based on his or her sex at the
time of marriage, not birth. 535 Minnesota also permits birth certificate
amendments for people who have undergone SRS536 and acknowledges that
“[t]here is no basis to conclude that Minnesota recognizes Plaintiff as female
for some purposes—birth records and driver’s licenses, but not for others—
marriage certificates.”537
The courts in New Jersey, California, and Minnesota recognize that
sex can no longer be defined narrowly and “gender identity plays a central
role in determining sex.” 538 While these decisions are favorable, and
certainly an improvement from the rigid approach taken in Corbett, Nash,
and Gardiner, the decisions were very focused on what the New Jersey court
considered harmony between the transsexual’s gender and genitalia.539 The
approach to defining sex for the purposes of marriage in states that prohibit
same-sex marriage has certainly expanded, but is still too focused on sexual
anatomy and biology as definitive of a person’s gender.540
This issue has been addressed in jurisdictions outside of the United
States, and the approach taken by an Australian court is particularly
noteworthy.541 In In re Kevin, (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), 542 a
FTM transsexual and his wife sought a declaration as to the validity of their
marriage. 543 Prior to their marriage, Kevin, a FTM transsexual, had
undergone hormone treatments, a total hysterectomy and mastectomy, but
did not undergo a phalloplasty and still had a vagina.544 The key difference
in this case from the New Jersey, California, and Minnesota cases, is that
Kevin had not undergone complete sex-reassignment surgery, and therefore,
in the words of the New Jersey court, there was not complete harmony
between gender and genitals. 545 However, the Australian court was not
535.
Id. at 1032.
536.
See MINN. STAT. § 144.218(4) (2013).
537.
Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
538.
Id. at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36.
539.
Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note
262, at 35–36; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL
23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] p.83 at 104 (Eng.).
540.
See M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
541.
See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA
1074 ¶ 1 (Austl.).
542.
[2001] FamCA 1074 (Austl.).
543.
Id. ¶ 1.
544.
See id. ¶ 30.
545.
Id. ¶¶ 30, 198; Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local
#638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (D. Minn. 2012);
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; see also Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36.
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concerned with finding this harmony, and concluded that Kevin was legally
male for the purposes of marriage.546 The court’s determination was based
on expert testimony by psychiatrists who stated that Kevin’s “brain sex or
mental sex is male.”547 The court expressly rejected the approach taken in
Corbett, finding that sex cannot be determined based on any single factor
“such as chromosomes or genital sex,” and stated that to determine a
person’s sex for the purpose of marriage:
[T]he relevant matters include . . . the person’s biological and
physical characteristics at birth . . . the person’s life experiences,
including the sex in which he or she is brought up and the person’s
attitude to it; the person’s self-perception as a man or woman; the
extent to which the person has functioned in society as a man or a
woman; any hormonal, surgical or other medical sex reassignment
treatments the person has undergone . . . and the person’s
biological, psychological and physical characteristics at the time of
the marriage, including—if they can be identified—any biological
features of the person’s brain that are associated with a particular
sex.548

D.

Issues That Arise During Divorce

Even if a transsexual has successfully entered into a valid marriage
recognized as a legal opposite sex marriage, issues may still arise when one
of the spouses file for divorce.549 What should generally be a straightforward
divorce proceeding can turn into a complex judicial determination of the
transsexual’s legal sex and potential invalidation of the marriage.550 This is
the battle that Michael Kantaras—an FTM transsexual—faced when he filed
a petition for dissolution of marriage, and his wife counter petitioned
alleging that their marriage was void because Michael is female and Florida
prohibits same-sex marriage.551 The court agreed, holding that Michael is

546.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶
330; see also M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
547.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶
244; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35.
548.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶¶
328–330; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104 (Eng.).
549.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
550.
E.g., id. at 156–57.
551.
Id. at 156.
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female and invalidated the marriage. 552 Due to the invalidation of their
marriage, Michael faced an ongoing battle of establishing parental rights.553
More recently, an Arizona judge denied a divorce for Thomas
Beatie—an FTM transsexual—based on the conclusion that he was a female
at the time he married a woman, and due to Arizona’s prohibition on samesex marriage, the marriage was invalid. 554 Beatie is referred to as the
Pregnant Man because he retained female reproductive organs and gave
birth to three children during his marriage.555 He plans to appeal the divorce
denial because “he wants the three children to whom he gave birth to know
their parents’ marriage was legitimate” fearing that his children will “‘see
that [the] court said that’s not your daddy.’”556
It is clear that the sex of an individual is based on many components,
which cannot be determined by biology alone.557 It seems inappropriate, and
rather counter-intuitive, to narrowly define sex of a person as fixed at the
time of his or her birth, when the individual personally and psychologically
identifies differently, has undergone SRS or transition-related treatments, or
even has had his or her certificate changed to reflect his or her new sex.558
Moreover, states that prohibit same-sex marriage, but refuse to acknowledge
the sex change of a transsexual, ultimately permit precisely what the samesex marriage ban was enacted to prevent.559
When the ban on same-sex marriage meets the insistence that legal
sex may not be changed, the result is as fitting as it is ironic: [I]n
these jurisdictions, transgender gay and lesbian couples can . . .
marry. Assume a transsexual woman lives in a state where birth
anatomy—here, a penis—forever defines legal sex. As a legal
male, she is free to marry another woman, even though she, her
partner, and society at large view them as lesbian.560
552.
Id. at 161.
553.
See id.
554.
Associated Press, Arizona Judge Rejects Divorce for Transgender
Pregnant Hawaii Man, Saying He Has No Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/judge-rejectsdivorce-transgender-pregnant-man-article-1.1302675.
555.
Id.; Jacques Billeaud, Transgender Man Plans to Keep Seeking Divorce,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 2013, at A8.
556.
Billeaud, supra note 555.
557.
See supra Part V.
558.
See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
559.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 34.
560.
Id. For example, Serafima is a MTF transsexual who is in a relationship
with another woman and considers herself a lesbian. See supra Part V. The jurisdiction that
prohibits same-sex marriage and follows the strict biological approach to defining sex for the
purposes of marriage would permit them to marry, because Serafima was born a male—even
though in reality they are a same-sex couple. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 34; supra Part V.
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The complex issues of determining the validity of a post-transition
marriage would be greatly simplified through same-sex marriage equality by
removing any and all sex pre-qualifications for couples that want to marry.561
However, the states that still prohibit same-sex marriage should follow the
approach taken by the Family Court of Australia, which weighed more
heavily psychological and personal perceptions of an individual’s gender
identity in the determination of legal sex for the purposes of marriage.562
X.

THE RIGHT TO RAISE CHILDREN/PARENTAL RIGHTS

As seen thus far, the struggles faced by the trans community concern
some of the most intimate aspects of life—the right to marry, the right to be
recognized for all legal purposes as the gender one identifies with, the right
to equal health care, and matters concerning child custody and parental
rights.563
Legal ties between a parent and child can be established biologically,
through adoption, or through marriage. 564 Unfortunately, none of these
options for establishing and securing legal ties between a parent and child
seem to hold true when a parent is transgender. 565 The guiding standard
governing child custody disputes is always the best interest of the child.566
Variation exists among the states in the interpretation of the best interest of
the child standard, and judges have broad discretion in weighing factors in
child custody determinations.567
Unfortunately, this standard has been unfairly applied against
transgender parents. 568 Gender identity should not be a factor in custody
determinations or adoption placements, absent special circumstances
indicating a likely negative impact on the child’s best interests. 569
Unfortunately, many courts have denied child custody to a parent based on a
finding that the parent’s gender identity, by itself, would not be in the best
561.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 40.
562.
See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] FamCA
1074 ¶¶ 43–46 (Austl.); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445.
563.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 2, 12–13, 57, 67–68.
564.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 41–42.
565.
Id. at 42.
566.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2014).
567.
Kari J. Carter, Note, The Best Interest Test and Child Custody: Why
Transgender Should Not Be a Factor in Custody Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.–
MED. 209, 209–10 (2006).
568.
See, e.g., Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59–60 (Nev. 1986).
569.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004); Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 294 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
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interest of the child. 570 Some extreme cases have even gone as far as
terminating a trans person’s parental rights.571
In Daly v. Daly, 572 the Supreme Court of Nevada terminated the
parental rights of Suzanne—formerly known as Tim—the child’s biological
father who underwent SRS.573 The court found that termination of parental
rights were in the child’s best interest due to a “risk of serious physical,
mental, or emotional injury to the child” if she were forced to maintain
visitation with Suzanne.574 The court even went as far to state that “[i]t was
strictly Tim Daly’s choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a
female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.”575
In addition to the extreme cases terminating parental rights of a trans
parent, there have been numerous decisions restricting or denying child
custody and visitation rights to a transgender parent.576 For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals in J.L.S. v. D.K.S.577 reversed the order of joint
custody by the trial court because the father underwent sex-reassignment
surgery. 578 The court determined “that immediate contact between the
children and father would impair the boys’ emotional development.”579
A circuit court in Florida correctly recognized that transgender status
should not be a factor in custody determinations. 580 In Kantaras v.
Kantaras 581 , Michael Kantaras, a FTM transsexual, was married to Linda
Forsythe. 582 Michael adopted Linda’s son from a previous marriage, and
during their marriage Linda gave birth to a daughter through artificial
insemination.583 After nine years of marriage to Linda, Michael filed for a
570.
See, e.g., J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
571.
E.g., Daly, 715 P.2d at 60.
572.
715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
573.
Id. at 57, 60.
574.
Id. at 57–58.
575.
Id. at 59.
576.
See J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Cisek v.
Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
577.
943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
578.
Id. at 774–75.
579.
Id. at 772. Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington restricted the
parental rights of a transgender father and granted residential placement with the mother,
claiming to base this decision “on the children’s need for ‘environmental and parental
stability.’” In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). The court
did not follow the recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem, who concluded that “Robbie
was the more nurturing and engaged parent, and . . . recommended that the court designate
Robbie as the primary residential parent.” Id. at 68.
580.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 808 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
581.
No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
582.
Id. at 2, 4, 11.
583.
Id. at 15, 18–19.
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divorce and sought custody of both children.584 In their custody battle, Linda
argued that Michael had no parental rights over the children because he was
a female.585 She claimed that the adoption of her son was void because it
was done when Florida prohibited gay adoption, and that Michael was not
the biological or legal father of her daughter.586
Surprisingly, a Florida circuit court determined that the marriage was
valid and concluded that it would be in the children’s best interest to remain
in the parental custody of their transgender father.587 The approach taken by
this court, in determining the custody of the children, is particularly
noteworthy because Michael’s transgender status had no impact on the
court’s application of the best interest of the child standard. 588 A
psychologist, who testified about the qualities of a good parent, stated that
there are no concerns about awarding custody to a trans parent as long as he
is a good parent.589 The circuit court’s holding relied heavily on the finding
that “[w]ith respect to the children, being a transsexual does not prevent him
from being a good parent.”590
However, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held the
marriage between Michael and Linda as a same-sex marriage, and thus void
ab initio.591 The court’s decision did not reverse the custody determination
of the trial court and instead left that issue for review on remand.592 This
decision unfortunately meant that Michael faced continued litigation in the
fight to protect the parental rights over his children.593 Luckily, the wellknown television celebrity, Dr. Phil, heard about this ongoing case, invited
Michael and Linda on his show, and successfully encouraged them to resolve
the dispute in mediation.594 After two days of mediation, Michael’s battle
was finally over when it was settled that he would retain all of his parental
rights over his two children.595
As demonstrated in In re Marriage of Simmons, 596 judicial
invalidation of marriage can also have devastating effects on the parental
584.
Id. at 2–3, 102, 615.
585.
See id. at 6.
586.
Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 4–5, 8.
587.
Id. at 52, 799, 808.
588.
Id. at 52, 799.
589.
Id. at 294.
590.
Id. at 52.
591.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
592.
Id.
593.
See id.
594.
Case Summary & History, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://
www.nclrights.org/cases-and-policy/cases-and-advocacy/kantaras-v-kantaras/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2015).
595.
Id.
596.
825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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rights of a trans person.597 The marriage of Sterling, a transsexual male, to
his wife Jennifer, was declared invalid as a same-sex marriage and the court
declared sole custody of the child to the wife. 598 During their marriage,
Jennifer underwent artificial insemination, and pursuant to the Parentage Act,
the two of them and their physician signed a contract stating that Sterling is
the natural father of the child born from this procedure. 599 However, the
court awarded custody to Jennifer, finding that Sterling was not biologically
tied to the child and “lacked parental rights or standing to seek custody.”600
In order for the artificial insemination agreement they signed to be
valid, Sterling would have to be a husband and Jennifer, a wife.601 However,
due to the invalidity of their marriage, they were not husband and wife at the
time the agreement was signed, and the court further concluded that the
Parentage Act does not “include[] transsexual males who have signed
artificial insemination agreements as husbands in an invalid same-sex
marriage.”602
The fact that someone is transgender should not affect his or her
parental rights and should not be a factor in the courts application of the best
interest of the child standard.603 Although courts may deny the fact that a
parent’s transgender status had a negative impact on their decision restricting
or terminating parental rights,604 “reading between the lines it is easy for one
to discern a bias against the transgender person and his or her gender
identity.”605 Courts should follow the approach used by the Kantaras court
in determining the best interest of the child in child custody disputes.606 The
focus should be solely on parenting ability, excluding gender identity in that
determination.607 Being a transsexual does not prevent someone from being
a good parent; bias, animus, or a lack of understanding should not restrict or
prevent a person from the right to raise children.608

597.
See id. at 312.
598.
Id. at 307, 311, 315.
599.
Id. at 307.
600.
Id.
601.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311.
602.
Id.
603.
See In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
(Kulik, J., dissenting).
604.
See id. at 67.
605.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68.
606.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
607.
Contra In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 312–13.
608.
See HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

73

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

176

NOVA LAW REVIEW

XI.

[Vol. 39

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated, the American “legal system insists upon a
male/female dichotomy.”609 Further, there are social expectations associated
with what it means to be male and female, and those who fall outside of the
cultural norm for femininity and masculinity are misunderstood, harassed,
discriminated against, and even physically abused. 610 For these reasons,
there is a compelling need for legislative changes and specific legal
protections for the trans community.611 The law should not categorize people
based on his or her chromosomal make-up or attempt to fit an individual into
a narrow category in which he or she may not belong. As shown, the
insistence on legally defining an individual as either male or female creates
difficulties for transsexuals at all stages of his or her life. 612 This binary
classification system has the effect of diminishing the trans person’s
autonomy by refusing to acknowledge and respect him or her for who he or
she is.613 Everyone deserves to be respected and acknowledged for exactly
who they are, an individual, not as a sex. Instead of determining the rights
and protections given to American citizens based on their classification of
either male or female, the law should treat everyone equally—whether a
person is male, female, transgender, intersex, homosexual, bisexual,
pansexual, and so on—we are all individuals, entitled to the same rights,
protections, and respect in society as well as in law.

609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 289.
See GRANT ET. AL., supra note 20, at 3.
See id.
See id. at 3–8.
See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 935.
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FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: INTRODUCTION

One of the most basic tenets of federal judicial law is that a federal
court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case.1 Subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by the U.S. Constitution or
federal statutes.2 These sources provide two primary bases of subject matter

1.
See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (holding that “when
a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
complaint in its entirety”).
2.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.

Id.; see also infra notes 3–6.
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jurisdiction: Federal question jurisdiction 3 and diversity jurisdiction. 4
First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”5 Alternatively, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over certain cases, based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332.6
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, some diversity cases originate
in the federal district court, but others are removed by defendants from state to
federal court pursuant to § 1441.7 Regardless of their origin, in order to rely
on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the parties must demonstrate that
they meet the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction found in § 1332,
including the minimum amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.8
Section 1332 provides specific jurisdictional requirements based upon the
identity of the parties and whether a case is filed as a class action.9
Although the diversity jurisdiction requirements appear to be
straightforward—at least as they are presented in the statute—their application
has proved to be more complex over time.10 An abundance of case law has
developed regarding how the requirements for diversity jurisdiction should be
interpreted; this Guide focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
interprets them today.11 Specifically, Part II sets out the statutory foundations
of diversity jurisdiction.12 Part III addresses Eleventh Circuit and Supreme
Court of the United States precedents regarding § 1332’s
amount-in-controversy requirement, while Part IV analyzes the statute’s

3.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
4.
Id. § 1332. Title 28, Section 1367 of United States Code provides that the
federal courts, in some circumstances, may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
that are part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the courts have primary
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 1367; see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“Once the court determines it has original jurisdiction over the
civil action, it can turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims in the action.”).
5.
28 U.S.C. § 1331. For example, federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334—bankruptcy proceedings, 28
U.S.C. § 1335—interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1337—commerce and antitrust regulations, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338—patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1340—internal revenue and customs
duties, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343—civil rights and elective franchise. Id. §§ 1334, 1335, 1337,
1338, 1340, 1343.
6.
Id. § 1332.
Id.; §§ 1332, 1441(a)–(h).
7.
8.
Id. § 1332(a).
9.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)–(d)(4).
See id. § 1332(a)–(d)(4); infra Parts II–VI.
10.
11.
See infra Parts II–VI.
12.
See infra Parts II.
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requirements for diversity of citizenship. 13 Section 1332’s specific
requirements for diversity jurisdiction in the context of class actions are set
forth in Part V.14 Finally, Part VI presents some specific legal rules that come
up in appellate litigation of diversity issues.15
II.

STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND
GENERAL RULES OF APPLICATION

The starting point for federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction is § 1332.16
In subsection (a), that statute provides the basic requirements for diversity
jurisdiction:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, 17 exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between—
(1) citizens of different [s]tates;
(2) citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,
except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction
under this subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the
same [s]tate;
(3) citizens of different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.18

Subsection (d) sets out specific diversity jurisdiction requirements for
class action lawsuits, which are different from those in other diversity cases.19
More generally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”), provides the following requirement for pleading jurisdiction in
13.
See infra Parts III–IV.
14.
See infra Parts V.
15.
See infra Parts VI.
16.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
17.
Id. The amount in the amount-in-controversy requirement has increased
numerous times since the nineteenth century, and has been set at more than $75,000 since 1996.
See id. § 1332(a).
18.
Id. § 1332(a)(1)–(4).
19.
See id. § 1332(d).
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cases filed originally in federal court: “A pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support.”20 Applying this rule, when a plaintiff
files suit in federal court based on diversity, he or she must allege facts that
demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.21 If a
plaintiff’s inadequate jurisdictional allegations remain uncured, the district
court is required to dismiss the case without addressing its merits. 22
Dismissal is required because “once a federal court determines that it is
without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”23
Sometimes a diversity case is in federal court because a defendant has
petitioned for its removal from state court.24 The statutory basis for removal
of a civil action from a state court to a federal court is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a [s]tate court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.25

The burden is on the defendant to adequately plead diversity in a
removal case. 26 A defendant seeking to remove an action from state to
federal court must file a notice of removal in the district court that “contain[s]
a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of
all process, pleadings, and orders” served upon the defendant in the state court
action. 27 If the defendant fails to demonstrate that the § 1332 diversity
requirements have been met in a removed case, the district court will remand
the case back to the state court.28

20.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added).
21.
28 U.S.C. § 1332; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co.,
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013).
22.
Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268–69; see also Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d
1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001).
23.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
24.
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
25.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (“A civil case filed in state
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought
originally in federal court.”).
26.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
27.
Id.
28.
See id. § 1332; Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
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Even if the parties do not dispute a court’s subject matter jurisdiction
based upon diversity, federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”29 The parties
may not agree to waive subject matter jurisdiction. 30 As a result, the
following legal issues may come up either by way of arguments raised by one
or more of the parties, or because the federal court identifies a potential
problem with diversity jurisdiction.31
III.

DETERMINING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

In civil actions—aside from class actions—there are two basic
requirements for diversity jurisdiction: (1) the amount in controversy must
be more than $75,000; and (2) the parties must be completely diverse.32 This
first section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit applies the
amount-in-controversy requirement.33
A.

Burden of Demonstrating that Amount in Controversy Has Been Met

As stated above, the diversity statute requires that “the matter in
controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.”34 The party responsible for bringing the case to the federal courts
bears the burden of demonstrating that the diversity requirements have been
met.35 In a case originating in the federal district court, the plaintiff must
allege in good faith a sum adequate to meet the statutory requirements.36

29.
30.
Cir. 1982).

Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
Id.; see also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th

The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s
competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise
conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise a party could work a wrongful
extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied
them.

Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1000 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (holding that “subject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited
or waived”).
31.
See infra Parts III–IV.
32.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4).
33.
See infra Part III.A–F.
34.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
35.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411–12 (11th Cir.
1999).
36.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L.L.C., 329 F.3d 805, 807
(11th Cir. 2003); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288
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In contrast, in cases removed from state court to federal court, the
defendant bears the burden of proving diversity. 37 The defendant must
“show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting jurisdiction.”38
Applying this standard in removal cases, the federal court will show deference
to the plaintiff’s damages allegations when pleaded specifically.39 However,
when the plaintiff has not alleged a specific amount of damages, the court will
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard.40
B.
“Legal Certainty” Requirement for Dismissal Based on Failure to
Meet Amount in Controversy Requirement
Federal courts “will not dismiss a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the diversity statute ‘unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’
that plaintiff’s claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional amount.’”41
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this standard “give[s] great weight to
plaintiff’s assessment of the value of plaintiff’s case.”42 It is an objective
standard.43
In contrast, the court will not allow defendants seeking to remove
cases from state to federal court to benefit from the legal certainty test.44
Thus, where the plaintiff seeks less than the amount required for diversity
jurisdiction, “only the sum actually demanded is in controversy.”45 In order
to avoid remand in removal cases involving alleged damages below the
statutory amount-in-controversy minimum, the defendant “must prove to a
legal certainty” that the plaintiff’s counsel has either falsely or incompetently
assessed the case. 46 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that one way that a
(1938) (stating that “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith”).
37.
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
38.
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994); see also
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
39.
See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 (stating that “plaintiff’s claim, when it is
specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth”).
40.
See Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 947–48 (11th Cir.
2000).
41.
Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 (11th Cir.
1998) (quoting Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094) (emphasis added); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem.
Co., 303 U.S. at 289 (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”).
42.
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094.
43.
Id. at 1096.
44.
See id. at 1094–95 (noting that the plaintiff “is the master of his own
claim.”).
45.
See id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
46.
Id.
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removing defendant could remain in federal court in this circumstance was if
“he showed that, if plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible awards.”47
C.

Timing of Amount in Controversy Determination for Removal Cases

Jurisdictional facts—including those regarding the amount in
controversy—must be determined as of the date of removal.48 However, the
court is not limited to jurisdictional allegations in the removal petition; it may
also consider post-removal evidence of the amount in controversy, such as that
presented in affidavits, if that evidence is relevant to the time of removal.49
D.

Calculating Amount in Controversy

1.

Law Regarding Aggregating Claims to Meet Amount in Controversy
Requirements

The law regarding aggregation of claims to meet amount in
controversy requirements is complex and not always consistent. 50 This
subsection sets out some of the rules regarding aggregation of claims.51
a.

Aggregation of Multiple Claims by Plaintiff(s) Against a Single
Defendant

As a general rule, a plaintiff may aggregate multiple claims against a
single defendant in order to meet the amount in controversy requirements for
diversity jurisdiction.52 In contrast, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that multiple plaintiffs’ claims can be aggregated, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, only when “plaintiffs [have] unite[d] to enforce a single
title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.”53 Thus,
47.
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096.
48.
Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000).
49.
Id.; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating that “a district court may properly consider post-removal evidence in determining
whether the jurisdictional amount was satisfied at the time of removal”).
50.
14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3704 (4th ed. 2011).
51.
See infra Part III.D(1)(a–c).
52.
Pearson v. Nat’l Soc’y of Pub. Accountants, 200 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir.
1953).
53.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973).
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when multiple plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, the court will not
aggregate those claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy.54
b.

Aggregating Claims Against Multiple Defendants

When a plaintiff brings separate and distinct claims against multiple
defendants, the general rule is that claims cannot be aggregated to meet the
amount in controversy requirement. 55 The outcome is different when a
plaintiff brings claims against two or more defendants who are jointly liable to
the plaintiff; in that situation, the claims may be aggregated.56 Applying this
rule, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not aggregate claims against
two insurance companies when one company had primary liability and the
other one had excess coverage of the same insured risk.57
c.

Aggregation in the Context of Class Actions

There are additional specific aggregation rules in the context of class
actions.58 For a complete discussion of those rules, see Part V.59
2.

Methods of Determining Amount in Controversy in Removal Cases

The Eleventh Circuit has set out a specific approach to determining
amount in controversy in removal cases.60 When the state court complaint
seeks more than $75,000 in damages, “a removing defendant may rely on the
plaintiff’s valuation of the case to establish the amount in controversy unless it
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount
claimed.”61 However, if the complaint does not contain a claim for a specific
amount of damages, the federal court should consider whether “it is facially

54.
E.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Dyess Furniture Co., 292 F.2d 232, 233 (5th
Cir. 1961) (“The law has been . . . long settled . . . that when two or more plaintiffs, having
separate and distinct demands, unite in a single suit for convenience of litigation, their claims
cannot be aggregated to make up the jurisdictional amount.”).
55.
Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961); see
also Cornell v. Mabe, 206 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1953).
56.
Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13; Cornell, 206 F.2d at 516–17 (“However, when the
action is to recover a single tract of land and the several defendants claim under a common
source of title, the matter in controversy is the entire tract of land and not its several parts.”).
57.
Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13.
58.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
59.
See infra Part V.
60.
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
61.
Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315
(11th Cir. 2002).
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apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional requirement.”62
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy is facially apparent
from the complaint, “the district court is not bound by the plaintiff’s
representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff is in
the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought.”63 Indeed, the
court may decide that the defendant’s evidence regarding the amount in
controversy is more reliable than that of the plaintiff.64 The district court
“may use [its] judicial experience and common sense in determining whether
the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.”65
“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the
complaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was
removed.” 66 In order to sufficiently allege jurisdiction in the petition for
removal, the defendant must do more than make “[a] conclusory allegation . . .
that the . . . amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts
supporting such an assertion.”67
3.

Determining Amount in Controversy in Cases Involving Only
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In cases where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive
relief, the proper measure of amount in controversy is the value of the object
of the litigation.68 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that this value should

62.
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010).
63.
Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061.
64.
Id. at 1061.
65.
Id. at 1062.
Thus, when a district court can determine, relying on its judicial
experience and common sense, that a claim satisfies the amount in controversy
requirements, it need not give credence to a plaintiff’s representation that the value of
the claim is indeterminate. Otherwise, a defendant could wrongly be denied the
removal to which it is entitled.

Id at 1064.
66.
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
67.
Id. at 1319–20; see also Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972
(11th Cir. 2002) (“The defendants in this case have failed to carry their burden; all they did was
to fill the notice of removal with the type of unsupported assumptions we have held to be
inadequate.”).
68.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see
also Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216,
218 (11th Cir. 1997).
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be determined from the plaintiff’s perspective.69 If the value of the requested
relief is too speculative or immeasurable, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the
plaintiff fails to meet the amount in controversy requirements for diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.70
4.

Determining Amount in Controversy for Specific Performance Cases

In diversity cases in which the plaintiff seeks specific performance of
a contract, federal courts generally base their calculation of the amount in
controversy on the value of the property at issue, not the amount that might be
awarded in damages for breach of contract.71
5.

Challenges to Arbitration Awards and the Amount in Controversy
Requirement

The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide subject matter
jurisdiction for a case to be in federal courts.72 Instead, a party seeking to
challenge an arbitration award must demonstrate an independent basis for
jurisdiction, such as diversity.73 In Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc.,74 the Eleventh Circuit held that “a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award is also
seeking a new arbitration hearing at which he will demand a sum which
exceeds the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”75

69.
Ericcson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218–20; see also Davis v.
Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1999). Note: Not all circuits
follow the plaintiff’s-viewpoint rule, although the majority have. Ericsson GE Mobile
Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218 n.8.
70.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d
at 222 (“Because [the plaintiff] cannot reduce the speculative benefit resulting from a rebid to a
monetary standard, . . . there is no pecuniary amount in controversy.”); see also Morrison v.
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “a plaintiff who bases
diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctive relief must show that the benefit to be obtained
from the injunction is sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the . . . amount in
controversy requirement”) (quotation omitted).
71.
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Bullard, 995 F.2d 1046, 1047 (11th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). “When the value of property sought to be obtained by specific performance
exceeds the sum which might have been awarded in damages, the amount in controversy is
established by the value of the property.” Id.
72.
Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 431 F.3d 1320,
1325 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
73.
See Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1325.
74.
431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005).
75.
Id. at 1325.
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Effect of Subsequent Events

Subsequent events do not change a federal court’s analysis of the
amount in controversy, as the court’s jurisdiction is determined as of the date
that the case enters the district court.76 As the Supreme Court of the United
States noted in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,77 the fact that
the plaintiff does not ultimately recover the full amount alleged in the
complaint does not void the federal court’s jurisdiction in a diversity case.78
In explaining the good-faith requirement, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he
inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.”79
Applying this rule, a plaintiff’s stipulation or amendment of the
pleadings after a case is removed to federal court that reduces the amount in
controversy below the statutory minimum does not divest the federal court of
diversity jurisdiction.80 Moreover,
the fact that it appears from the face of the complaint that the
defendant has a valid defense, if asserted, to all or a portion of the
claim, or the circumstance that the rulings of the district court after
removal reduce the amount recoverable below the jurisdictional
requirement, will not justify remand.81

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, in determining the amount in
controversy, it will not consider whether some damages may be precluded by
the statute of limitations.82

76.

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 293

(1938).
77.
303 U.S. 283 (1938).
78.
Id. at 289.
79.
Id.; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan,
777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that, once the amount in controversy requirement
is met “and the federal court is seized of jurisdiction, the court’s power is not conditional on a
later award of at least that amount”).
80.
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292.
81.
Id.
82.
McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006).
The district court also found it significant that Maytag’s calculation of the
amount in controversy did not account for the effect of any applicable statutes of
limitations. When determining the amount in controversy for jurisdictional
purposes, however, courts cannot look past the complaint to the merits of a defense
that has not yet been established.

Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1332 n.9.
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Relevance of State Law to Determination of Amount in Controversy

Although the question of whether the plaintiff has met the amount in
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is a federal question, courts
will often consider whether state law is relevant to that determination. 83
Specifically, the court will utilize state law “insofar as it defines the nature and
extent of the right plaintiff seeks to enforce.”84
In Broughton v. Florida International Underwriters, Inc., 85 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a plaintiff could rely upon claims for
statutory penalties and attorney’s fees, brought pursuant to a Georgia statute,
to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction. 86 Although the court was willing to consider these types of
claims, it ultimately determined that the defendant was not liable under the
state statute and, therefore, the plaintiff did not meet the minimum
amount-in-controversy requirement. 87
In Ericsson GE Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc.,88 the
court also considered the availability of state-law remedies—this time under
Alabama law—in determining whether the amount in controversy
requirement was met.89
IV.

DETERMINING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

The following Part addresses in more detail the Eleventh Circuit’s
analysis of § 1332’s requirement that parties seeking the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction demonstrate diversity of citizenship.90 In fact, most of
the court’s analysis regarding jurisdiction under this statute has focused
primarily on this specific requirement, as explained further.91
83.
See Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863
(11th Cir. 1998); Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352–53 (1961).
[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal
jurisdiction is a federal question to be decided under federal standards, although the
federal courts must, of course, look to state law to determine the nature and extent of
the right to be enforced in a diversity case.

Horton, 367 U.S. at 352–53.
84.
Broughton, 139 F.3d at 863 (quoting Duderwicz v. Sweetwater Sav. Ass’n,
595 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979)).
85.
139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998).
86.
Id. at 863–64.
87.
Id. at 864.
88.
120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997).
89.
Id. at 220–21 (holding that under Alabama law, if the plaintiff was
successful it would only be entitled to rebid the contract and that the value of that benefit was
too speculative to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.).
90.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
91.
See infra Part IV.A.
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Rules Related to Pleading Diversity of Citizenship Exists
1.

The Rule for Cases Filed Originally in District Court
a.

Requirements Under FRCP 8

When a party seeks to bring an original civil action in the federal
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), FRCP 8 applies.92 Under FRCP 8, the
plaintiff’s complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the court’s
jurisdiction. 93 Applying FRCP 8 in the context of § 1332, in order to
adequately allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must provide specific
allegations regarding the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.94
Although the rule is straightforward, numerous legal issues can complicate the
federal court’s analysis of the parties’ citizenship, as illustrated below.95
b.

Timing: Diversity Jurisdiction Is Determined as of Date that the
Action Was Filed

In determining whether the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit looks to the facts as they existed at the time
the action was filed.96
i.

Post-filing Changes in Citizenship Do Not Matter for
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction

It is well established that the only citizenship that matters for purposes
of determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists is the original parties’
citizenship at the time the lawsuit is filed; any changes in a party’s citizenship
that occur after filing are irrelevant.97 Thus, the district court will not “lose
jurisdiction over a diversity [claim that] was well founded at the outset even
[if] one of the parties . . . later change[s] [its] domicile.” 98 Moreover,
post-filing changes in the citizenship of a party cannot cure jurisdictional
defects in a diversity action, where “[t]he purported cure arose not from a
92.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
93.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
94.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
95.
See infra Part IV.A.1.b.
96.
See Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)
(per curiam); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989).
97.
Freeport-McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 428; Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Kan., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) (“Jurisdiction once acquired on that ground
is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties.”).
98.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970),
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change in parties to the action, but from a change in the citizenship of a
continuing party.”99
ii.

The Substitution of Parties Under FRCP 25(c) Does Not
Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction

Diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse
party to the action—accomplished by substituting the nondiverse party as a
plaintiff under FRCP 25(c)—when the plaintiffs and defendant were diverse at
the time that the action arose and at the time that federal proceedings were
commenced; the substituted party “was not an indispensable party at the time
the complaint was filed”; and the substituted party “had no interest whatsoever
in the outcome of the litigation until sometime after [the] suit was
commenced.”100
iii.

Permissive Intervention of a Party Under FRCP 24 Does Not
Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction

FRCP 24 provides for intervention of right and permissive
intervention by other parties.101 The intervention of a party, by leave of court,
does not destroy the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction when the intervening
party’s “presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the
original parties.”102
Recent Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that an intervenor’s
citizenship does have an effect on a court’s diversity jurisdiction analysis in
some circumstances, however.103 In Flintlock Construction Services, L.L.C.
v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C 104 a case brought pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction, the intervenor was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff and
sought to bring claims against both the plaintiff and the defendants.105 In
order to maintain diversity jurisdiction, the court dismissed the intervenor’s
99.
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2004).
100.
Freeport McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 426–29 (noting that “[a] contrary rule
could well have the effect of deterring normal business transactions during the pendency of
what might be lengthy litigation”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S.
112, 118–19 (1894) (holding that the substitution of nondiverse defendants for diverse
defendants did not destroy federal jurisdiction).
101.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b). FRCP 24(a) provides for intervention of right,
while FRCP 24(b) applies to permissive interventions. Id.
102.
Wichita R.R. & Light Co., 260 U.S. at 54.
103.
See Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710
F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
104.
710 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2013).
105.
Id. at 1222-23.
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claims against the plaintiff but allowed the claims against the defendant to
proceed.106
iv.

Plaintiff Cannot Later Amend Complaint to Add Nondiverse
Defendant

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity jurisdiction
is not destroyed by a federal court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over
nonfederal claims involving impleader, cross-claims, or counter-claims, a
court will not have diversity jurisdiction where a plaintiff later amends the
complaint to add a nondiverse party.107
v.

In Evaluating Diversity, the Court Should Realign Parties
According to Their Real Interests

The plaintiff’s alignment of the parties is not determinative for
diversity purposes.108 Thus, a federal district court, in determining whether
there is complete diversity, has a duty to realign parties according to their real
interests.109 For example, in shareholder derivative suits brought in federal
court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the court will align the corporation as a
defendant whenever the corporate management has adopted a position that is
antagonistic to that of the plaintiff shareholder.110
c.

Curing Defects in Diversity Jurisdiction

Under certain circumstances, it is possible to cure defects in diversity
jurisdiction.111 The following subsection provides some analysis of when
curing is possible and how it may be accomplished.112
i.

Courts May Use FRCP 21 to Drop Nondiverse Dispensable
Parties

“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms,
add or drop a party.”113 Thus, although generally diversity jurisdiction is
106.
Id. at 1225.
107.
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1978).
108.
Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
109.
Id.; see also City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310,
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “federal courts are required to realign the parties in an action
to reflect their interests in the litigation”).
110.
See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 96–98 (1957).
111.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; infra Part IV.A.1.C.
112.
See infra Part IV.A.1.C.
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determined at the time of filing, a jurisdictional defect relating to diversity of
citizenship can be cured by the dismissal of a nondiverse dispensable party
who destroyed diversity.114 The Supreme Court of the United States has
warned that federal courts should exercise this power sparingly. 115 In
determining whether to dismiss a nondiverse party, the court “should carefully
consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of the
parties in the litigation.”116
Dismissal of nondiverse parties is not possible in all circumstances.117
If the nondiverse party is indispensable, the court must dismiss the entire case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.118
ii.

Under Some Circumstances, Parties Can Cure Defective Allegations
of Jurisdiction

Parties may amend defective allegations of jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1653.119 Title 28, Section 1653 of the United States Code provides
that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in
the trial or appellate courts.”120 The statute applies only to allegations of
jurisdiction, however, and not to the underlying jurisdictional facts. 121
Moreover, a defendant’s admissions as to his domicile—as well as record
evidence regarding domicile—are sufficient to cure a plaintiff’s pleading
defect when the complaint only pleaded the defendant’s residency.122
Parties may also cure deficiencies in diversity jurisdiction allegations
by submitting evidence of citizenship during case proceedings. 123 The
113.
FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490
U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to
allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been
rendered.”).
114.
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004);
see also Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 827, 837–38; Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v.
Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011).
115.
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 837–38.
116.
Id. at 838.
117.
See id. at 837–38.
118.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1343.
119.
28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2012).
120.
Id.; see also Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.12 (11th Cir.
2013) (allowing parties to submit supplemental materials to demonstrate diversity of citizenship
in case removed from state court).
121.
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 831 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1653
“addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists, and not defects in
the jurisdictional facts themselves”).
122.
See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342–43.
123.
See id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

95

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

198

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Supreme Court of the United States has held that a federal court may consider
record evidence in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 124
Applying that rule, the appellate court “need not vacate a decision on the
merits if the evidence submitted during the course of the proceedings cures
any jurisdictional pleading deficiency by convincing [the court] of the parties’
citizenship.”125
iii.

Limitations on a Party’s Attempts to Cure Jurisdictional
Allegations

Although it is possible for the plaintiff to cure the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint, a federal court will not accept the parties’
stipulation that diversity jurisdiction exists.126 Furthermore, although a party
may cure insufficient allegations of diversity jurisdiction by amending
pleadings, a party may not cure them solely through self-serving statements in
an unsworn brief.127
2.

Case Removed from State Court to Federal District Court

As explained above, a defendant may also remove a case from state
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as long as he demonstrates that the federal
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.128 As the Eleventh Circuit
explained in Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,129 “[a] civil case filed in state
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have
been brought originally in federal court.”130 Similar to the diversity rules for
cases filed originally in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit has developed a
series of legal rules for analysis of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction in
removal cases, as discussed further.131

124.
See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 382 (1904)
(stating “[t]he whole record . . . may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment
of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of
citizenship”).
125.
Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013).
126.
See id. at 1269–70 (stating “it is fundamental that parties may not stipulate
to federal jurisdiction”).
127.
See id. at 1269 (noting that “we have never held that an unsworn statement
in a brief, alone, can demonstrate a party’s citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction”).
128.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,
154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
129.
154 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998).
130.
Id. at 1287.
131.
See infra Part V.B.
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Burden to Adequately Plead Diversity Is on the Defendant in a
Removal Case

Although the pleading requirements are somewhat similar in removal
cases to those originating in federal court, the pleading requirements for
removed cases are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), rather than FRCP 8(a)(1).132
As explained further, the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of
pleading diversity in a case removed from state court.133 As part of that
requirement, the defendant’s notice of removal must include “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal.”134
b.

Specific Statutory Rules for Removal of Diversity Cases

Title 28, Section 1441 of the United States Code contains additional
special rules for diversity cases in the context of removal cases, as described
below.135
i.
Fictitious Names (“Jane Does”) Are Disregarded for
Purposes of Determining Jurisdiction in Removal Cases
Title 28, Section 1441(b)(1) of the United States Code instructs that,
“[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the
jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . the citizenship of defendants sued under
fictitious names shall be disregarded.”136
ii.

Exception When Defendant Is Citizen of State in Which
Action Was Brought

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “[a] civil action otherwise removable
solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”137
132.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
133.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972
(11th Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A.
134.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
135.
See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
136.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); see also Walker v. CSX Transp., Inc., 650 F.3d
1392, 1395 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011).
137.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81,
90 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts
would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or
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Time For Determining Whether Diversity Exists for Purposes of
Removal

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), “[i]n a case not originally
removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the
post-commencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements—for
example, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party—may remove the
case to federal court within [thirty] days of receiving such information.”138
The timing of a determination of diversity for purposes of removal is
approached somewhat differently than it is in cases originating in federal
court.139 In cases removed from state to federal court, the district court must
look at the case at the time of removal, rather than the time of filing of the
original complaint, to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.140
Generally, the right of removal is decided by the pleadings, viewed at the time
when removal is filed.141
d.

Curing Faulty Citizenship Allegations in Removal Petitions

Faulty allegations of citizenship in a removal petition may be properly
cured by filing an amended petition for removal in the federal district court.142
Moreover, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly
removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional
requirements are met at the time final judgment is entered.”143 The Supreme
Court has contrasted situations in which a jurisdictional defect remained
uncured and situations in which there was no jurisdictional defect at the time
that the district court entered judgment.144
defendants may remove the action to federal court . . . provided that no defendant “is
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”

Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted).
138.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68–69.
139.
Compare Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.
2002), with Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883).
140.
Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curium); see also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002);
Leonard, 279 F.3d at 972 (noting that “the critical time is the date of removal”); Poore v.
Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by
Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 2007).
141.
Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 253 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir.
2001) (per curiam). But see Gibson, 108 U.S. at 563 (holding that diversity of citizenship,
when the basis of jurisdiction, must exist at the time of the filing of the original action, as well as
at the time of the petition for removal).
142.
See D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 147
(5th Cir. 1979).
143.
Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 64.
144.
Compare id. at 76–77, with Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194
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Despite a federal trial court’s threshold denial of a motion to
remand, if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect
remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. . . . In this case,
however, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the
District Court. To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment, and
return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional
requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court
system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted
administration of justice.145

e.

Effect of Subsequent Acts on Diversity Jurisdiction

“[I]f a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity
action at the time of removal, subsequent acts do not divest the court of its
jurisdiction over the action.”146
B.

Types of Parties

Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh
Circuit have further developed the requirements for how a federal court
determines a party’s citizenship in the context of diversity jurisdiction.147
The rules vary, depending on the type of parties.148 Those rules are analyzed
further below.149

U.S. 377, 382 (1904).
145.
Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 76–77 (citations omitted).
146.
Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that changes to pleadings made after removal in diversity cases do not deprive the court of
supplemental jurisdiction); Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287,
1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir.
2007). But see Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that,
after removal, plaintiff destroyed diversity by joining non-diverse defendant, but defect could
be cured by dismissing non-diverse defendant).
147.
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010); Molinos Valle Del
Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2011); McCormick v. Aderholt,
293 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367
(11th Cir. 1994).
148.
Compare McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257–58, with Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at
80.
149.
See infra Parts IV.B.1–12.
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Individuals
General Rules

The plaintiff is required to allege natural parties’ citizenship, not
residence.150 As the court has observed, “[t]o be a citizen of a [s]tate within
the meaning of [§] 1332, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United
States, and a domiciliary of that [s]tate. For diversity purposes, citizenship
means domicile; mere residence in the [s]tate is not sufficient.” 151
Furthermore, the federal court applies federal law, not state law, to determine
a party’s citizenship under § 1332.152 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
“[t]he word ‘States’ . . . includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”153
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a person’s “[c]itizenship is
equivalent to domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”154 The court
has defined a party’s domicile as “the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent
home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of
returning whenever he is absent therefrom.’”155 There is a presumption that a
person is a domiciliary of the State of his birth, unless and until he acquires a
new domicile, regardless of whether his parents were citizens of that State.156
In order to demonstrate a change in domicile, a party must show both: “(1)
physical presence at the new location, [and] (2) an intention to remain there
indefinitely.”157
b.

United States Citizens Living Abroad

“[United States] citizens domiciled abroad are neither ‘citizens of a
State’ under § 1332(a) nor ‘citizens or subjects of a foreign state’ and therefore
are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court.”158 In determining
150.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342 n.12; Taylor, 30 F.3d
at 1367 (“Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to
establish diversity for a natural person.”).
151.
Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
152.
Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
153.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).
154.
McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam).
155.
Id. at 1257–58 (quoting Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399).
156.
See Gregg v. La. Power & Light Co., 626 F.2d 1315, 1317 (5th Cir. 1980).
157.
McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258.
158.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
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that a United States citizen domiciled abroad destroyed diversity jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court of the United States applied the following reasoning:
In order to be a citizen of a [s]tate within the meaning of the
diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the
United States and be domiciled within the [s]tate. The problem in
this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no
domicile in any [s]tate. He is therefore stateless for purposes of §
1332(a)(3). Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in
the [d]istrict [c]ourt when a citizen of a [s]tate sues aliens only, also
could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen.159

Although Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain160 applied this rule
in the context of a defendant, it also applies to a United States citizen living
abroad who is a plaintiff to a lawsuit: “A United States citizen with no
domicile in any state of this country is stateless and cannot satisfy the
complete diversity requirement when she, or her estate, files an action against
a United States citizen.”161
There is one important exception to this rule.162 “[A] citizen of a
state does not lose her domicile when her employer sends her abroad,” or, in
other words, when the citizen is living abroad “‘in the exercise of some
particular profession.’”163
c.

Dual Citizenship

There is also a special rule for individuals who have dual
citizenship.164 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “an individual who is a
dual citizen of the United States and another nation is only a citizen of the
United States for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”165

159.
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 827–28 (1989)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (case in which one defendant was a United States
citizen living overseas); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3).
160.
490 U.S. 826 (1989).
161.
King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007); see also
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828–29; Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“[A] United States citizen who is a permanent resident of a foreign country may not invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”).
162.
See King, 505 F.3d 1171–72.
163.
Id. at 117–72 (quoting Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 423 (1853)).
164.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011).
165.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
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Permanent Resident Aliens

The district court does not have diversity jurisdiction of “an action
between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are
domiciled in the same [s]tate.”166
e.

Other Aliens

For a full discussion of how other aliens are treated for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.167
2.

Corporations

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), “a corporation shall be deemed to
be a citizen of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the [s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.”168 Thus, “the complaint must allege either the corporation’s state
of incorporation or principal place of business.”169 As demonstrated below,
the interpretation of this statute has been more complicated in practice, and as
a result, a number of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases provide
further guidance for its application.170
a.

Domestic Corporations–Principal Place of Business
i.

The “Nerve Center” Test

“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the place where
the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation’s activities.” 171 The Supreme Court has observed that “in
practice, [the principal place of business] should . . . be the place where the
corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the
actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’
and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”172
166.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
167.
See infra Part IV.B.12.
168.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
169.
Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
170.
See infra Part B.2.a.
171.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010) (noting that some lower
federal courts have referred to that place as the corporation’s “nerve center”).
172.
Id. at 93.
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By taking this approach in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 173 the Supreme Court
specifically rejected an approach to the “principal place of business”
determination that measured the amount of business conducted within a state
and compared that amount to the amount of business conducted in other
states.174
The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue in a
published case since the Supreme Court decided Hertz Corp.175 However,
prior to Hertz Corp., the Eleventh Circuit applied a “total activities” test to
determine a corporation’s principal place of business.176 In MacGinnitie v.
Hobbs Group, LLC,177 the court described the “total activities” test as follows:
[The “total activities”] test combines the “place of activities” test
and the “nerve center” test used by other circuits. Under the “place
of activities” test, the location of the majority of the corporation’s
sales or production activities is its principal place of business.
Under the “nerve center” test, the location of the corporate offices is
generally the principal place of business.
....
The total activities test requires a somewhat subjective
analysis to choose between the results of the nerve center and place
of activities tests, if they differ. . . . Where a company’s activities
are not concentrated in one place, a district court is entitled “to give
these ‘nerve-center’-related facts greater significance” in
determining principal place of business.178

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz Corp., the Eleventh
Circuit’s application of the “total activities” test to determine a corporation’s
“principal place of business,” as the Court did in MacGinnitie and earlier
cases, appears to no longer be good law.179

173.
559 U.S. 77 (2010).
174.
See id. at 93–95.
175.
See id.; cf. Holston Inv., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that, in Hertz, the Supreme Court “announced a simple
rule wherein a corporation’s principal place of business is determined based on where the
corporation’s ‘nerve center’ is located”).
176.
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005).
177.
420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005).
178.
Id. at 1239 (citations omitted).
179.
Compare Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 80, 93–95, with MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d
at 1239.
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Application

Applying the standard set out in Hertz Corp., the Supreme Court
determined that the mere filing of a Securities and Exchange Commission
form “listing a corporation’s ‘principal executive offices’ would, without
more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center,’” and thus
its “principal place of business” for diversity jurisdiction purposes.180
The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to apply alter ego theory in the
context of diversity jurisdiction; thus, for diversity purposes, the Florida
incorporation of a subsidiary could not be ignored on the ground that the
subsidiary was the alter ego of its non-Florida citizen parent corporation and
that the parent’s California citizenship should be imputed to the subsidiary.181
b.

Domestic Corporation with Principal Place of Business Outside of
United States

There is a special rule for a domestic corporation whose principal
place of business is outside of the United States.182 In Cabalceta v. Standard
Fruit Co., 183 the Eleventh Circuit held that if “a domestic corporation’s
world-wide principal place of business is not in one of the United States, the
District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico, . . . then the foreign principal place of
business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes.” 184
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) was amended effective January 2012.185
That provision now states: “[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen
of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the
[s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”186 It is
unclear whether Eleventh Circuit’s holding from Cabalceta is still good law
after that amendment.187

180.
181.
182.

Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97.
Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 1985).
E.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.

1989).
183.
883 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1989).
184.
Id. at 1561.
185.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
186.
Id. (emphasis added). That statutory provision states a different rule for
cases in which the defendant is a liability insurer. See id.
187.
See id.; Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1561.
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Foreign Corporations

For jurisdictional purposes, federal courts treat the corporation of a
foreign state as a citizen of that state.188 However, if a foreign corporation
has its principal place of business in the United States, it is a citizen of the state
in which its principal place of business is located.189 However, a corporation
“owned by a foreign state is . . . deemed a foreign state for purposes of federal
jurisdiction.”190 In that case, diversity jurisdiction will not exist unless the
foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(4).191
For additional discussion of alienage jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.192
d.

Corporations Chartered Pursuant to Federal Law

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1348, “[a]ll national banking associations
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed
citizens of the [s]tates in which they are respectively located.”193 However,
the statute does not further define how the court should determine a national
bank’s location.194 The Supreme Court has subsequently provided further
guidance, holding in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt195 that “a national bank, for §
1348 purposes, is a citizen of the [s]tate in which its main office, as set forth in
its articles of association, is located.”196
Prior to Wachovia Bank, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that a federal
savings bank, as a corporation chartered pursuant to federal law, “would not
be a citizen of any state for diversity purposes and diversity jurisdiction would
not exist unless the corporation’s activities were sufficiently localized in one

188.
See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88, 91 (2002).
189.
Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir.
1984) (“[A] foreign corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it has its principal
place of business.”); see also Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1981)
(determining that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), a Panamanian corporation was a citizen of
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because its principal place of business was located
in Florida).
190.
See Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir.
1993).
191.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542.
192.
See infra Part IV.B.12.
193.
28 U.S.C. § 1348.
194.
See id.
195.
546 U.S. 303 (2006), rev’d, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (2013).
196.
Id. at 307.
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state.” 197 However, after Wachovia Bank, the Court’s analysis in Loyola
Federal Savings Bank v. Fickling198 should no longer be good law.199
e.

Dissolved or Inactive Corporations

Circuit courts that have considered the issue are divided regarding
whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has a principal place of
business. 200 In Holston Investments, Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 201 the
Eleventh Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for this issue: “[A] dissolved
corporation has no principal place of business.” 202 Thus, a dissolved
corporation is only a citizen of its state of incorporation.203
3.

Unincorporated Associations

Unincorporated associations are treated differently than corporations
when it comes to citizenships analysis.204
[U]nincorporated associations do not themselves have any
citizenship, but instead must prove the citizenship of each of their
members to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Furthermore, no matter the particular features of an
unincorporated entity, it has long been “[t]he tradition of the
common law . . . to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups
and to assimilate all others to partnerships,” which must plead the
citizenship of each member.205

Thus, an unincorporated association has no legal existence separate
from its individual members, even if state law permits the unincorporated
association to “sue or be sued in the association[’s] name.”206
197.
198.
199.

Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603, 606 (11th Cir. 1995).
58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995).
See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 317–19; Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank, 58 F.3d

at 606.
200.
See Holston Invs., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070–71
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing the various approaches to this issue used by other
circuits).
201.
677 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
202.
Id. at 1071.
203.
See id.
204.
See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1081,
1086 (11th Cir. 2010).
205.
Id. at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)).
206.
Id. at 1091 (quoting Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir.
1962)).
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Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)

With this standard in mind, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “a
limited liability company . . . ‘is a citizen of any state of which a member of
the company is a citizen.’ . . . ‘To sufficiently allege the citizenships of these
unincorporated business entities, a party must list the citizenships of all the
members of the limited liability company.’”207 Applying this rule, it is not
enough for the complaint to allege that an “[LLC was] created under the laws
of the [s]tate of Georgia, with its principal place of business . . . in Scottsdale,
Georgia.”208
b.

Partnerships: General and Limited

Similar to the approach taken for LLCs, for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, a partnership’s citizenship “depends on the citizenship of each of
its partners.”209 Accordingly, “a limited partnership is a citizen of each state
in which any of its [general or limited] partners . . . are citizens.” 210
Furthermore, when one of the partners is also a partnership, the district court
should inquire into the citizenship of the second partnership’s partners as
well.211
c.

Syndicates

Syndicates—such as the underwriters associated with Lloyd’s of
London—are required to plead every member’s citizenship, just like other
unincorporated associations.212

207.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast
SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); see also Flintlock
Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
208.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, LLC, 663 F.3d at 1305; see also
Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 1224; Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021,
1022.
209.
Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431, 433
n.1 (5th Cir. 1979).
210.
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021; see also Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990).
211.
Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co., 588 F.2d at 433 n.1.
212.
See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1088–89
(11th Cir. 2010).
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Unincorporated Joint Stock Companies

Federal courts treat unincorporated joint stock companies as
partnerships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and apply the same rules for
determining citizenship.213
e.

Unincorporated National Labor Unions

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that federal courts
should not treat unincorporated national labor unions as corporations for
diversity purposes but instead should look to the citizenship of the union’s
members.214
f.

Unincorporated Business Trusts

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the citizenship of an
unincorporated business trust is to be determined on the basis of the
citizenship of its shareholders.215 However, the court has also stated that a
business trust is neither a corporation nor an association, and therefore, where
the trustees hold, manage, and dispose of trust assets for the benefit of trust
beneficiaries, the court should consider the citizenship of trustees rather than
trust beneficiaries.216
g.

The Exception: Sociedad en Comandita

As an exception to the general rule that the citizenship of an
unincorporated association is determined by the citizenship of its individual
members, the Supreme Court has held that a sociedad en comandita—an
entity created under the civil law of Puerto Rico—could be treated as a citizen
of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.217 In coming to this
213.
See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
214.
See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145, 147, 149–53 (1965).
215.
See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1337–39 (11th Cir. 2002); Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R.
Starnes Co. of Fla., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[T]he Trust Funds,
which appear to be voluntary unincorporated associations, are not citizens of any particular
state; rather, the citizenship of trust fund members is determinative of the existence of diversity
of citizenship.”); Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 1987)
(determining that, because trust funds were voluntary unincorporated associations, the
citizenship of their members was determinative of the existence of diversity of citizenship).
216.
See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 462, 463 nn. 10, 11,
465–66 (1980).
217.
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

108

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT

211

determination, the Court reasoned that the sociedad’s juridical personality “is
so complete in contemplation of the law of Puerto Rico that we see no
adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a different status for
purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that
law.”218
4.

Receivers

In an action by or against a receiver, the district court should consider
the citizenship of the receiver for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 219
However, the case law distinguishes between situations in which a receiver is
a proper party to litigation—and thus his citizenship should be
considered—versus those in which he is not a proper party, and his citizenship
should be ignored in diversity determinations.220 In the former, the receiver
is a proper party because another party seeks to take property out of his
possession or seeks relief against his acts.221 However, the receiver is not a
proper party to litigation affecting parties’ rights in property not in his
possession, or to litigation asserting rights to said property in his possession
without disturbing his possession thereof.222
5.

Liability Insurance Companies
a.

Statutory Basis

Section 1332 provides special rules for determining a liability
insurance company’s citizenship for diversity purposes:
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of
liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such
insurer shall be deemed a citizen of–
(A) every [s]tate and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen;
(B) every [s]tate and foreign state by which the insurer has been
incorporated; and

218.
219.
220.
(5th Cir. 1921).
221.
222.
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(C) the [s]tate or foreign state where the insurer has its principal
place of business.223

b.

Case Law Interpreting These Provisions

The “direct action” provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) is limited to
actions against insurers and thus is not applicable to a workers’ compensation
action brought in federal court by an insurer.224 Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)
“will defeat diversity jurisdiction only if the claim which the third party has
against the insuredfor intentional tort, negligence, fraud, etc.is the same
one asserted against the insurance company as within the zone of primary
liability for which the company issued the policy.”225 As the Eleventh Circuit
has observed, “courts have uniformly defined the term ‘direct action’ to refer
to ‘those cases in which a party suffering injuries or damage for which another
is legally responsible is entitled to bring suit against the other’s liability
insurer without joining the insured or first obtaining a judgment against
him.’”226
In contrast:
[W]here the suit, brought either by the insured or by an injured third
party, is based not on the primary liability covered by the liability
insurance policy but on the insurer’s failure to settle within policy
limits or in good faith, the [§] 1332(c) direct action proviso does not
preclude diversity jurisdiction.227

In Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,228 the court explained
that, “unless the cause of action against the insurance company is of such a
nature that the liability sought to be imposed could be imposed against the
insured, the action is not a direct action.”229

223.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
224.
Id.; Northbrook Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 7 (1989); see also
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 1332(c)
does not apply to a “declaratory judgment action in which a liability insurer is the plaintiff”).
225.
John Cooper Produce, Inc. v. Paxton Nat’l Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 433, 435 (11th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
226.
Kong v. Allied Prof’l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157, 1159 (11th Cir. 1985))
(emphasis omitted).
227.
Fortson, 751 F.2d at 1159; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
228.
751 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1985).
229.
Id. at 1159.
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Institutions of Higher Learning

The Eleventh Circuit held that a complaint insufficiently alleged the
citizenship of Tuskegee University when it stated that Tuskegee University
was “‘an Alabama institution of higher learning, located in Macon County,
Alabama.’”230 The court has also applied an Eleventh Amendment immunity
analysis to determine that a state university was not a state citizen for the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction.231
7.

Unincorporated Indian Tribes

There is also a special rule for determining the citizenship of
unincorporated Indian tribes. 232 As the Eleventh Circuit has observed,
“unincorporated Indian tribes cannot sue or be sued in diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because they are not citizens of any state.”233
8.

Estates

“Where an estate is a party, . . . the citizenship that counts for diversity
purposes is that of the decedent.”234 Thus, the legal representative of the
estate is also deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent.235
Note: Prior to May 18, 1989, “federal diversity jurisdiction in estate
cases was determined by looking [into] the domicile of the representative of
the estate,” rather than the decedent’s domicile. 236 On that date, the
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requiring courts to “look to the domicile of
the decedent to determine diversity jurisdiction” went into effect.237 Thus, as
to this issue, case law predating the 1989 amendment is no longer good law.238
230.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
231.
See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir.
1999).
232.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607
F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010).
233.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
234.
Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
235.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); see also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d
1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Where an estate is a party, the citizenship that counts for diversity
purposes is that of the decedent, and she is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which she was
domiciled at the time of her death.”).
236.
Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 668 n.3 (11th Cir.
1991).
237.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
238.
See Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 668 n.3.
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Infants and Incompetents

Section 1332 provides that “the legal representative of an infant or
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same [s]tate as the
infant or incompetent.”239
10.

States

Special diversity jurisdiction rules also apply when a state is a party to
the case.240 A state is not a citizen of a state for the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction.241
A public entity or political subdivision of a state, unless simply an
‘arm or alter ego of the State,’ however, is a citizen of the state for
diversity purposes. Therefore, if a party is deemed to be ‘an arm or
alter ego of the State,’ then diversity jurisdiction must fail.242

When analyzing whether diversity jurisdiction exists over cases
involving state entities as parties, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis to determine the citizenship of the
state entities.243
11.
a.

State Agencies and State-Created Public Entities

Test for Determining Whether a State Agency Is a Citizen of a State

The Eleventh Circuit has applied the following analysis to determine
whether state agencies are “sufficiently separate and independent from the
state so as to confer citizen status upon them” for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction:
(1) whether the agency can be sued in its own name; (2) whether the
agency can implead and be impleaded in any competent court; (3)
whether the agency can contract in its own name; (4) whether the
agency can acquire, hold title to, and dispose of property in its own
name; and (5) whether the agency can be considered a body

239.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
240.
See Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).
241.
Id.; Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir.
1999); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983).
242.
Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412 (quoting Moor, 411 U.S. at 717).
243.
Id.; Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318.
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corporate having the rights, powers and immunities incident to
corporations.244

As demonstrated below, the Eleventh Circuit takes a case-by-case approach to
this analysis.245
b.

Specific Examples

i.

State Universities

As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Eleventh
Amendment immunity analysis to determine that a state university was not a
state citizen for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.246
ii.

A State Entity’s Board of Trustees

The Supreme Court held—in a case in which the Board of Trustees of
the Ohio State University was a party—that the complaint must allege the
citizenship of each individual trustee because the board was not a corporation,
even though under state law the Board had the power to sue and be sued, enter
into contracts, and supervise lands and other property of the university under
its collective name.247
Taking a different approach, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of
Florida was a citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because
the title of the land in dispute was vested with the Trustees and “because the
Trustees ha[d] acted . . . as a separate and distinct entity from the state.”248
iii.

Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

In Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Davis, 249 the Eleventh Circuit determined that diversity jurisdiction was
proper because Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
“[was vested] with the power to sue and be sued and possessed other generally
recognized corporate powers.”250
244.
245.
246.
247.

Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318.
See infra Part IV.B.11.b.
Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412; see supra Part IV.B.6, 10.
See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 213–18

248.
249.
250.

Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1316, 1318.
616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 833.

(1904).
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State Bar

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the Florida Bar, having been
explicitly created by and existing under the Supreme Court of Florida as an
“official arm of th[at] court,” could not be sued in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction.251
v.

Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans

The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleanscreated by state law, granting the Board all of the
rights, powers, and immunities incident to a corporation and specifically
granting to it various business powers, including authority to employ legal
services and engage counselis a separate entity from the State of Louisiana
for diversity purposes.252
vi.

Alabama State Docks Department

The Alabama State Docks Department is merely the alter ego of the
State of Alabama and thus is not a citizen of Alabama for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.253
vii.

Political Subdivisions, such as Municipalities or Counties

“It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship,
political subdivisions are citizens of their respective [s]tates.”254 Thus, “a
municipality which is independent in character and function from the state
should be considered a citizen for § 1332 diversity.”255 Moreover, a county
may be a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction if, under state law, it has
a sufficiently independent corporate character.256
251.
252.

See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195, 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1969).
C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 424 F.2d 764, 76567 (5th Cir.

1970).
253.
Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 415
F.2d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1969).
254.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 926 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Other cases in which the Supreme Court
determined that political subdivisions were citizens of a state for purposes of diversity include:
Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 180 (1933); Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472,
485–86 (1900); Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533–34 (1893); Lincoln Cnty. v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer Cnty., 74 U.S. 118, 122 (1869).
255.
Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976).
256.
Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719–21 (1973).
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Private Probation Companies as Officers of the Court

The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that private probation
companies, as officers of the court, are governmental entities for purposes of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). 257 Instead, private
probation companies are private entities, in the same way that attorneys would
not qualify as government entities.258
12.
a.

Specific Diversity Rules for Aliens
Statutory Basis for Alienage Jurisdiction

Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code also sets forth
specific diversity requirements for cases involving foreign citizens.259 First,
the statute provides that federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction of a
civil action that meets the amount in controversy requirement and is between
citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except
that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this
subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same
[s]tate.”260

Second, it allows diversity cases to be brought between “citizens of
different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties.”261 Finally, the statute allows diversity cases to be brought
between “a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.”262
b.

Case Law Analyzing Alienage Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Circuit has held that aliens who are in the United States
on non-immigrant work visas are not permanent residents for purposes of 28

257.
McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)).
258.
McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242.
259.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(4) (2012).
260.
Id. § 1332(a)(2).
261.
Id. § 1332(a)(3).
262.
Id. § 1332(a)(4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).263 The court has determined that the permanent resident
alien provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) refers only to an alien’s official
immigration status.264 Thus, an alien who resided in Florida for four years
but had not yet attained official permanent resident status was not a citizen of
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.265 The fact that an alien resides
in the United States is not relevant for diversity jurisdiction; what matters for
purposes of diversity is the alien’s citizenship, not residency. 266 In
comparison, “an individual who is a dual citizen of the United States and
another nation is only a citizen of the United States for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”267
The Supreme Court has held that “the United Kingdom’s retention
and exercise of authority over the [British Virgin Islands (“BVI”)] renders
BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, ‘citizens or subjects’ of the United
Kingdom under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”268
c.

Foreign States

Where a foreign state is a party to a case, diversity jurisdiction may
exist if the foreign state is the plaintiff but will not exist if the foreign state is
the defendant.269 Suits may only be brought against foreign states pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, rather than 28 U.S.C. §
1332.270
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a foreign state is defined as
including “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.” 271 Furthermore, the statute defines
“instrumentality of a foreign state” as:

263.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 n.10
(11th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
264.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1340 n.10.
265.
Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1348–50
(11th Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
266.
Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1981).
267.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2).
268.
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88, 100 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
269.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5 (1989); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542
& n.11 (11th Cir. 1993).
270.
Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1543; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1330 (1976)).
271.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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[A]ny entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in [§] 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws
of any third country.272

A corporation owned by a foreign state is deemed a foreign state for
purposes of federal jurisdiction; thus, diversity jurisdiction will not exist
unless the foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).273 In order for a foreign state to bring a diversity action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), at least one of the defendants must be a citizen
of a state, and diversity jurisdiction does not exist if all defendants are only
citizens of foreign states.274
C.

Complete Diversity Rule

Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code “require[s] complete
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”275
D.

Exceptions to Complete Diversity Rule

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity, there are
several exceptions to this rule, as discussed further.276
1.

Court May Ignore Citizenship of a Plaintiff that Has Independent
Basis of Original Federal Jurisdiction Against Defendant

Although the general rule is that diversity jurisdiction requires
complete diversity, there is an exception to this requirement when a

272.
Id. § 1603(b).
273.
Id. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542–43.
274.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v.
M/V Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987, 990–91 (11th Cir. 1985).
275.
28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Wis.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68
(1996).
276.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; infra Part IV.D.1–8.
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non-diverse plaintiff “has an independent basis of original . . . jurisdiction
against the defendant.”277
2.

Court May Properly Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction When
Non-Diverse Defendant Is Sued Under Federal Law

Similarly, the district court still may properly exercise diversity
jurisdiction “when the plaintiff joins a non-diverse defendant sued under
federal law with a diverse defendant sued in diversity.”278
3.

Supplemental/Ancillary Claims Asserted Between Non-Diverse
Defendants
While it is true that a nondiverse defendant must be formally
dismissed from the case to permit a subsequent removal, this in
effect requires only that the plaintiff dismiss all his claims asserted
against the nondiverse defendant and does not prevent the federal
court from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim
against a defendant or a cross-claim between defendants. . . . Once
a court has jurisdiction over a main claim, it also has jurisdiction
over any claim ancillary to the main claim, regardless of the amount
in controversy, citizenship of the parties or existence of a federal
question in the ancillary claim.279

The Supreme Court cases addressing this issue were decided prior to
Congress’s passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
in 1990.280 That statute specifically provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
277.
Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir.
1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
278.
Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508, 1511–12 (11th
Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
381 (1959).
279.
Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (11th Cir.
1988); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375–77 (1978) (holding
that a diverse defendant could implead a non-diverse third-party defendant, but the plaintiff
could not assert a claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant).
280.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377.
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shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on [§] 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the [FRCP], or over claims by persons proposed
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of [§] 1332.281

The supplemental jurisdiction statute appears to have codified the
Supreme Court’s holdings with respect to these issues, and therefore these
cases should still be good law.282
4.

Nominal Parties

“[A] federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.”283
Applying this rule, courts will disregard nominal, nondiverse parties in
determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.284
5.

Statutory Interpleader Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335

Claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, applying statutory
interpleader, require only minimal diversity; the plaintiff does not have to be
diverse from the defendants, but at least two defendants must be diverse from
each other.285

281.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(b).
282.
Id. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377.
283.
Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980); see also Bacon v.
Rives, 106 U.S. 99, 104 (1882) (holding that the joinder of formal parties, destitute of interest,
cannot oust the federal court of jurisdiction).
284.
See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Mfr.’s Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182, 190 (1924)
(determining depository of a trust was a nominal party when it had no interest in the outcome);
Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 437 (1903) (holding that corporate directors
were nominal parties when the relief prayed for by plaintiffs against both a company and its
directors was to be recovered from the company only); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 469
(1879) (holding that the railroad was a nominal party for removal purposes after it resolved its
dispute with the defendant and had no common interest with the trustee plaintiffs).
285.
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523, 530 (1967); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Class Actions

The statute sets forth requirements of minimal diversity, rather than
total diversity, for class actions brought pursuant to the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction.286
For further discussion of diversity jurisdiction and class actions, see
Part V.287
7.

Total Diversity Rule and Alienage Jurisdiction
a.

Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)

In cases in which jurisdiction is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2), the presence of aliens as both plaintiff and defendant destroys full
diversity under alien jurisdiction.288
b.

Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3)

There is an exception to the previous rule.289 Under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(3), the district court may have diversity jurisdiction over a case in
which there are aliens on both sides of the actions, as long as there are also
citizens of a state on both sides.290
8.

Removal Cases, When Non-Diverse Party Fraudulently Joined

Although the district court generally will not have diversity
jurisdiction over removal cases where the parties are not completely diverse,
district courts still have diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff has

286.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
287.
See infra Part V.
288.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama,
633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2011) (vacating judgment in favor of alien corporation against
alien citizens because aliens’ presence destroyed full diversity under alienage jurisdiction);
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the
presence of at least one alien on both sides of an action destroys diversity”); Ed & Fred, Inc. v.
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the rule
of complete diversity was applicable to an action brought by an alien against a citizen of a state
and another alien).
289.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).
290.
Id.; Iraola & Cia, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 860 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“It is a standard rule that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over cases
where there are foreign entities on both sides of the action, without the presence of citizens of a
state on both sides.”).
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fraudulently joined non-diverse defendants in order to prevent removal.291
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three circumstances when non-diverse
parties have been fraudulently joined in state court. 292 First, fraudulent
joinder exists “when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause
of action against the resident—non-diverse—defendant.” 293 Second, a
plaintiff may fraudulently plead jurisdictional facts in an attempt to avoid
removal.294 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has identified a third example of
fraudulent joinder: “[W]here a diverse defendant is joined with a non-diverse
defendant as to whom there is no joint, several, or alternative liability and
where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the
claim against the non-diverse defendant.”295
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “‘[t]he determination of whether
a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined must be based upon the
plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits
and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.’”296 The district court
should approach a fraudulent joinder claim in the same way that it would a
motion for summary judgment under FRCP 56(b), resolving disputed
questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff.297
With respect to the first type of fraudulent joinder, there is a fairly
high hurdle for a removal attempt. 298 In Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 299 the
Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]f there is even a possibility that a state court
would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the
resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and
remand the case to the state court.”300 Thus, “[t]he plaintiff need not have a
winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a

291.
292.
293.

Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.; see also Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir.

1983).
294.
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440.
295.
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996).
296.
Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001),
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005)).
297.
Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b).
298.
See Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440–41.
299.
709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983).
300.
Id. at 1440–41.
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possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be
legitimate.”301
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the third type of fraudulent
joinder in the context of class action cases. 302 This Guide addresses that
analysis in greater detail in Part V.303
E.
Exceptions Where Court Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction Even if
Diversity Is Established
1.

Probate Exception

Under limited circumstances, courts will abstain from hearing a case
involving wills and estates, even if there is diversity of citizenship, pursuant to
the judicially-created probate exception. 304 However, this exception is
narrowly construed.305
2.

Domestic Relations Exception
a.

General Rule

The domestic relations exception divests the federal courts of power
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees but does not ordinarily
include tort claims. 306 Thus, even if the district court has diversity
jurisdiction, the court will abstain from hearing a claim in cases involving the
301.
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis omitted).
302.
See Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287–90; Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1996).
303.
See infra Part V.
304.
See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d
666, 672 (11th Cir. 1991).
305.
See Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (“[F]ederal courts of equity have jurisdiction
to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a
decedent’s estate to establish their claims so long as the federal court does not interfere with the
probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in
the custody of the state court.”); Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 672–73; Mich. Tech. Fund v. Century
Nat’l Bank, 680 F.2d 736, 737–38, 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that district court properly
exercised jurisdiction over action against decedent’s estate seeking a declaration that decedent’s
will conveyed certain assets to plaintiff, in spite of fact that there were pending probate
proceedings and the federal court was required to interpret the will); DeWitt v. Duce, 599 F.2d
676, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that a suit alleging independent tort claim for
intentional interference with inheritance was properly before district court based on diversity
jurisdiction).
306.
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).
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parties’ domestic affairs.307 Speaking specifically to this issue, in Ingram v.
Hayes,308 the Eleventh Circuit stated that “federal courts generally dismiss
cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation[] rights,
establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or
divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.”309
b.

Limitations to the Domestic Relations Exception

“The [domestic relations] exception . . . is to be read narrowly and
does not—at least, ordinarily—include third parties in its scope.” 310 The
Eleventh Circuit has stated that courts should not abstain from cases related to
domestic-relations law “when the following factors are absent: (1) strong
state interest in domestic relations; (2) competency of state courts in settling
family disputes; (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state; and (4) the problem of
congested federal court dockets.”311 Instead, “federal courts should dismiss
the action only if hearing the claim would mandate inquiry into the marital or
parent-child relationship.”312
c.

Examples

In Rash v. Rash,313 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the domestic
relations exception did not apply in a case disputing assets, specifically
alimony, rights to pension, and real property, and which involved the question
of which competing state decrees should be enforced.314 Similarly, in Kirby
v. Mellenger, 315 the court held “that the district court [had] abused its
discretion [in] dismissing [the] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” in a
diversity case in which a former wife sued her former husband to obtain a

307.
See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999).
308.
866 F.2d 368 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
309.
Id. at 369–70 (determining that the district court properly dismissed child
support arrearage claim because claim would require district court to decide the propriety of the
Alabama state court’s order).
310.
Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), reh’g
granted, 719 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1998); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 n.7 (observing that
the third-party defendant in that case “would appear to stand in the same position with respect to
[the plaintiff] as any other opponent in a tort suit brought in federal court pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction”).
311.
Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441; see also Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370.
312.
Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370.
313.
173 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1999).
314.
See id. at 1380.
315.
830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
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share of his military retirement benefits not awarded under a Texas divorce
decree.316
The Eleventh Circuit’s precedent also demonstrates that a federal
court may have jurisdiction over some issues but not others in this context.317
Thus, in Jagiella v. Jagiella,318 the Circuit Court determined that the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction over the former wife’s suit seeking
alimony and child support arrears and properly refused to exercise jurisdiction
the of former husband’s counterclaims for modification of the divorce decree
by reducing his child support payments and increasing his visitation rights and
for alienage of his children’s affection.319
3.

Violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1359: Parties Improperly or Collusively
Joined to Invoke Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1359, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court.”320
V.

SPECIAL RULES FOR CLASS ACTIONS AND MASS ACTIONS

Plaintiffs may bring a class action in federal court pursuant to FRCP
23.321 If the class action relies on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, it
must meet the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.322 Specifically,
§ 1332(d) provides specific rules for determining when a federal court may

316.
See id. at 178–79.
317.
See Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1981).
318.
647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981).
319.
See id. at 564–65.
320.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012); see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394
U.S. 823, 826–29 (1969) (holding that § 1359 prevents federal courts from exercising diversity
jurisdiction in cases in which parties have been collusively joined, regardless of whether
diversity was based on parties being citizens of different states or alienage jurisdiction);
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 (11th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the application of § 1359 in the context of transfers or assignments of claims and
holding there is no presumption of collusion in determining whether diversity jurisdiction was
manufactured in violation of the statute); Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1381
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001),
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005) (holding that fraudulent joinder of defendants could not be
used to defeat diversity jurisdiction).
321.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
322.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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exercise diversity jurisdiction in class actions.323 Many of the rules regarding
diversity jurisdiction are different for class actions than for other diversity
cases; and thus, it is important to look closely at the provisions in § 1332(d).324
Furthermore, in many circumstances, case law decided prior to passage of
CAFA,325 which revised the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class
actions, may no longer be good law.326 CAFA sets out specific requirements
for federal diversity jurisdiction in two types of cases: Class actions and
certain mass actions that qualify as class actions. 327 The following
subsections analyze the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class action
and mass action lawsuits post-CAFA.328
A.

Class Actions versus Mass Actions

As stated above, CAFA applies to class actions and certain mass
actions.329 A class action is defined as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of
the [FRCP] or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.”330 The
statute defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”331 For
the most part, CAFA applies the same diversity jurisdiction rules to mass
actions as class actions, going so far as to define a mass action as a class action
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 332 except for specific circumstances
analyzed in the following subsections.333 The Eleventh Circuit has observed
that, “CAFA’s mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of
interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.”334

323.
See id.
324.
Id.
325.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)).
326.
Id.
327.
See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op.
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
328.
See infra Parts A–C.
329.
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2 § 4, 119 Stat. at 9.
330.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012).
331.
Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
332.
See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“a mass action shall be deemed to be a class
action removable under [§ 1332(d)(2)-(10)] if it otherwise meets the provisions of those
paragraphs”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1199–1201 (11th Cir. 2007).
333.
See infra Parts B–C.
334.
Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1198.
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Amount-in-Controversy Requirements

As explained further below, CAFA sets out different
amount-in-controversy requirements depending on whether the lawsuit is a
class action or a mass action.335
1.

Amount-in-Controversy Requirements for Class Actions

Class actions have a different amount-in-controversy requirement
than other cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.336 Under CAFA, a
class action brought pursuant to the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction must
exceed the value of five million dollars excluding costs and interests.337 The
statute explicitly states that each individual member’s claims will be
aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.338 The statute does not
require any individual class action plaintiff to assert a claim exceeding
seventy-five thousand dollars. 339 Although CAFA’s legislative history
suggests Congress’s intent that courts resolve doubts about the amount in
controversy in favor of finding jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected
that approach.340 Instead, the court has held that doubts regarding amount in
controversy should be resolved in favor of remanding the class action to the
state court.341
Applying the same rule that applies in other diversity cases that are
removed to federal court, when the plaintiffs in a class action have not pleaded
a specific amount of damages, the removed defendant is required to prove that
the amount in controversy meets the statutory minimum by a preponderance
of the evidence.342 In those circumstances, the district court looks to the face
335.
Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (6) (setting out
amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)
(setting out specific requirements for mass actions that qualify as class actions under the
statute).
336.
Compare the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with those set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
337.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
338.
Id. § 1332(d)(6). Prior to CAFA, class action plaintiffs were only allowed
to aggregate their claims in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
410 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2005).
339.
Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
340.
See generally Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1327–30 (11th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the legislative history of CAFA).
341.
Id. at 1329–30.
342.
Id. at 1330 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001)); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 550 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2013).
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of the complaint, and, “[i]f the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent
from the complaint, the court [looks] to the notice of removal and may require
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was
removed.”343 A defendant’s conclusory allegation in the notice of removal,
stating that the jurisdictional amount has been met, is insufficient to satisfy
CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement.344 In applying this rule, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant’s bare assertions that the amount in
controversy in one case was similar to that in other cases that the federal court
had jurisdiction over, without specific factual details, affidavits, or other
evidence to support those assertions, was insufficient to establish the court’s
diversity jurisdiction in CAFA cases.345 In contrast, the federal court may
consider a defendant’s own affidavits, declarations, and other evidence in
inferring that the jurisdictional minimum has been met.346
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied the same standard for
determining the amount in controversy when class action plaintiffs seek
injunctive or declarative relief as the court does for other types of diversity
cases.347 Thus, in South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,348
the court determined that “the value of declaratory relief is ‘the monetary
value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the [relief he is seeking]
were granted.’” 349 In the case of a class action, the federal court should
therefore “aggregate the claims of individual class members and consider the
monetary [benefit] that would flow to the entire class if declaratory relief were
granted.”350
Furthermore, in class actions in which a class has not yet been
certified, a named plaintiff cannot stipulate that the class will not seek
damages in excess of five million dollars in an attempt to avoid removal to
federal court.351 In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,352 the Supreme
343.
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319); see also
S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (“What counts
is the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”). Like other removal cases, the
calculation of the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases is based upon the time of
removal. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751.
344.
Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (citing Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320).
345.
See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1210–11, 1220–21
(11th Cir. 2007); Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752–54 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Lowery).
346.
Pretka, 608 F.3d at 755.
347.
See S. Fla. Wellness, Inc., 745 F.3d at 1315–16; supra Part 111.D.3.
348.
745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
349.
Id. at 1316 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268
(11th Cir. 2000)).
350.
Id.
351.
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 19,
2013).
352.
No. 11-1450, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013).
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Court explained that such a stipulation was ineffective “because a plaintiff
who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed
class before the class is certified.”353 The Supreme Court observed that this
rule is different from non-class action diversity cases, where the plaintiff has
the ability to legally bind himself through his stipulations.354
2.

Amount in Controversy Requirements for Mass Actions

Title 28, Section 1332 or the United States Code sets out different
amount-in-controversy requirements for mass actions than for class actions.355
In addition to requiring total aggregated claims of more than five million
dollars, the statute specifies that the federal court only has diversity
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in mass actions whose individual claims satisfy the
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement provided for in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).356
C.

Diversity Requirements under CAFA
1.

Basic Requirements for Diversity

Under CAFA, complete diversity of citizenship is not required. 357
Instead, the statute only requires minimal diversity for both class actions and
mass actions.358 CAFA’s diversity requirements can be met in the following
three specific circumstances:

353.
Id. at 4.
354.
Id. at 7.
355.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012) (setting out amount in
controversy requirements for class actions), with § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that the federal
court only has diversity jurisdiction over mass action plaintiffs who meet the amount in
controversy requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
356.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(11)(B)(i). The Eleventh Circuit considered this
requirement in Lowery, but did not ultimately determine how the $75,000 amount in
controversy requirement fit within the five million dollar amount in controversy requirement
because the court determined that the defendant did not demonstrate that the removed action
met the five million dollar minimum. See id. § 1332(d)(2); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483
F.3d 1184, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
357.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C).
358.
See id.; Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip
op. at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). Prior to CAFA’s effective date, the Supreme Court interpreted §
1332(a) to require that each named plaintiff in a class action be diverse from each defendant, but
that standard was replaced by CAFA’s minimal diversity standard. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1193
n.24 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921)).
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(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate
different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a
[s]tate; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate and
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state.359

A class action also requires a minimum of one hundred plaintiffs,
including named and unnamed class members.360 In contrast, a mass action
requires a minimum of one hundred named plaintiffs.361 In Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 362 the Supreme Court of the United States
specifically rejected the argument that the numerosity requirement for mass
action diversity jurisdiction could be met when a state filed suit as a sole
plaintiff based upon injuries suffered by the state’s citizens.363 Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant may not attempt to combine two
separate cases under the mass action provision by arguing that the cases
involved common questions of law and fact, when the plaintiffs of those suits
did not seek to consolidate their claims and each case, when considered
separately, did not meet the numerosity requirements for federal diversity
jurisdiction over mass actions.364
2.

Federal Court’s Discretionary Authority to Decline to Exercise
Diversity Jurisdiction Over Some Class Actions

There are certain circumstances when the district court may decline to
exercise diversity jurisdiction in class action cases even when minimal
diversity exists.365 This discretionary authority exists in cases where more
than one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the proposed class members—as
well as the primary defendants—are citizens of the state in which the action
has been filed. 366 The statute directs the district court to consider the
359.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012)).
360.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); see also id. § 1332 (d)(1)(D).
361.
See AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. at 5 (interpreting the
requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)).
362.
No. 12-1036, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
363.
See id. at 1.
364.
See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2013).
365.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
366.
Id.
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following factors in determining whether to decline to exercise diversity
jurisdiction in these circumstances:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or
interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the
[s]tate in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of
other [s]tates;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks
to avoid [f]ederal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the [s]tate in which the action
was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other
[s]tate, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed
class is dispersed among a substantial number of [s]tates; and
(F) whether, during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims
on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.367

3.

Federal Court Must Decline to Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction over
Class Actions in Certain Circumstances

Title 28 § 1332 of the United States Code also sets out certain
circumstances when the district court must decline to exercise diversity
jurisdiction in class action cases, even when the minimal diversity
requirements in § 1332(d)(2) have been met.368 Specifically, the district court
will not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the following class actions:
(A)(i) . . . a class action in which—
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the [s]tate in which the action
was originally filed;
(II) at least [one] defendant is a defendant—

367.
368.

Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F).
See id. § 1332(d)(4).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

130

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT

233

(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the [s]tate in which the action was originally
filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the [s]tate in
which the action was originally filed; and
(ii) during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or
similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of
the same or other persons.369

The Eleventh Circuit refers to this provision as the “local
controversy” exception.370
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that CAFA’s legislative history
indicated “Congress intended the local controversy exception to be a narrow
one, with all doubts resolved ‘in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the
case.’”371 The party seeking to keep the class action out of federal court has
the burden of demonstrating that CAFA’s local controversy exception
applies.372 With respect to the first prong, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that
plaintiffs’ designation of particular classes may make it difficult for the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class were
citizens of a particular state, but that difficulty did not excuse them from the
local controversy exception’s requirements.373
The court has also provided some guidance regarding the second
prong, known as the “significant defendant” prong.374 In Evans v. Walter
Industries, Inc., 375 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the non-diverse
defendant was not a significant defendant because: (1) the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that the defendant was significantly liable for the damages
alleged by the plaintiffs, in comparison to seventeen other co-defendants;
369.
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
370.
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006).
371.
Id. at 1163 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005)).
372.
Id. at 1164 (stating that “when a party seeks to avail itself of an express
statutory exception to federal jurisdiction granted under CAFA, . . . we hold that the party
seeking remand bears the burden of proof with regard to that exception”).
373.
Id. at 1166.
374.
See id. at 1166–68.
375.
449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).
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(2) the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendant played a significant
role in the underlying actions that caused the plaintiffs’ damages; and (3) the
facts showed that the defendant’s actions were primarily limited to a small part
of the time period and geographical location at issue in the case.376
The district court should also not exercise diversity jurisdiction over
class actions when at least two-thirds of the proposed class members, as well
as the defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action has been filed.377
4.

Statutory Limitations on a Federal Court’s Exercise of Diversity
Jurisdiction in Mass Action Removal Cases

Although district courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over
certain mass actions removed from state court, the statute provides additional
limitations for jurisdiction in that context.378 Specifically, § 1332(d)(11)(B)
specifically bars the federal courts’ exercise of diversity jurisdiction in mass
action removal cases under the following circumstances:
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in
the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in
injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State;
(II) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant;
(III) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the
general public—and not on behalf of individual claimants or
members of a purported class—pursuant to a [s]tate statute
specifically authorizing such action379; or
(IV) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for
pretrial proceedings.380

Aside from these requirements, the same rules that apply to class
actions originating in federal court also apply to removal cases.381
376.
Id. at 1167–68 (stating that “plaintiffs’ evidence offers no insight into
whether U.S. Pipe played a significant role in the alleged contamination, as opposed to a lesser
role, or even a minimal role. The evidence does not indicate that a significant number or
percentage of putative class members may have claims against U.S. Pipe, or indeed that any
plaintiff has such a claim.”).
377.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2012).
378.
See id. § 1332(d)(11).
379.
Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B). The Supreme Court has referred to this provision as
the “general public exception.” See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
No.12-1036, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
380.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).
381.
See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A).
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The Defendant Has the Burden of Demonstrating that Diversity
Jurisdiction Exists in Removal Cases.

Although CAFA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended
the plaintiff to bear the burden of demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction
exists in removal cases, the statute is silent as to that issue.382 As a result, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that “CAFA does not change the traditional rule that
the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction.”383
6.

Timing of Citizenship Determination in Class Actions

The statute directs the federal court to base citizenship determinations
as of the date on which the complaint is filed.384 If the original complaint did
not meet federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements, the district court
should base citizenship determinations as of the date on which an amended
complaint is filed, if the amended complaint then adequately pleads federal
subject matter jurisdiction.385
7.

Other Special Diversity Rules in Class Action and Mass Action Cases
a.

Only Named Parties Considered for Diversity Purposes

It is a long-standing rule that the federal court ordinarily considers, for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the citizenship of the named parties.386
b.

Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations

Unincorporated associations are treated differently in class actions
than they are in other diversity cases.387 “For purposes of [a class action], an
382.
See id. § 1332(d); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005).
383.
Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)).
384.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7).
385.
Id.
386.
See Day v. Persels & Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013);
Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, 624 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1980).
[T]he rule that absent class members are not parties for the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction “is . . . justified by the goals of class action litigation” because “[e]ase of
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to consider the
citizenship of all class members” and “considering all class members for these
purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions.

Day, 729 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002)).
387.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).
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unincorporated association [is] deemed to be a citizen of the [s]tate where it
has its principal place of business and the [s]tate under whose laws it is
organized.”388
VI.
A.

APPELLATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION ISSUES
Standard of Review

Because jurisdictional questions are questions of law, appellate courts
review de novo whether the federal court has diversity jurisdiction in a civil
action.389 The court also applies a de novo standard to the review of the
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1).390 However, the Eleventh Circuit reviews
a district court’s jurisdictional factual findings regarding the parties’
citizenship for clear error.391
B.

Adequacy of Diversity Allegations

When the pleadings were inadequate for the court to assess whether
diversity jurisdiction existed, the Eleventh Circuit has “issued a jurisdictional
question asking the parties whether the allegations of citizenship were
deficient and, if so, whether amendment of the complaint was necessary.”392
After determining that the plaintiff’s “allegations of citizenship were fatally
deficient,” the court remanded the case to the district court for jurisdictional
findings.393

388.
389.

Id.
See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.

1998).
390.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (amended 2007); Underwriters at Lloyd’s v.
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010).
391.
See Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013);
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1085.
392.
Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1267–68; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, when the court could not ascertain whether the
amount in controversy in a removal case was sufficient for diversity jurisdiction, it required the
parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue).
393.
See Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268.
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Requirement that Appellate Court Sua Sponte Consider Whether
Diversity Jurisdiction Exists

If it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is in question, the
appellate court is required to sua sponte inquire into both its own jurisdiction
and that of the district court whose opinion is under review.394
D.

Objections Based on Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Be
Raised at Any Time

A party can raise an objection to the federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction at any time.395 Applying this rule, the Supreme Court has held
that, even after a party loses at trial, he or she may still move for dismissal
under FRCP 12(b)(1).396

394.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999);
see also Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that
“federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of
their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the
parties either overlook or elect not to press”); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
395.
Henderson, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5.
396.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3) (amended 2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).
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HISTORICAL CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION IS NOT
CONSIDERED A SEARCH WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
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INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2010, three men brandishing guns entered a pizzeria in
South Florida and demanded cash from an employee.1 About a month later,

*
Stephanie Carlton is a J.D. candidate for May 2016 at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad College of Law. Stephanie would like to extend a thank you to her
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for their hard work to improve and refine this article. She
would also like to thank her mother and father who have endlessly supported her throughout
her law school journey.
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the same group ran into a car parts store and forced an employee at gunpoint
to unlock the safe.2 When the employee scrambled to open the safe, the
armed men screamed in the employee’s face, threatening to kill him.3
“Eventually, when the safe did not open, [the robbers] fled.”4 As he fled
with his accomplices, Davis shot at a dog that was merely barking at them.5
The group of robbers, in a two-month span, terrorized the South
Florida community by committing a series of seven armed robberies.6
Eventually, surveillance video, DNA, and cell site location information
(“CSLI”) enabled the police to catch the violent group.7 Notably,
“[h]istorical [CSLI] showed that Davis and his accomplices had placed and
received cell phone calls in close proximity to the locations of the crimes
around the times that the crimes were committed.”8 Obtaining historical
CSLI, and the use of it as evidence during Davis’s trial, became a
controversial issue during Davis’s appeal.9 The governmental obtainment of
historical CSLI with a court order rather than a warrant has created a Fourth
Amendment debate.10 Should the government be required to demonstrate
probable cause to secure a warrant to obtain historical CSLI?11 Although
this modern constitutional debate has been considered in other circuits,
United States v. Davis12 raises an issue of first impression in the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.13
This Comment analyzes the prevailing controversy surrounding
technology, government, and privacy.14 It begins by exploring the elements
of the Fourth Amendment and the predominant cases dealing with privacy
such as Katz v. United States.15 Part two discusses what constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment and presages the discussion of why obtaining

1.
Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205
(11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928-EE).
2.
Id. at 6–7.
3.
Id. at 7.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4–9.
7.
See id. at 9–10.
8.
Id. at 10.
9.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
10.
See id.
11.
See id.
12.
754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th
Cir. 2014).
13.
Id. at 1210.
14.
See infra Parts II–V.
15.
389 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part II.
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historical CSLI does not constitute a search that will be discussed in the latter
part of the Comment.16
Part three of this Comment discusses historical CSLI and this noninvasive law enforcement practice.17 This section elaborates on the
difference between historical and real-time CSLI while explaining why
historical CSLI is non-invasive and does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.18
Part four—the largest and most significant part—focuses on the
recent Eleventh Circuit decision of Davis.19 This section contains an indepth critique of the opinion.20 Additionally, it explains the mistake the
Eleventh Circuit made in comparing the case at hand to United States v.
Jones.21 This Part then discusses other weaknesses of the opinion and
explains how and why the court’s decision was misguided.22
The purpose of this Comment is to educate the public on the
misinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment and to explain why one does not
have an expectation of privacy in public.23 Lastly, this Comment analyzes
the recent Eleventh Circuit decision and discusses why the court got it wrong
when it comes to Fourth Amendment implications and historical CSLI.24
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution warrants
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”25
The Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect the privacy of individuals from unlawful
intrusion by the government.26 An individual must have a “‘constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in order to obtain protection

16.
See infra Part II.A.
17.
See infra Part III.
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); see infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
No. 10-1259, slip op. 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012); see infra Part IV.
22.
See infra Part IV.
23.
See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
defendant lacked legitimate expectation of privacy when he left garbage bags filled with
contraband next to the street).
24.
See infra Parts II–IV.
25.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26.
Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored
Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location
Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 712 (2012).
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under the Fourth Amendment from an unreasonable search or seizure.27 To
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable the
Court in Katz developed a two-part test.28 The first part of the test involves
whether “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search.”29 The second part of the test asks whether
“society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”30 The
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, does not extend to what an
individual consciously reveals to the public.31 Furthermore, the expectation
of privacy, construed from the Fourth Amendment, is determined by the
context of each case.32
A.

What Constitutes a Search?

To determine whether the government has performed an
unreasonable search protected under the Fourth Amendment, one must
determine whether that person exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy which society is ready to accept as reasonable.33 If no expectation of
privacy exists then a search without a warrant does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.34 If, however, a person does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the government cannot seize evidence without a warrant supported
by probable cause.35
A person does not have a subjective expectation of privacy to what
he or she exposes to the public.36 When “a person knowingly exposes
[information] to the public,” he or she can no longer subjectively believe that
information will be kept private, and therefore will not benefit from Fourth
Amendment protections.37

27.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
28.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
30.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
31.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
32.
Malone, supra note 26, at 712.
33.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34.
See id.
35.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36.
See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996).
37.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TECHNOLOGY

There are roughly three hundred million cell phone subscribers in the
United States alone.38 Notwithstanding the country’s growing affinity with
technology, a lack of appellant precedent exists regarding what the
government can and cannot obtain from technological devices, such as cell
phones.39 It is important to understand how a cell phone works in order to
evaluate the few cases available regarding CSLI and to help predict future
decisions.40
When a person places a cell phone call, a signal is conveyed to the
nearest cell tower, and eventually to the carrier’s office.41 What experts refer
to as a cell site is the “geographical location containing the cell tower, radio
transceiver, and base station controller.”42 Anytime a person receives or
makes a cell phone call, the carrier stores that information.43 It should be
noted that even when a cell phone user is not placing a call, his or her
location can be identified because the phone is continuously interacting with
the mobile network.44 According to many scholars, due to the sophistication
of mobile devices, CSLI can be obtained within a few hundred feet.45
A.

Cell Site Location Information (“CSLI”)

What is typically referred to as CSLI has become a widely used
method for the government to help fight crime.46 Although it has recently
been used to combat criminal activity, many fear that obtainment of this
information infringes on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.47 Courts
frequently differentiate between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI, also
38.
See CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, CTIA’S Wireless Industry Survey
Results, (2013), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf.
39.
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 681 (2011).
40.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “Davis’s Fourth Amendment
argument raises issues of first impression in this circuit, and not definitively decided
elsewhere in the country”); Malone, supra note 26, at 703 (stating that “many people probably
do not consider how this technology works or what information they may inadvertently be
sharing with their cell phone company”).
41.
Malone, supra note 26, at 707–08.
42.
Christopher Fox, Comment, Checking In: Historic Cell Site Location
Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 773–74 (2012).
43.
See id.
44.
Malone, supra note 26, at 708.
45.
Id. at 704.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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known as prospective CSLI.48 This distinction between real-time and
historical CSLI is vital in the evaluation and response to privacy issues.49
Courts have yet to sufficiently address whether CSLI deserves any
constitutional protection at all.50 The major issue facing CSLI among legal
scholars is whether a warrant should be required to obtain historical CSLI.51
Before one can obtain a warrant, probable cause must be established.52 Even
before one can delve into this complex constitutional issue, two questions
must be answered.53 The first question is whether collecting CSLI is
considered a search; if it is considered a search, then there must be
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.54 Second, if obtaining CSLI is not
considered a search, then what standard must the government meet in order
to obtain historical CSLI?55
1.

Historical Versus Real-Time Location Information

Historical CSLI records are obtained from a past date in time and
only provide “the date, time, and duration of calls, whether calls are inbound
or outbound, and show the originating and terminating cell sites for calls
received or placed on the phone.”56 Cell phone carriers retain this
information for a given amount of time for business purposes.57 Real-time
CSLI permits the government in present time to track a cell phone user’s
whereabouts.58 The majority of courts faced with requests for real-time
CSLI consistently have held the material is considered “tracking information
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which requires a warrant—and thus a
showing of probable cause—before an order for disclosure of that CSLI may
48.
Malone, supra note 26, at 704.
49.
Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is
Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1875,
1884 (2011).
50.
Malone, supra note 26, at 704.
51.
Id. at 704–05.
52.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause . . . .”).
53.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1887.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical
Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2011,
at 1, 10.
57.
Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old
Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 571, 579–80 (2012).
58.
See id. at 582.
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be granted.”59 The real debate, however, regarding CSLI concerns historical
data, as seen in Davis.60 Courts have interpreted historical CSLI to be
overseen by section 201 of the Stored Communications Act.61
a.

The Stored Communications Act

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 oversees the
discovery of CSLI.62
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
encompasses the Stored Communications Act in title two and “serve[s] as the
basic statutory framework within which CSLI jurisprudence has
developed.”63 Congress passed the Stored Communications Act to combat
privacy concerns regarding the voluntary obtainment of consumers’ personal
information.64 Under the Stored Communications Act, the government
cannot simply compel communication companies, specifically cell phone
companies, to turn over private customer information such as telephone
numbers and call logs.65 In addition, the communication companies are
similarly constricted in their ability to turn over customer information to the
government.66
Under the Stored Communications Act, a government agency may
compel a communication service provider to provide the “contents of a wire
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only
pursuant to a warrant.”67 Under section 201 of the Stored Communications
Act, the government may therefore obtain the actual location of a cell phone
subscriber in real time only when the government agency obtains a warrant

59.
Malone, supra note 26, at 710; see also Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 § 108, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
60.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); Malone, supra note 26, at 710–11.
61.
Stored Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(2012); Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d
Cir. 2010); Malone, supra note 26, at 710.
62.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894.
See generally Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
63.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894; see also Stored Communications Act §
201.
64.
See Harkins, supra note 49, at 1899.
65.
Harkins, supra note 49 at 1896; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). “The SCA
regulates government access to stored user account information compiled by third parties in
the ordinary course of business.” Harkins, supra note 49, at 1896.
66.
Blank, supra note 56, at 11.
67.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Malone, supra note 26, at 718.
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pursuant to probable cause.68 While § 2703(a) only allows the government
to obtain real-time location information pursuant to a warrant, § 2703(c)
permits the government to obtain historical location information.69 To obtain
historical information,
[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service or remote computing service to disclose a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity:
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; . . . (B) obtains a court order
for such disclosure; [or] . . . (D) submits a formal written request
relevant to a law enforcement investigation . . . .70

Accordingly, the government, pursuant to § 2703(c), may obtain
records of cell phone subscribers with a court order by following § 2703(d)
of the codified Stored Communications Act.71
The Stored Communications Act, section 201, sets forth the
requirements needed for a government agency to obtain a court order, which
would compel a carrier to turn over the information of a subscriber.72 This
subsection of the statute allows the government to obtain the location
information “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”73
Although most scholars and courts acknowledge that “a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber”74 refers to historical CSLI, the
central dispute involves what standard should be employed by courts to
68.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). According to the Act, a
government agency may obtain the actual location of a subscriber’s communications only
when the agency obtains a warrant pursuant to probable cause required by the Fourth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
69.
U.S. CONST. amend IV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (c).
70.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), three
qualifications must be met: [F]irst, the CSP must be a provider of an electronic
communication service; second, the data may not be content information as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” an electronic communications service.

Fraser, supra note 57, at 583 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)); see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).
71.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d); Fraser, supra note 57, at 585.
72.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
73.
Id.
74.
Id. § 2703(c)(1).
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authorize disclosure of historical CSLI.75 “Over the last several years, the
prevailing view among the courts was that historical CSLI was governed by
the S[tored] C[ommunications] A[ct] and thus could be obtained without a
warrant pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order.”76
Conversely, many argue that a cell phone is really a tracking device
and thus outside the scope of the Stored Communications Act since a
tracking device is not within its definition of what is considered an electronic
communication.77 Therefore, in order for the government to compel a carrier
to provide historical CSLI of a subscriber, “the information must have been
stored by [a provider of electronic communications].”78 The Third Circuit,
however, has specifically addressed this issue and determined that a cell
phone is not considered a tracking device.79
b.

Third Circuit Opinion

In its holding, the Third Circuit articulated that by its nature, CSLI is
not considered a tracking device and therefore should not be held to the
higher probable cause standard.80 The Third Circuit decision was the first on
the appellate level that decided “whether a court can deny a [g]overnment
application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the [g]overnment has satisfied its
burden of proof under that provision.”81 The government in In re
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government82
submitted a request to the magistrate judge for a court order to obtain
75.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010).
76.
Malone, supra note 26, at 721; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
77.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12) (2012); Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
78.
Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
79.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 309, 313.
80.
Id. at 313.
We therefore cannot accept the MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be
considered information from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires
probable cause for its production.
In sum, we hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under §
2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination. . . . The MJ erred in allowing her impressions of the general
expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into anything else. We
also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than probable cause, a conclusion
that . . . is supported by the legislative history.

Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
81.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 305–06.
82.
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
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historical CSLI.83 The magistrate judge denied the government’s request and
insisted on a government showing of probable cause when obtaining CSLI.84
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the magistrate’s ruling and held
“that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a [court] order and that
such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination.”85
Notwithstanding the Third Circuit decision, some still believe that a
cell phone is considered a tracking device when the government is
attempting to obtain real-time or prospective data.86 Although many scholars
support this contention, this Comment from here on focuses solely on
historical CSLI.87
Even though government agencies frequently use historical CSLI to
investigate criminal activity throughout the country,88 a few scholars and
courts believe section 2703(d) should be discarded and replaced with a newer
and higher standard of probable cause.89 The Third Circuit, however, has
held that to determine what standard a court should employ when a
government agency attempts to obtain historical CSLI is not an issue for the
courts to decide, and that the standard should, instead, be left up to
Congress.90
We respectfully suggest that if Congress intended to circumscribe
the discretion it gave to magistrates under § 2703(d) then
Congress, as the representative of the people, would have so
provided. Congress would, of course, be aware that such a statute
mandating the issuance of a § 2703(d) order without requiring
probable cause and based only on the Government’s word may
evoke protests by cell phone users concerned about their privacy.
The considerations for and against such a requirement would be
for Congress to balance. A court is not the appropriate forum for

83.
Id. at 305.
84.
Id. at 305, 308.
85.
Id. at 313. “We also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than
probable cause, a conclusion that . . . is supported by the legislative history.” Id.
86.
Malone, supra note 26, at 724–25.
87.
E.g., id., at 724–25; see infra Parts III–V.
88.
See Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
89.
See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010);
Malone, supra note 26, 704–05.
90.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 319.
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such balancing, and we decline to take a step to which Congress is
silent.91

This precedent-setting decision offered by the Third Circuit—while
one of the first federal circuit court decisions regarding historical CSLI—
most likely will determine how future courts will examine the governmental
obtainment of historical CSLI.92
IV.

UNITED STATES V. DAVIS: WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT
WRONG

The next section of this Comment focuses on the misguided decision
of the Eleventh Circuit in Davis.93 This section will provide evidence
showing why the court was misguided.94
A.

No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Third Party Doctrine

Although the Eleventh Circuit claims that a cell phone subscriber has
a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation of privacy may not be
one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.95 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly articulated that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to
the information a person voluntarily reveals to a third party.96 Accordingly,
if historical CSLI is considered to be information that is voluntarily given to
a third party, then it is presumed that the government obtainment of historical
CSLI is not considered a search and no warrant is required.97 To support this
argument, many opponents of a warrant requirement standard cite to the
Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller.98
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy to the voluntary information provided to a bank.99
Before his trial, the respondent sought to suppress bank records obtained

91.
Id.
92.
Malone, supra note 26, at 723.
93.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); infra Part IV.A–E.
94.
See infra Part IV.A–E.
95.
Malone, supra note 26, at 712, 733.
96.
Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506
(2012).
97.
Id.
98.
425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743–44 (1979).
99.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45.
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through a purportedly flawed subpoena.100 The lower court denied his
motion and respondent was subsequently convicted on conspiracy charges.101
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court later affirmed
the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.102 Additionally, in its
decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a person conveys personal
information to a third party, that person anticipates that the third party will
inevitably convey that personal information to the government.103
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress . . . the
expressed purpose of which . . . to require records to be maintained
because they [are useful] “in criminal . . . investigations and
proceedings.”104

Banks retain a record of their customers’ accounts to comply with
the Bank Secrecy Act, which is “merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a
proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that records
are available when they are needed.”105 The Court concluded that because
customers are aware that the information within their account is kept by the
bank—a third party—there is no Fourth Amendment right violated when that
information is conveyed to law enforcement.106
In addition to citing Miller, challengers to the warrant requirement
standard for historical CSLI also cite the Court’s decision in Smith v.
Maryland107 to bolster their argument.108 In that case the Court held—three
years after Miller—that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the telephone numbers they dialed.109 In Smith, the government
obtained an installation of a pen register on the petitioner’s phone to collect
100.
Id. at 436.
101.
Id. at 436–37.
102.
Id. at 437, 440.
103.
Rothstein, supra note 96, at 507 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
104.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1976)).
105.
Id. at 444.
106.
Id. at 444–45.
107.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
108.
See id. at 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 446; In re Application of
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
109.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
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the phone numbers he dialed.110 The police installed the pen register on the
petitioner’s phone without obtaining a warrant or court order.111 The
petitioner was suspected of participating in a robbery and subsequently
making harassing phone calls to his victim.112 With the help of the pen
register, the police were able to identify the petitioner as the robbery
suspect.113 The victim was ultimately able to identify her robber, and
thereafter, the petitioner was arrested.114 Prior to his trial, the petitioner
sought to suppress all evidence obtained from the pen register on the
contention it violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.115 The lower court ultimately denied the petitioner’s
motion to suppress and the appeal went all the way to the Supreme Court.116
Eventually, the Supreme Court held that because the information is
voluntarily conveyed to a third party, a person does not have a subjective
expectation of privacy to the phone numbers he or she dials.117 In addition,
most people are aware that the carrier retains a record of the numbers dialed
because they eventually appear on a monthly telephone bill.118
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain
secret.119

The petitioner attempted to argue that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy because the telephone calls originated in his house.120
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court quickly shut down this argument by stating
“[r]egardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the
110.
Id. at 737.
111.
Id.
112.
See id.
113.
Id.
114.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
115.
Id. at 737–38.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 743–44; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 588. “Further, in Smith v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court found that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed
records of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and therefore assumed the risk
that those records would be revealed to the police.” Fraser, supra note 57, at 588.
118.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
119.
Id. at 743.
120.
Id.
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telephone company in . . . the same way if he wished to complete his call.
The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some
other phone could make no conceivable difference . . . .”121 Even if he had
an expectation of privacy to his dialed telephone numbers, the Supreme
Court further noted that society is not willing to acknowledge this
expectation of privacy as reasonable.122
B.

Historical CSLI: A Voluntary Disclosure to a Third Party

The underlying policy argument in both Miller and Smith is
identical: When a person voluntarily reveals information to a third party
they surrender any legitimate expectation of privacy over that information.123
Courts have extended the third party argument to comprise information
regarding:
“[C]redit card statements, electric utility records, motel
registration records, and employment records.”124 Proponents of a warrant
requirement, however, challenge this line of reasoning and contend “cell
phones automatically register with cell phone towers and send location
information without any voluntary action by the user.”125 Although this may
be the case, the automatic registration of a cell phone with a tower is an
acknowledged consequence of possessing a cell phone.126
Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the
government uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes
that law enforcement agencies have reported and solved with the
help of CSLI.127

The Third Circuit, however, attempted to argue that a typical cell
phone user likely does not even realize that a carrier retains their location

121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43
(1976); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012).
“Historical CSLI has been analogized with other types of personal records, such as bank
records, that courts have ruled are [freely given] to a third party.” Malone, supra note 26, at
739.
124.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
125.
Malone, supra note 26, at 739.
126.
Id.
127.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789.
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information.128 However, this argument can easily be invalidated.129 When a
cell phone user places a call, the user must undoubtedly anticipate that their
carrier will determine their call location for billing purposes.130 How would
a carrier determine the proper billing rate for a cell phone call without
determining the subscriber’s location when making the call?131 Therefore, a
subscriber must recognize that their cell phone provider retains their location
information as part of the ordinary course of business.132
An additional argument for why historical CSLI is considered a
voluntary conveyance of information is because a cell phone user can easily
turn off their phone, thereby preventing the registration of their location with
a cell tower.133 In addition, most cell phone thieves immediately turn off the
stolen phone because they understand that their location will likely be
traceable.134 “[T]he prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions and
subscribers’ increased use of these services directly undermine the position
that cell phone customers are not voluntarily sharing their location
information with [cell site providers].”135
1.

Comparison to United States v. Davis

Similar to the telephone numbers dialed in Smith,136 and the bank
information provided to the bank in Miller,137 the defendant in Davis
128.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); Malone,
supra note 26, at 739.
129.
See Malone, supra note 26, at 739.
130.
Id. at 739–40.
131.
See id.
[A]s users become more aware of cell phone technology, there will no longer be a
widespread lack of knowledge regarding the type of location data cell phone
companies routinely collect. If people continue to use their cell phones even after
they learn and understand how historical CSLI is gathered and maintained, they
will have a much harder time arguing that the CSLI has not been voluntarily
conveyed.

Id. at 740.
132.
Id. at 739–40.
133.
Malone, supra note 26, at 740.
134.
Garth Johnston, Smart Thieves Wise Up to Smart Phones: Turn ‘Em Off
to Disable Tracking, GOTHAMIST (March 26, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2012/
03/26/smart_crooks_wise_up_on_smart_phone.php.
135.
Fox, supra note 42, at 788.
Therefore, a cell phone user has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI
that the [cell site provider] records when the user makes or receives a call because
the subscriber has voluntarily shared this information with the [cell site provider]
and assumes the risk that the [cell site provider] may turn the information over to
law enforcement agencies.

Id. at 788–89.
136.
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voluntarily transmitted his location to cell towers in order to make and
receive calls.138 The carrier then retained the location information of the
defendant for its personal business records.139 “[H]istorical [CSLI] are
records created and kept by third parties that are voluntarily conveyed to
those third parties by their customers. As part of the ordinary course of
business, cell[] phone companies collect information that identifies the cell[]
towers through which a person’s calls are routed.”140
C.

The Beeper Cases

Soon after the decisions of United States v. Knotts141 and United
States v. Karo,142 the Supreme Court decided two cases within a two-term
period that addressed the issue of governmental use of tracking devices in
determining the whereabouts of suspected drug manufacturers.143 These two
cases assist in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy to his or her precise location.144 Additionally, “[t]hese cases are
especially apt when discussing historical CSLI because they dealt with a
technology that many critics of the current interpretation of the SCA
compare to cell phones: [T]racking devices.”145
Employing the use of beepers allows law enforcement
agents to track the object the beeper has been attached to by
following the emitted signals, similar to the way in which one can
compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the
movements of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in realtime.146

In Knotts, law enforcement agents positioned a tracking beeper in a
container that was holding chloroform that agents suspected was used by the
defendants in their production of drugs.147 Law enforcement agents were
able to track the container to a remote cabin.148 With the assistance of the
137.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1976).
138.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209–10, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g
granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
139.
Id. at 1209–10.
140.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012).
141.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
142.
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
143.
Fox, supra note 42, at 780.
144.
Malone, supra note 26, at 713.
145.
Id.
146.
Fox, supra note 42, at 780 (footnote omitted).
147.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
148.
Id.
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beeper and surveillance of the defendant’s cabin, the agents were able to
obtain a search warrant.149 During the execution of the search warrant,
agents discovered a drug laboratory and subsequently arrested the
defendant.150
The defendant sought to suppress the evidence law
enforcement obtained through the warrantless tracking of the beeper.151
After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant was convicted and
sentenced for producing a controlled substance.152
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction
and found the use of the beeper to track the defendant was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.153 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
Eighth Circuit’s decision and found the defendant’s expectation of privacy
was not violated because the warrantless tracking of the beeper was not a
search within the Fourth Amendment.154 The Court reasoned that “[t]he
governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper . . . amounted
principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways.”155 Additionally, the Court noted that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy when traveling in a car on a public road because that
person voluntarily conveys that information to the public.156 The Court
therefore once again concluded that a person cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to what is voluntarily conveyed to the public.157
A similar fact pattern involving a beeper occurred in Karo.158 After
the defendants purchased cans of ether from a confidential informant that
were used in the extraction of cocaine from clothes that had been imported
into the United States, the government secured a warrant that allowed the
installation and tracking of a beeper in one of the cans.159 Once the
defendant picked the cans of ether up from the informant, the agents then
followed the defendant to his home.160 After the cans were moved to a
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–82.

When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
157.
Id. at 281–82.
158.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
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number of locations, through the use of the beeper, the government agents
finally discovered that the cans were at the house rented by the defendants.161
The agents then obtained a warrant to search the house and subsequently
discovered the defendants’ cocaine and laboratory paraphernalia.162 The
defendants were consequently arrested and moved to suppress the evidence
derived from the initial warrant to install the beeper.163
After the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s suppression of evidence, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.164 The Court ultimately decided that although the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the government installed
the beeper on the ether can, the monitoring of the can when it was inside the
defendant’s home was considered an unreasonable search.165 Unlike Knotts,
as the Court noted, the beeper in Karo showed that it was inside the
defendants’ home. 166 The Court furthermore held that the use of a beeper to
track a person in his or her private residence that is not open to visual
surveillance is considered a search within the Fourth Amendment.167
Where exactly the beepers were broadcasting their precise location is
the key difference between these two cases.168 The most significant question
to ask when one is studying electronic surveillance cases is “what kind of
information can be collected and whether that sort of information would be
freely available to, say, a passerby?”169 Moreover, these two cases inevitably
created a public/private distinction to evaluate the use of warrantless tracking
devices and their potential Fourth Amendment implications.170

161.
Id. at 708–10.
162.
Id. at 710.
163.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 710. “The [d]istrict [c]ourt granted respondents’
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the . . . residence on the grounds that the
initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid and that the . . . seizure was the tainted fruit of
an unauthorized installation and monitoring of that beeper.” Id.
164.
Id. at 710–11.
165.
Id. at 713, 715.
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course,
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the
interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.

Id. at 715.
166.
(1983).
167.
168.
169.
170.
U.S. at 284.

Karo, 468 U.S. at 710, 715; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
Malone, supra note 26, at 715.
Id. at 716.
Fox, supra note 42, at 782; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 468
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CSLI Differs from Beeper Cases

Supporters of a warrant requirement for CSLI argue that the same
analysis used in the beeper cases should be employed in CSLI cases.171
Employing the same public/private analysis, however, would be
superfluous.172
[C]urrently CSLI is not consistently accurate enough to implicate
the home of a suspect, but rather only indicates the general area
where the call was made from, which may or may not give rise to
the inference that the defendant was at home. Knotts and Karo
make clear that acquiring location information about an object in
the vicinity of the home or other private space, but not within its
interior, is not a search.173

In addition, “historical CSLI does not convey information about the
interior of a home.”174 Unlike the beeper cases that provide a precise
location of the tracking device, historical CSLI typically only reveals the
location of a cell phone within roughly 200 feet.175
[T]he historical [CSLI] at issue identif[ies] only the closest cell[]
tower to the Defendants’ phones, and not the precise location of
the Defendants themselves. . . . Indeed, even with an ever-denser
cell[] tower grid, such precision is impossible. Moreover, even if
cell site records could definitively indicate that an individual is in
his home, that information only reveals that a person made or
received a phone call while at home—in other words, nonincriminatory information that is clearly obtainable via the
constitutional pen register at issue in Smith v. Maryland.176

171.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789. “Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly
accurate, it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo, as that information will
allow law enforcement to determine if a suspect is in his or her home.” Fraser, supra note 57,
at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
172.
See Fraser, supra note 57, at 611–12. “The tracker beeper cases simply do
not carry over well to a tracking device that has other uses; there is a need for a different
distinction in CSLI analysis.” Id. at 612.
173.
Id. at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
174.
Malone, supra note 26, at 737.
175.
Id. “Unless a person is standing in the middle of a residence and the walls
are 100 feet away in any direction, his historical CSLI will not be precise enough to prove that
he is actually inside the walls of the residence and secluded from the public eye.” Id.
176.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (D. Md. 2012); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Malone, supra note 26, at 738. “CSLI
cannot indicate with certainty anything about the interior of a private residence. Thus, the
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Consequently, unlike the more precise tracking of a beeper,
historical CSLI does not provide a precise location of a cell phone because
the cell tower only gives an approximate location.177 Because historical
CSLI substantially differs from beeper tracking, “CSLI falls outside of the
traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Accordingly, when a law
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI information to
approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.”178
D.

United States v. Jones

The most recent case that dealt with Fourth Amendment implications
on tracking devices occurred in United States v. Jones.179 In Jones, the
government secured a search warrant to install a GPS on a vehicle that was
registered to the respondent’s wife.180 The government suspected the
respondent of trafficking drugs through his nightclub and accordingly sought
the warrant to allow the government to install the electronic tracking
device.181 The warrant authorized the government to install and track the car
in the District of Columbia for only ten days.182 Disobeying the terms of the
warrant, the government installed the device in Maryland on the eleventh
day.183 Signals from the device documented the vehicle’s location within
roughly one hundred feet.184 With help from the tracking device, the
government was able to obtain an indictment against the respondent and

Fourth Amendment does not protect historical CSLI, and current law does not require a
warrant or probable cause to obtain historical CSLI.” Malone, supra note 26, at 738.
177.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789. “This information does not provide the actual
location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower location used to carry a call
and because location calculations based on cell towers give only an approximation of a
subscriber’s phone’s location.” Id. at 789.
178.
Id. at 790.
If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate location of the cell phone at the
initiation of the call can be computed. This approximate location, however,
provides the general area of the caller, not the exact location. A tracking beeper, on
the other hand, can be traced to a precise location. . . . [H]istoric CSLI cannot show
that a subscriber was at a particular place at a particular time; it can only show that
the phone was in a general area.

Id. at 789–90.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012).
Id. at 1–2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2.
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several of his co-conspirators, charging them with conspiracy to distribute
cocaine.185
Prior to trial, the respondent sought to suppress the evidence
obtained from the GPS tracking, arguing that the installation and tracking of
the GPS on the vehicle was an unreasonable search within the Fourth
Amendment.186 The court, however, only suppressed the evidence obtained
through the GPS while the vehicle was parked in the garage of the
respondent’s house.187 Subsequently, the respondent was convicted at
trial.188 The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the evidence acquired from the warrantless tracking of the GPS
violated the Fourth Amendment.189
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, indicated that the case was primarily about the physical
intrusion by the government onto private property for the sole purpose of
obtaining evidence.190 “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion
would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.”191 The Court, therefore, predominantly
based its decision on the common law trespass doctrine.192 The physical
trespass by the government to install the GPS device, outside the
requirements set forth by the warrant, violated the respondent’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.193
1.

Why Jones Analysis Does Not Apply

The Eleventh Circuit in Davis erroneously applied the analysis set
forth by the Supreme Court in Jones to arrive at its holding.194 Several
reasons exist why the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to
historical CSLI cases.195

185.
Id. at 2–3.
186.
Id. at 2.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 3.
189.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op at 3.
190.
Id. at 4.
191.
Id. at 4.
192.
Id. “The majority decided only that a search occurs when the government
trespasses on an individual’s property for the purpose of gathering information.” Rothstein,
supra note 96, at 501.
193.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–3, 12.
194.
See id. at 3–4; United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212, 1214 (11th
Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
195.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3–4; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620.
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First, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that GPS tracking and CSLI are
analogous.196 As previously discussed, the tracking produced by a GPS and
historical CSLI yield different levels of accuracy when determining an
individual’s location.197 In Jones, the device was attached to a car, and the
law enforcement agents tracked its movements in real-time.198 In Davis,
however, the government did not track the suspects movements in real-time;
the government simply obtained historical CSLI which does not track an
individual’s precise real-time movements.199 “Historical cell site location
data is, as its name implies, historical—the information revealed by such data
exposes to the government only where a suspect was and not where he is.”200
In addition, unlike Jones, the agents in Davis obtained records from
the defendant’s cell phone carrier that only revealed the vicinity in which he
made or received a cell phone call.201 And, unlike Jones, “this information
can only reveal the general vicinity in which a cell[] phone is used.”202 The
court even noted that “[w]e do not doubt that there may be a difference in
precision, but that is not to say that the difference in precision has
constitutional significance.”203 This argument is flawed because a person
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to everything, and a
person’s precise location is vital in determining whether their Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated.204 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
erred when it compared the tracking device employed in Jones to the
historical CSLI employed in Davis.205
Next, the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to the Davis
case because there was no trespass in Davis.206 Nevertheless, although the
court addresses this factual distinction, it still used Jones to arrive at its
decision.207
[I]n the controversy before us there was no GPS device, no
placement, and no physical trespass. Therefore, although Jones
clearly removes all doubt as to whether electronically transmitted
196.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213.
197.
See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text.
198.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2.
199.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 613–14.
200.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (D. Md. 2012).
201.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2; Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; Graham,
846 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
202.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at
2.
203.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216.
204.
See e.g., Fraser, supra note 57, at 609–13.
205.
See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213–14, 1216; Fraser, supra note 57, at 613.
206.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 4.
207.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
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location information can be protected by the Fourth Amendment it
is not determinative as to whether the information in this case is so
protected. The answer to that question is tied up with the
emergence of the privacy theory of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. While Jones is not controlling, we reiterate that it is
instructive.208

Such an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s analysis set forth in Jones
further demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit got it wrong.209 Because the
obtainment of one’s historical CSLI does not involve a physical trespass to
one’s property, the Eleventh Circuit should not have employed the trespass
theory to analyze the possible Fourth Amendment implications.210 Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit should have employed the analysis set forth in Katz—to
determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society was willing to accept as reasonable—to his CSLI.211
E.

Katz Analysis Applied to Davis

If the Eleventh Circuit decided to instead employ the Katz analysis it
would have found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.212 Conversely, even if the court found that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it would have found that society would
not be willing to accept that expectation of privacy as reasonable because his
location was voluntarily conveyed to the public through his cell phone
provider.213
The Eleventh Circuit stated that:
[E]ven on a person’s first visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a
bookie, or a priest, one may assume that the visit is private if it
was not conducted in a public way. One’s cell phone, unlike an
automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere. Thus, the
208.
209.

Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620.

While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of Jones will be, the
Court’s narrow holding that the installation and use of the GPS device was a search
provides little guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain historical
CSLI records. First, with respect to cell phones, the government does not have to
install the devise used to generate location information—the user is already
carrying around his or her cell phone.

Fraser, supra note 57, at 620; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
210.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012).
211.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Graham, 846 F.
Supp. 2d at 396.
212.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 396–401.
213.
See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99; Malone, supra note 26, at 733.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

159

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

262

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

exposure of the [CSLI] can convert what would otherwise be a
private event into a public one. . . . [CSLI] is private in nature
rather than being public.214

However, as previously indicated, “historical CSLI are the
provider’s business records, and are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”215 Because the defendant’s historical CSLI was retained by
his cell phone provider within its ordinary course of business, the defendant
had no expectation of privacy to those records and consequently his Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated.216 Therefore, because the Eleventh
Circuit disregarded the third party doctrine in arriving at its decision, it got it
wrong when it comes to historical CSLI and the Fourth Amendment.217
V.

CONCLUSION

Requiring a warrant each time law enforcement wishes to obtain
historical CSLI would hinder the efforts of law enforcement and slow down
their ability to investigate crimes.218 While society’s dependence on cell
phones continues to grow and the government’s need to solve crimes
continuously persists, a uniform standard to obtain historical CSLI needs to
be addressed by Congress.219 However, as the Third Circuit articulated, it is
not for the courts to decide what standard should be employed to obtain these
records, but it is for Congress to decide.220 The Eleventh Circuit failed to
follow its sister circuit in this regard.221
As discussed at length, historical CSLI is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.222 The Stored Communications Act223 helps protect citizens
and enables law enforcement to efficiently do their job.224 Because a cell
phone user does not have a legitimate expectation to privacy to the records
voluntarily conveyed to their cell phone provider, the Fourth Amendment is

214.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
215.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV.
216.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV.
217.
See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–400.
218.
Malone, supra note 26, at 744.
219.
Fox, supra note 42, at 792.
220.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
221.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17.
222.
See Fox, supra note 42, at 792.
223.
See generally Stored Communications Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710 (2012).
224.
Malone, supra note 26, at 745; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
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not implicated.225 The Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze Davis properly and
consequently its decision was misguided.226
After the submission of this Comment, the government filed a
petition for rehearing en banc.227 With a majority of judges agreeing in favor
of rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately vacated the Davis decision.228

225.
Malone, supra note 26, at 745.
226.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210; see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp.
2d 384, 403 (D. Md. 2012); Fraser, supra note 57, at 613; Malone, supra note 26, at 745.
227.
See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1223.
228.
Id.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In public and private schools, disabled children are being restrained
and secluded against their will.1 One Florida disabled student was restrained
in a hot dog roll, which is when teachers roll the student up in blankets.2
After the school admitted the teachers had rolled the child up for fun, the
parents then realized their child had odd reactions to blankets and towels at
home.3 Another autistic student, who weighs only fifty-two pounds and is in
second grade, was restrained and pinned down to the floor repeatedly.4 His
mother said the teachers “bust[ed] his lip, bruis[ed] his torso and arm, and
sprain[ed] his neck on different occasions.”5 When the mother found the
bruises, she filed a no-restraint letter with the school, but despite this, the
abuse continued.6
Additionally, another disabled student—who was
crying—was restrained in a chair at a public school by a teacher using
packing tape.7 The twenty-one year old teacher taped the five-year-old
disabled student to a chair so tightly that he could not move, and then turned
the chair upside down.8 The teacher said he did this as a form of discipline,
and would not release the student until he stopped crying.9 On another
1.
See infra Part II.
2.
Parent Story: Who Will Care About Our Children Once EducRAT$
Cleanse, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PREVENTION OF TEACHER ABUSE, http://endteacherabuse.org/
Musumeci.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
3.
Id.
4.
Technique Leaves Second-Grader with Bruises, Sprain, Busted Lip Isaiah
Moore, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at A8.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Man Charged with Abuse After Taping Student into Chair Police Say Boy,
5, Unhurt, Suffered ‘Mental Anguish’, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2011, at B2.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
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occasion, another student put the same child into a trashcan, and the teacher
pushed him down so he could not get out of the trashcan.10 This teacher was
arrested for aggravated child abuse.11 Another abuse incident transpired
when an aide broke a disabled student’s arm at an elementary school.12 The
school fired the special education aide, who was also a behavioral specialist,
for using inappropriate discipline but was not arrested on criminal charges.13
This is what occurs daily in our Florida public schools.14 Florida and federal
statutes do not prohibit the restraining and secluding of disabled students.15
Florida and federal statutes ought to limit restraining and secluding disabled
students to emergency purposes only.16
This Comment analyzes the problems with the current Florida laws
on restraining and secluding disabled children in school.17 Part II explains
the historical aspects of federal statutes regarding disabled children from
1973 until the present.18 Part III examines the history of all past and current
federal statutes that have been proposed in both the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate from 2009 through 2015.19 None of
these bills have been enacted yet.20 Part IV surveys Florida statutes and
regulations concerning disabled students, when school personnel are allowed
to restrain or seclude them and how the school personnel are supposed to
document and record the incidents.21 Part V scrutinizes how schools violate
disabled students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by inflicting corporal
punishment on them.22 Part V also analyzes disabled students’ procedural
due process rights and their substantive due process rights.23 Part VI
provides recommendations on how to prevent school personnel from
restraining and secluding disabled students in school improperly and to only
restrain or seclude students if they are an imminent threat to themselves or
others around them.24

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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Id.
Id.
NAT’L ASS’N FOR PREVENTION OF TEACHER ABUSE, supra note 2.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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FEDERAL STATUTES REGARDING DISABLED CHILDREN

The Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was passed in 1990 to
protect the civil rights of individuals with disabilities.25 Title II of the ADA
specifically prohibits discrimination of individuals with disabilities.26 The
school district falls under Title II Chapter 2.8000 of the ADA as a public
service.27 Congress had to clarify what it intended when it passed the ADA
in 2008.28 In September of 2008, President Barack Obama signed into law
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADA
AA”).29 This law came into effect on January 1, 2009.30 Congress passed
the ADA AA because the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions
interpreted the ADA’s definition of a disability too narrowly.31 Congress
explained that the ADA AA rejects the high burden from the Supreme Court
and reiterates Congress’ intent for the scope of the ADA to be broad and
inclusive, not narrow.32 Congress specified that “[i]t is the intent of the
legislation to establish a degree of functional limitation required for an
impairment to constitute a disability that is consistent with what Congress
25.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012);
NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SCHOOL IS NOT SUPPOSED TO HURT: THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION MUST DO MORE TO PROTECT SCHOOL CHILDREN FROM RESTRAINT
AND SECLUSION 41 (2012), available at www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/School_is_Not_Supposed_to_Hurt_3_v7.pdf.
26.
42 U.S.C. § 12132; Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008 for Students with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools,
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.
OFFICE
FOR
CIV.
RTS.,
(Jan.
19,
2012),
U.S.
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-504faq-201109.html (last modified Jan. 19,
2012).
27.
Dep’t of Justice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical
Assistance Manual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services,
http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html (last visited Sep. 2, 2015); Protecting Students with
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children
with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIV. RTS. (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html (last modified Dec. 19, 2013).
28.
Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26.
29.
Id.; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 1,
122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12201 (2012)).
30.
§ 8, 122 Stat. at 3559.
31.
Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also
§ 2, 122 Stat. at 3553.
32.
Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also
§ 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
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originally intended.”33 In this amendment, it also broadens the scope of
major life activities, and provides a non-exhaustive list of both general
activities and bodily functions.34
B.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)—now
29 U.S.C. § 794—prohibits any program that receives federal financial
assistance to deny a qualified handicapped person benefits, exclude
participation, or be subjected to discrimination solely due to the person’s
handicap.35 The ADA AA affects the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by
changing what it means to have a disability.36 This amendment now
broadens the scope of a disability, and students who were denied before
based on the narrow definition of disability, might now be able to qualify
under the broader definition.37 Section 504 requires that a free appropriate
public education (“FAPE”) be provided to all students that qualify with a
disability.38
C.

Title II of the ADA of 1990

Title II of the ADA of 1990 prohibits discrimination due to a
person’s disability.39 Title II cannot be construed to any lesser standard other
than the standards under Section 504 and its implementing regulations.40
Title II prohibits discrimination by all state and local government services,
33.
Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26.
34.
§ 3, 122 Stat. at 3555; see also 34 C.F.R. 104.3(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2013);
Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/rights/guid/
ocr/disability.html (last modified Sept. 21, 2012).
35.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.1, .4; Protecting Students with
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children
with Disabilities, supra note 27.
36.
Disability Discrimination, supra note 34; Protecting Students with
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children
with Disabilities, supra note 27; see also § 3, 122 Stat. 3555.
37.
See § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555; Disability Discrimination, supra note 34.
38.
Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, supra note 27; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 794.
39.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Letter from
Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleague 2 (May 14, 2014),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405-charter.pdf.
40.
Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also
29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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programs, and activities—which include public schools—regardless of
whether the state or local government service receives any federal financial
assistance.41
D.
History of the Protection and Advocacy System and the National
Disability Rights Network
The federally mandated Protection and Advocacy System (“P&A”)
program is located in every state in the country.42 The P&A program
provides support for people with mental, emotional, intellectual, and physical
disabilities.43 The National Disability Rights Network (“NDRN”) is a
nonprofit organization for P&A, which allows NDRN to try and make a
society that gives disabled individuals equal opportunities, where they can
exert their meaningful choices and their autonomy.44 Through legal
assistance, legislative advocacy, and training assistance, NDRN hopes to
create a better society for disabled individuals.45 However, while these
programs are all in place to help disabled individuals, the Office of Special
Education Programs (“OSEP”) is directly accountable for administering the
implementation of special education laws.46
NDRN published its first report in 2009 on restraint and seclusion in
schools and found that, notwithstanding twenty years of allegations of abuse,
nineteen states had no laws on restraint and seclusion to protect children in
school.47 Florida was one of the states that did not have any laws on restraint
41.
Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, supra note 27; Questions and
Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students with Disabilities Attending Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
42.
NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 42.
43.
Id. at 42–43.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND
RESTRAINTS: SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND
TREATMENT CENTERS 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]; Darcie
Ahern Mulay, Keeping All Students Safe: The Need for Federal Standards to Protect
Children from Abusive Restraint and Seclusion in Schools, 42 STETSON L. REV. 325, 327 n.12
(2012) (finding that the other remaining states that do have laws on restraining and secluding
children are very limited and ineffective for its purpose). But see JESSICA BUTLER, THE
AUTISM NAT’L COMM., HOW SAFE IS THE SCHOOLHOUSE?: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SECLUSION
RESTRAINT
LAWS
AND
POLICIES
57–58
(2015),
available
at
AND
http://www.autcom.org/pdf/HowSafeSchoolhouse.pdf (documenting that of the laws that go
into effect on March 18, 2015, seventeen states—including Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
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and seclusion in schools in 2009.48 The Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) then reported that restraint and seclusion laws vary from state-tostate and are very broad in their interpretation.49 The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires that students aged three to
twenty-one receive education in the least restrictive environment.50
E.

History of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

On November 29, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act (“EHA”)—also known as Public Law 94142—into law.51 The EHA was passed to help disabled children attend
school and to not be discriminated against while in school.52 Before the
EHA passed in 1970, schools in the United States only educated one in five
children who had disabilities.53 During this time, most states had laws
excluding students who were deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, or mentally
retarded.54 The EHA was amended in 1990, and is now called IDEA.55
IDEA was passed to specifically protect children with disabilities.56
There are landmark cases furthering educational support for disabled
students.57 Cases like Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania58 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of
Columbia59 recognized that states and local neighborhoods have the

Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming—do not have a
specific statute, regulation, or guideline on secluding and restraining children in schools).
48.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 4 n.4.
49.
Id. at 4.
50.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3.
51.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–
142, 89 Stat. 773 (amended 1990); The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services Celebrates 35 Years of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
OF
SPECIAL
EDUC.
&
REHABILITATIVE
SERVS.,
http:/
OFFICE
/www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/index.html (last modified June 6, 2012).
52.
History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities through IDEA, OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., http://
www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last modified July 19, 2007).
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
20 U.S.C. § 1400.
56.
History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities through IDEA, supra note 52.
57.
Id.
58.
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam).
59.
348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D.C 1972).
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responsibility to educate children with disabilities.60 In Mills, the court held
that children with disabilities have the right to be educated because the right
to an education is protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.61
The United States has made progress to better accommodate disabled
children’s basic needs.62 Nevertheless, even though disabled students were
being accommodated, they were accommodated not so they could go to
school, but so they could go to state institutions.63 At these state-run
institutions, they were provided with minimal food, shelter, and clothes,
which is not in itself very accommodating.64 The United States finally
started making programs for the disabled students and their families.65
Through IDEA, children with disabilities now receive FAPE in every state in
the United States, which is provided by OSERS.66 IDEA and FAPE were a
response to the millions of disabled students who were either excluded from
being educated, or had limited access to education.67
Now disabled children are able to attend schools, become educated,
and become productive members of society, instead of being in state
institutions.68 With the implementation of IDEA and FAPE, disabled
students are now attending high school graduation, going to college, and
finding employment.69 These implementations are moving this country in
the right direction; however, there is still more work to be done.70 What
these federal laws have tried to implement is a safeguard for disabled

60.
Id. at 878; Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1259–60;
History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through
IDEA, supra note 52.
61.
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868, 875; see also History: Twenty-Five Years of
Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52.
62.
See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878; History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in
Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52.
63.
See History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services Celebrates 35
Years of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 51.
67.
History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52; see also Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(9), (c), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (amended 1990).
68.
History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 51; see also Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, § 3(b)(9), (c), 89 Stat. at 775.
69.
See History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52.
70.
See id.
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children to attend school and be accommodated.71 With these laws also
came federal training assistance for special education teachers and related
specialists.72 However, all of this training for special education teachers and
related specialists fell short because there are hundreds of cases of disabled
students being restrained and secluded in Florida schools.73 When these
disabled children are restrained and secluded against their will, although they
sometimes may not be hurt physically, they are hurt mentally and
emotionally.74 Some cases have been reported of disabled children who were
restrained or secluded, and as a consequence, were physically injured, and in
rare cases some children have even died.75
IDEA authorizes the federal government to give funds to states for
educating disabled children as long as the state complies with the provisions
of IDEA.76 All disabled students are located and evaluated to establish if the
child is eligible for special education and related services that the state
offers.77 If a child is accepted for special education, the child’s parents and
school personnel develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”).78
An IEP is a document that explains the goals of the student and what services
are to be provided to the student.79 The IEP was created to give the student
goals, cater to the student’s unique needs, and provide services throughout
the student’s education in order to improve their learning capabilities while

71.
See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 3(c), 89 Stat.
at 775; History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities
Through IDEA, supra note 52.
72.
History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52. Acts were enacted to expand training of teachers
in all disability areas. Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282;
Captioned Films Act of 1961; Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-276, 75 stat.
575 (which trained teachers for deaf students); The Training of Professional Personnel Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-158, 73 stat. 339 (trained teachers on how to teach mentally retarded
students); Captioned Films Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-905, 72 Stat. 1742 (trained teachers
for students who had mental retardation).
73.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7–8.
74.
Id. at 8.
75.
Id.
76.
NANCY LEE JONES & CAROL J. TOLAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40521,
THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): SELECTED JUDICIAL
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE 2004 REAUTHORIZATION 1 (2009).
77.
Id.
78.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3.
79.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 47, at 3.
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in school.80 With the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA, Congress required the
U.S. Department of Education to create model forms for IEP, prior written
notice, and procedural safeguards.81
F.

Guidelines from U. S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan

On July 31, 2009, U. S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan sent a
letter to all Chief State School Officers and advised each state to review its
current policies on restraint and seclusion.82 In Mr. Duncan’s letter, he
advised the Chief State School Officers of a technique that is available called
positive behavior interventions and support (“PBIS”).83 He urged schools to
apply the PBIS technique to all students, staff, and all places in school so that
eventually restraining and secluding any child would be unnecessary.84 He
also urged schools to start reporting incidents where students were restrained
or secluded.85 Mr. Duncan wanted these reports to be published so other
students, administrators, teachers, and parents of children can consent to the
procedures and techniques used at a particular school.86 Furthermore, in
2009, the U.S. Department of Education “asked its regional Comprehensive
Centers to collect [every] [s]tate’s statutes, regulations, policies, and
guidelines [relating to] the use of restraint and seclusion” in school.87 This
information was then posted on the U.S. Department of Education’s
website.88 Additionally, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (“SAMHSA”)—which is affiliated with the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services—asked the OSEP to look at a paper written
by SAMHSA concerning abusive restraints and seclusions in school.89 The
OSEP concluded, after reading the report, that it would benefit everyone at
school, but especially students “if information and technical assistance were
provided to [s]tate departments of education, local school districts, and
preschool, elementary, and secondary schools” to help reduce restraint and
80.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3; DISABILITY
RIGHTS SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS 15 (2009),
available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.pdf.
81.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON
REQUIRED CONTENT OF FORMS UNDER PART B OF THE IDEA 1 (2009).
82.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: RESOURCE DOCUMENT
4–5 (2012).
83.
Id. at iii, 5, 25.
84.
Id. at iii.
85.
See id. at 5.
86.
Id.
87.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
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seclusion.90 The information and technical assistance provided to the
schools, instruct schools to use restraint or seclusion only when a student is
an immediate, serious, physical danger to himself or others.91
In the GAO report documenting instances of abuse from 1990–2009,
most of the instances where children were restrained or secluded were due to
“problems with untrained or poorly trained staff.”92 The GAO report
presented four encompassing themes: (1) disabled children were restrained
and secluded when there was no physically aggressive trigger and when their
parents did not give consent for those techniques to be used; (2) a disabled
child restrained face-down or a restraint that blocks the airway so no air can
get to the lungs can make the child die; (3) school personnel were not trained
on how to properly restrain and seclude disabled children; and (4) school
personnel that were not properly trained on how to restrain and seclude
children and have seriously injured or killed them, are still employed as
teachers.93
On May 19, 2009, “[t]he GAO report was presented to the U.S.
House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor [during] a
hearing [regarding] restraint and seclusion.”94 During this hearing and other
hearings on the same issue, other testimony was also presented, such as
disabled students who were abused by being restrained or secluded in
school.95 This led to the drafting of the first federal legislation to protect
students from being restrained or secluded in school.96
The U.S. Department of Education recognizes that all districts and
all states can surpass the fifteen principles framework, but all states are going
to be urged strongly to follow these fifteen principles.97 It gives guidelines
as to when to use restraint and seclusion, how teachers should be trained,
school policies on restraint and seclusion, and documenting restraint and
seclusion incidents.98 The fifteen principles exemplify how to reduce or
eliminate restraint and seclusion school wide.99 These fifteen principles offer
schools appropriate behavior guideline, not only to develop policies on
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 7.
93.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7.
94.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 7.
95.
Id.
96.
See id. at 7–8.
97.
Id. at 11–12.
98.
See id. at 12–13.
99.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of
Education Issues Resource Document that Discourages Restraint and Seclusion (May 15,
2012),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-issues-resourcedocument-discourages-restraint-and-seclusion.
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restraining and secluding children, but to also ensure the students’ safety as
well as the safety of the adults.100 Mr. Duncan said it best when he correctly
stated:
[T]he standard for educators should be the same standard that
parents use for their own children. . . . There is a difference
between a brief time out in the corner of a classroom to help a
child calm down and locking a child in an isolated room for hours.
This really comes down to common sense.101

III.

THERE IS NO FEDERAL STATUTE THAT ADDRESSES RESTRAINT OR
SECLUSION OF DISABLED CHILDREN IN SCHOOLS

There is no federal statute prohibiting restraint or seclusion in
schools.102 Only states have guidelines, statutes, and regulations to prohibit
types of restraint and seclusion in schools.103 Congressman George Miller—
who was chair of the Education and Labor Committee—introduced a bill
called Preventing Harmful Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act on
December 9, 2009.104 This title was shortened to Keeping All Students Safe
Act.105 It passed in the House on March 3, 2010, but it died in the Senate.106
The next bill was introduced at the same time as the previous bill on
December 9, 2009, but in the Senate by former Senator Christopher Dodd,
who was chair of the Subcommittee of Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee; however, it did not pass the Senate.107 Congressman
George Miller introduced the next bill—the Keeping All Students Safe
Act—on April 6, 2011, which died in the House.108 The most recent bill in
the Senate on prohibiting restraint and seclusion in schools was introduced
by Senator Tom Harkin—current chair of the Health, Education, Labor, and

100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
BUTLER, supra note 47, at 6–7.
103.
Id.
104.
H.R. 4247-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://
www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4247?q=%7B”search”%3A%58”
(last
visited Sep. 4, 2015).
105.
Id.
106.
See id.
107.
See S. 2860-Preventing Harmful Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/2860?q=%7B
"search"%3A%5B" (last visited Sep. 4, 2015).
108.
See H.R. 1381-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1381?q=%7B"search"%3A%5B"
(last
visited Sep. 4, 2015).
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Pensions Committee—on February 24, 2014.109 This bill is also called
Keeping All Students Safe Act, and it has been referred to the committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.110 The most recent bill introduced
in the House was by Congressmen Bobby Scott and Don Beyer on February
12, 2015—also called Keeping All Students Safe Act—has been referred to
the committee on House Education and the Workforce.111 Curt Decker—
NDRN Executive Director—asked, “‘[h]ow many more students dying and
being emotionally traumatized are needed for Congress to pass this
legislation?’”112 The Cindy Smith, Policy Counsel at NDRN urges this bill
to swiftly pass in the Senate because
federal action is needed to ensure that all students and families
have adequate protection. ‘The states have had the opportunity to
pass legislation, yet the patchwork of state laws is . . . inadequate.
A parent should know if they move from one state to another that
they will be notified if their child is restrained or secluded, yet less
than half the states require parents of all students to be notified.’113

Restraining and secluding children in mental health facilities are
prohibited because they realize the danger.114 Researchers have concluded
that restraining and secluding disabled students in school has no therapeutic
effect, and conversely it increases the student’s agitation and disruptive
behavior.115
IV.

FLORIDA RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION LAWS

In Florida, a teacher’s assistant at Coral Gables Elementary School
taped five first graders’ arms to their laps, bound their ankles together, taped
109.
S. 2036-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2036?q=%7B"search"%3A%5B"
(last
visited Sep. 4, 2015).
110.
Id.
111.
H.R. 927-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr927 (last visited Sep. 4, 2015).
112.
Press Release, Nat’l Disability Rights Network, Senate Introduces
Keeping All Students Safe Act: NDRN Urges Swift Senate Passage (Feb. 12, 2014),
available at http://www.ndrn.org/component/content/article/5/510-press-release-ndrn-urgesswift-senate-passage-.html.
113.
Id.
114.
See Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3207, 114 Stat.
1195, 1195 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 190ii (2012)).
115.
See Sandy K. Magee & Janet Ellis, The Detrimental Effects of Physical
Restraint as a Consequence for Inappropriate Classroom Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV.
ANALYSIS 501, 502–03 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1284345/pdf/11800190.pdf.
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their heads to the blackboard, and taped the chairs they sat in to the
blackboard.116 These children were only six years old.117 The teacher’s
assistant was arrested eight times for various felonies, and the school stated it
did not allow corporal punishment.118 Many children have died, have
become severely injured, physically or mentally, and have experienced
trauma from techniques like restraint and seclusion.119 Another boy in
kindergarten was restrained three times in less than one month in his U.S.
Cerebral Palsy School in Orange County.120 One of those times, he was
restrained and held face down for forty-five minutes, and the school did not
have the parents’ consent to restrain their child.121 A parent said there could
be harmful consequences every time a disabled child is restrained.122 From
this incident the boy developed “post-traumatic stress disorder, epilepsy and
autism-spectrum behaviors.”123 Now seven, the boy is still hurt from his
experience of being restrained for non-aggressive behavior, and cries for no
reason.124 His father said “[i]t damage[d] [his son’s] core belief that [he is]
safe” in school.125 Another case involved a Florida teen that had posttraumatic stress disorder from being dangerously restrained and repeatedly
secluded, and as a result the boy had to be admitted to a psychiatric
facility.126 The court did not find the school’s acts to be excessive, egregious
or a shock to the conscience, even when the school did not have parental
consent to physically restrain or seclude the child.127

116.
Mulay, supra note 47, at 325–26; Jean-Paul Renaud, Teacher, Aide
Arrested on Child-Abuse ChargesFirst-Grade Students Say They Were Tied up for
Misbehaving, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1B.
117.
Renaud, supra note 116.
118.
Id.
119.
See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 9.
120.
Lauren Roth, Orange County Schools Still Restrain the Most Students,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2012, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-08-26/news/osorange-florida-restraint-seclusion-20120825_1_restraint-and-seclusion-orange-schoolssuperintendent-barbara-jenkins.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Roth, supra note 120.
126.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., REP. ON DANGEROUS USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINTS IN SCHOOLS REMAINS
WIDESPREAD AND DIFFICULT TO REMEDY: A REVIEW OF TEN CASES 4 (Comm. Print 2014)
[hereinafter STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH CONG.].
127.
Id. at 19.
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Child with a Disability Definition
[A] child with a disability—[in general]—means a child—
(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments—including
deafness—speech or language impairments, visual impairments—
including blindness—serious emotional disturbance, referred to in
this chapter as emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related
services.
....
The term child with a disability for a child aged [three] through
[nine]—or any subset of that age range, including ages [three]
through [five]—may, at the discretion of the State and the local
educational agency, include a child—
(i) experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and
as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures,
in [one] or more of the following areas: physical development;
cognitive development; communication development; social or
emotional development; or adaptive development; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related
services.128

B.

Florida Restraint Regulations

The Department’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) started
researching and collecting data on how many times restraint and seclusion
occurred in schools in 2009.129 The OCR did this research as part of the
Department’s 2009 to 2010 Civil Rights Data Collection (“CRDC”).130 For
this study, the OCR and the CRDC had to come up with definitions for
restraint and seclusion because they had not yet been defined by federal
statute.131 Today, the Florida statutes and the Florida Administrative Code
128.
129.
130.
131.
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provide definitions and regulations on reactive strategies such as restraint
and seclusion.132 The most common type of restraint used in school on
disabled students is physical or mechanical restraint.133
Florida Statute section 393.063(32) defines restraint as “a physical
device, method, or drug used to control dangerous behavior.”134 Section
393.063 of the Florida Statutes defines physical or manual restraint as “any
manual method or physical or mechanical device, material, or equipment
attached or adjacent to an individual’s body so that he or she cannot easily
remove the restraint and which restricts freedom of movement or normal
access to one’s body.”135 The Florida Administrative Code adds to this
statute by including specific time periods and defining what physical
restraint does not include.136 The Florida Administrative Code provides that
manual restraint is when a person uses his hands or body to physically
immobilize a person’s freedom of movement or normal access to
his or her body for more than fifteen continuous seconds. It does
not include physically guiding a client during transport or skill
training for up to two minutes. Repeated applications and releases
of manual restraint in order to circumvent the fifteen-second and
two-minute criteria are prohibited.137

The term mechanical restraint is defined as “a physical device used
to restrict an individual’s movement or restrict the normal function of the
individual’s body.”138 “This term does not include devices [that are]
implemented by trained school personnel or [used] by a student” that has a
medical or service need that has been prescribed by a doctor or related
services professional, and the student is using it for its appropriate
purpose.139 Some of these approved mechanical restraint devices are devices
that support a student’s spine so the student can sit up straight, have more
132.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32)–(33); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G8.001 (2014). “Reactive strategies means . . . procedures or physical crisis management
techniques of seclusion or manual, mechanical, or chemical restraint utilized for control of
behaviors that create an emergency or crisis situation.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G8.001(15).
133.
See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 9–10; Heather
Vogell, Violent and Legal: The Shocking Ways School Kids Are Being Pinned Down, Isolated
Against Their Will, PROPUBLICA (June 19, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/schools-restraints-seclusions.
134.
FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32).
135.
Id. § 393.063(32)(a).
136.
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(12), (17).
137.
Id. r. 65G-8.001(12).
138.
Id. r. 65G-8.001(13).
139.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10; see also FLA. STAT. §
393.063(32)(b)–(c); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(13).
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mobility, and improve their balance.140 These devices are approved because
the student would not be able to do any of these things without the support
from mechanical restraints.141 Most often, mechanical restraints are “straps,
handcuffs or bungee cords.”142 Other mechanical restraints that are allowed
are mechanical safety restraints used for transportation purposes, mechanical
restraints used for medical immobilization, and orthopedically prescribed
restraint devices that allow a student to participate in activities without
causing harm to himself.143 A student who is being mechanically restrained
must be allowed to move for a minimum of ten minutes for every hour that
the student is restrained.144
Chemical restraint is using medication to control and alter a disabled
student’s behavior immediately.145 Chemical restraint is only allowed when
there is written authorization from “an authorized physician who has
[established] that the chemical [medication] is the least restrictive, most
appropriate alternative available.”146 The authorizing physician must be
present or must be on the telephone when a trained and authorized staff
person examines the disabled child.147 If a disabled child is restrained, an
authorized, certified, and trained staff member must observe the student
during the restraint to monitor heart rate and determine when the release
criteria have been reached.148 Every effort must be made before using any
type of restraint on a student.149 Restraint used for a period of more than one
hour on a disabled student “require[s] approval by an authoriz[ed] agent”; if
it exceeds two hours, then the teacher needs to visually examine the student
and receive re-approval from the authorized agent.150
140.
See FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32)(c); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G8.001(13)(c); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10.
141.
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10.
142.
Vogell, supra note 133.
143.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(13); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra
note 82, at 10.
144.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.007(10).
145.
Id. r. 65G-8.001(5), .008(1).
146.
Id. r. 65G-8.008(2).
147.
Id. r. 65G-8.008(3).
148.
Id. r. 65G-8.005(3), .007(3); .008(3). A staff member or school personal
authorized to use
mechanical restraint must be a Certified Behavior Analyst certified by the Behavior
Analyst Certification Board [R], Inc.; a behavior analyst certified by the Agency
pursuant to [s]ection 393.17 [of the Florida Statutes], and by Rule 65G-4.003 [of
the Florida Administrative Code]; a physician licensed under [c]hapter 458 or 459
[of the Florida Statutes]; a psychologist licensed under [c]hapter 490 [of the Florida
Statutes]; or a clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, or mental health
counselor licensed under [c]hapter 491 [of the Florida Statutes].

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3)(c).
149.
Id. r. 65G-8.007(1).
150.
Id. r. 65G-8.007(4)–(5).
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The following restraints are prohibited from use:
1. Reactive strategies involving noxious or painful stimuli, as
prohibited by [s]ection 393.13(4)(g), [of the Florida Statutes];
2. Untested or experimental procedures;
3. Any physical crisis management technique that might restrict or
obstruct an individual’s airway or impair breathing, including
techniques whereby staff persons use their hands or body to place
pressure on the client’s head, neck, back, chest, abdomen, or
joints;
4. Restraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical
device, behind his or her back;
5. Physical holds relying on the inducement of pain for behavioral
control;
6. Movement, hyperextension, or twisting of body parts;
7. Any maneuver that causes a loss of balance without physical
support—such as tripping or pushing—for the purpose of
containment;
8. Any reactive strategy in which a pillow, blanket, or other item is
used to cover the individual’s face as part of the restraint process;
9. Any reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life;
10. Use of any containment technique medically contraindicated
for an individual;
11. Containment without continuous monitoring and documentation of vital
signs and status with respect to release criteria . . . .151

C.

Florida Seclusion Regulations

Most people equate secluding a disabled child with putting the child
in a time out period.152 However, the Florida Administrative Code explicitly

151.
Id. r. 65G-8.009(1)–(11).
152.
See Seclusion in Developmental Disability Facilities, DISABILITY RTS.
FLA.,
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/resources/disability_topic_info/seclusion_in_
developmental_disability_facilities (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

180

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION

283

provides seclusion is not a time out.153 If a teacher puts a disabled student in
time out and it exceeds the duration of twenty consecutive minutes, the time
out has now been converted into a reactive strategy of seclusion.154
Seclusion is defined as “involuntary isolation of a person in a room or area
from which the person is prevented from leaving.”155 There must be an
authorized and trained staff member present to approve the school
personnel’s action to seclude the student.156 Any room where the disabled
student is going to be secluded must have adequate lighting and ventilation
to allow the student to breathe at a normal pace.157 The room must also have
enough space for the student to lie down comfortably.158 The door to the
room must be unlocked when the student is secluded without being
monitored by a staff member.159 “[T]he door can be held shut by a staff
person using a spring bolt, magnetic hold, or other mechanism” that enables
the student to leave the room if the teacher leaves the locale.160 Before a
teacher uses seclusion, all other options must have been used, and there must
be a threat of imminent danger to the student or to others.161 Use of a
reactive strategy must be continuously monitored, be the least possible
restriction for its use, and end when the emergency ends.162 If the seclusion
lasts for more than one hour, it needs to be approved by an authorized agent;
if it lasts more than two hours, then the teacher must observe the student
before seeking re-approval.163

153.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(16). Time out is very short and can
only last from one minute to twenty consecutive minutes. Id. r. 65G-8.001(17)(a).
154.
Id. r. 65G-8.001(17); see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155.
FLA. STAT. § 393.063(33) (2014); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
65G-8.001(16).
156.
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3)(d)–(e). The authorized staff
member must have at a minimum:
[A] bachelor’s degree, two years of experience serving individuals with
developmental disabilities, and be certified in reactive strategies through an
Agency-approved emergency procedure curriculum; and [t]he authorizing agent or
staff person with approval authority for manual restraint must be certified in
reactive strategies through an Agency-approved emergency procedure curriculum.

Id.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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Florida Statutes and Regulations That Are Supposed to Protect
Students from Restraint and Seclusion

Florida labels children with disability as exceptional students
because they are eligible for special programs and services approved by the
Board of Education.164 Special education services are defined as designed
instruction and services, which are necessary for exceptional students to
benefit from their education.165 Some special services that may be included
for exceptional students are: transportation, physical therapy, aide for the
blind, braillists, counseling, speech therapy, assistive technology devices,
and mental health services.166 Reactive strategies, such as types of restraint
and seclusion, must neither be implemented robotically—as soon as a teacher
sees or punishes undesirable behavior—nor for the convenience of school
personnel.167 The restraint and seclusion must stop when the emergency
ends.168 For a teacher to become a special education teacher, the teacher
must: (1) have received certification of a special education teacher or passed
a Florida special education teacher license exam; (2) have not had a special
education certification or license be waived for any basis; and (3) have at
least a bachelor’s degree.169
To provide meaningful protection against restraint or seclusion for
disabled students, a state can either: (1) “provide[] multiple protections
against restraint or seclusion for students”; or (2) “ha[ve] few protections but
strictly limit[] the technique to emergency threats of physical harm. This
designation does not necessarily mean that a state’s laws provide sufficient
protection . . . .”170 The State of Florida has statutes that prohibit restraint or
seclusion when the student’s breathing is compromised, but it does not limit
it to emergency situations only.171

164.
165.
166.

FLA. STAT. § 1003.01(3)(a) (2014).
Id. § 1003.01(3)(b).
Id. Special services can include:

[T]ransportation; diagnostic and evaluation services; social services; physical and
occupational therapy; speech and language pathology services; job placement;
orientation and mobility training; braillists, typists, and readers for the blind;
interpreters and auditory amplification; services provided by a certified listening
and spoken language specialist; rehabilitation counseling; transition services;
mental health services; guidance and career counseling; specified materials,
assistive technology devices, and other specialized equipment; and other such
services as approved by rules of the state board.

Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.006(2).
FLA. STAT. § 393.13(4)(h).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(10)(B) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(b) (2013).
BUTLER, supra note 47, at 12 n.33.
Id. at 14 n.35; see also FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(4).
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Florida Statute, section 393.13, provides that a disabled person has a
right to be free from harm.172 This includes any “unnecessary physical,
chemical, or mechanical restraint, isolation . . . abuse, [and] neglect.”173 This
statute also provides that discriminating against disabled children and
excluding disabled children from any program or activity that is publicly
funded is prohibited.174
Florida Statute, section 1003.57, defines five options disabled
students have for a classroom environment in school.175 The first option is
learning in a regular classroom where the disabled student spends eighty
percent or more of his time learning with non-disabled students during the
week.176 The second option is in a resource room where the disabled student
spends “[forty] to [eighty] percent of the school week with non-disabled”
students.177 The third option is in a separate class where the disabled student
“spends less than [forty] percent of the school week with non-disabled”
students.178 The fourth option is a separate environment which is where the
disabled student is sent to a “separate private school, residential facility, or
hospital or homebound program.”179 The last option is an “[e]xceptional
student education center or special day school,” where the disabled student
attends “a separate public school to which non-disabled peers do not have
access.”180 When making the IEP, after the student is found eligible to
receive an exceptional student education (“ESE”), all of these options should
be discussed with the parents and student.181 The statute also requires the
school district to communicate to the parents what services are available and
appropriate for the student.182 At the IEP meeting, the school district must
disclose how much money it receives from the state for ESE support levels
for a full time student.183 The school district must also approve the student’s
IEP if it can be implemented at the student’s current school, or deny the IEP
when it cannot be implemented at the student’s current school.184
Florida almost made it to the weak category of states on laws
protecting children, but it is now in the bottom of the states that provide
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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meaningful protection.185 Florida did not make it in the weak category of
state laws on protecting children because of its strong data collection on
abuse instances.186 Florida monitors all of its schools by district to make sure
the schools are complying with state laws, and then publishes the findings on
the Department of Education’s website.187
1.

Florida’s Monitoring and Reporting Systems

Florida’s strong monitoring system is due to the 2010 Florida
Legislature passing House Bill 1073 which created section 1003.573 of the
Florida Statutes.188 The statute, titled Restraint and Seclusion on Students
with Disabilities, directly focuses on the problem of restraining and
secluding disabled children, even though there are schools where
nondisabled children are secluded and restrained.189 Nevertheless, two years
after this statute was implemented, Florida still had problems with
monitoring and reporting.190 From 2011 to 2012, one set of data from the
Florida Department of Education stated there were four times as many
students who were secluded in rooms “than a second set of data [called] the
School Environmental Safety Incident Report (“SESIR”).”191 Some districts
only view SESIR as a place to report disciplinary incidents and not restraint
and seclusion incidents.192 Cheryl Elters, a representative for the Florida
Department of Education, stated that school district personnel do not realize
they need to record restraint and seclusion data in two places.193 The
disconnect comes from how restraint and seclusion are used in schools
because most of these techniques are used on disabled children.194 Teachers
use restraint and seclusion on disabled children and view it not as a
disciplinary action for a behavior, but they view it as a safety precaution.195
185.
BUTLER, supra note 47, at 12–13.
186.
Id. at 12–13, 92.
187.
Id. at 13, 91; see also, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2013-14 EXCEPTIONAL
STUDENT EDUCATION MONITORING AND ASSISTANCE ON-SITE VISIT REPORT FOR SEMINOLE
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 (2014), http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7673/urlt/
1314OSSeminole.pdf.
188.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573 (2014); H.R. 1073, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Fla. 2010).
189.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573; see also BUTLER, supra note 47, at 10.
190.
See Sarah Gonzalez & John O’Connor, Florida Keeps Two Sets of
Seclusion Data—And Why Neither May Tell the Full Story, STATE IMPACT, (Aug. 14, 2012,
12:19 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2012/08/14/florida-keeps-two-sets-of-seclusiondata-and-why-neither-may-tell-the-full-story/.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Gonzalez & O’Connor, supra note 190.
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Teachers use restraint and seclusion when disabled students exhibit
dangerous behaviors that can cause a danger to themselves or others.196
Teachers also use restraint or seclusion as a disciplinary action to break up a
school fight.197 This is why there is a discrepancy in both sets of data.198
Even with these two sets of data, we still do not know the amount of disabled
children restrained and secluded—one reason is because school personnel do
not report to both data collections, and the other reason is because it occurs
in the classroom where it is most likely not going to be reported.199
Monitoring restraint and seclusion on disabled students should occur at the
“classroom, building, district, and state levels.”200
The research collected from all Florida school districts is available
on the Disability Rights Florida website,201 and when you find a report, it
links to the Florida Department of Education website for the charts.202 In
2012, there were only nine Florida counties that were authorized to use
mechanical restraint.203 From August 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012, there
were a total of 9712 incidents of restraint, and there were 4347 disabled
students.204 Forty-six percent of all disabled students restrained were in prekindergarten through third grade.205 The students were restrained on average
for eleven minutes; forty-five percent of students restrained were white and
eighty-four percent were male.206 From August 1, 2011 through June 30,
2012, there were a total of 4193 incidents of seclusion, and there were 1435
disabled students.207 Forty-two percent of these children that were secluded
were in pre-kindergarten through third grade, and forty-three percent that
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
See id.
199.
Id.
200.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(2)(a) (2014).
201.
Restraint and Seclusion—County by County, DISABILITY RIGHTS FLA.,
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/resources/disability_topic_info/
restraint_and_seclusion_county_by_county (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
202.
E.g., BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF
EDUC., RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 1, 2013 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014, available
at
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/Aug_
2013_to_June_2014_Detail.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
203.
Restraint and Seclusion—County by County, supra note 201. The nine
counties that were authorized to use mechanical restraint in 2012 were: Alachua,
Hillsborough, Levy, Madison, Manatee, Marion, Pinellas, Orange, and Santa Rosa. Id.
204.
BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 2011 THROUGH JUNE 2012, available at http://
www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/
August_to_June_various_2012.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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were secluded were in fourth grade through eighth grade.208 The students
were secluded on average for twenty minutes; forty-five percent of the
students secluded were black and eighty-three percent were male.209
From August 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, there were a total of
9218 incidents of restraint, and there were 4000 students with disabilities.210
Forty-nine percent of the restrained students were in pre-kindergarten
through third grade.211 From August 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, there
were a total of 2913 incidents of seclusion, and there were 1145 students
with disabilities.212 Forty-seven percent of these students were in fourth
grade through eighth grade.213
From August 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, there were a total of
8895 incidents of restraint, and there were 3461 students with disabilities.214
Forty-eight percent of disabled students restrained were in pre-kindergarten
through third grade.215 From August 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, there
were a total of 2264 incidents of seclusion, and there were 882 students with
disabilities.216 Forty-four percent of seclusion incidents occurred with
students from fourth to eighth grade.217
One example of how school districts are changing due to the
reporting of restraint and seclusion of disabled children is Orange County.218
Orange County eliminated seclusion of disabled students in 2012.219 Orange
County schools still restrain the most students.220 “Restraint and seclusion
are totally out of control,” says one parent of a disabled child.221 She says,
“children . . . us[e] behaviors to communicate,” and school teachers “need to
understand that.”222 The guideline from the U. S. Secretary of Education,
Mr. Arne Duncan, says restraint and seclusion should never be used as
208.
Id.
209.
BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., supra note 204.
210.
BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 1, 2012 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2013, available at
http://disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/August_2012_-_June_
2013_by_county,_disability,_type_and_strategy_.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., supra note 202.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
See Roth, supra note 120.
219.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 21; Roth, supra note 120.
220.
Roth, supra note 120.
221.
Id.
222.
Id.
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punishment or discipline.223 This guideline is also in compliance with
Florida Administrative Code chapter 65G-8.006, section 2.224 The guidelines
state wrap mats should never be used as a mechanical restraint.225 In Orange
County, Florida, schools still use wrap mats to strap disabled students lying
flat against a board.226 Anna Diaz, head of a special education service in
Orange County, Florida, said restraining a disabled student should only be
used when the student is in imminent danger of hurting himself or others.227
This statement is in accord with the guidelines, but saying it and doing it by
implementing and overseeing that those guidelines are being followed, are
two different things.228
Every school in Florida must have a policy that discusses restraint
and seclusion of students.229 These policies must follow chapter 65G-8.003
of the Florida Administrative Code.230 These policies must also include the
district’s plan to reduce or eliminate restraint and seclusion, which may
include additional training in positive behavioral support and crisis
management, parental involvement, and more student evaluation.231 With
the passage of this law, Florida school districts and school personnel are
banned from using any mechanical or physical “restraint that restricts a
student’s breathing.”232 Florida schools and school personnel are also
prohibited from “clos[ing], lock[ing], or physically block[ing] a student in a
room that is unlit and does not meet the rules of the State Fire Marshal for
seclusion time-out rooms.”233
2.

Documentation Requirement

Florida Statutes, section 1003.573 makes it a requirement that every
incident of restraint or seclusion be documented and reported within twentyfour hours.234 This report must contain the following items:

223.
Id.
224.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.006(2) (2014).
225.
Roth, supra note 120.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
See id.
229.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a) (2014); Seclusion in Developmental
Disability Facilities, supra note 152.
230.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.003(1) (2014).
231.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6)(a)–(b), (e); see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
65G-8.003(1).
232.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(4); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.009(3).
233.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(5); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 69A58.0084(1)–(5) (2014).
234.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(1)(a).
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1. The name of the student restrained or secluded.
2. The age, grade, ethnicity, and disability of the student
restrained or secluded.
3. The date and time of the event and the duration of the restraint
or seclusion.
4. The location at which the restraint or seclusion occurred.
5. A description of the type of restraint used in terms established
by the Department of Education.
6. The name of the person using or assisting in the restraint or
seclusion of the student.
7. The name of any nonstudent who was present to witness the
restraint or seclusion.
8. A description of the incident, including:
a.

The context in which the restraint or seclusion occurred.

b. The student’s behavior leading up to and precipitating the
decision to use manual or physical restraint or seclusion, including
an indication as to why there was an imminent risk of serious
injury or death to the student or others.
c. The specific positive behavioral strategies used to prevent and
deescalate the behavior.
d. What occurred with the student immediately after the
termination of the restraint or seclusion.
e. Any injuries, visible marks, or possible medical emergencies
that may have occurred during the restraint or seclusion,
documented according to district policies.
f.

Evidence of steps taken to notify the student’s parent or guardian.235

This statute provides that a restraint or seclusion incident report
should include: Everything about the child, the child’s disability, the reason
the teacher used restraint or seclusion, and what the teacher did to prevent
the situation from escalating to having to use restraint or seclusion.236
235.
236.

Id. § 1003.573(1)(b).
Id.
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Implied by this statute is that physical restraint or seclusion must be used
only if there is “an imminent risk of serious injury or death to the student or
others.”237 Nevertheless, this requirement is implicit in an incident report,
and it is not specifically provided as a requirement before a teacher can
restrain or seclude a disabled student.238 It can be interpreted that restraint
and seclusion can be used for any reason, and there does not need to be any
threat of serious bodily injury or harm before restraint or seclusion can be
used on the student.239
Documentation of the abuse should be given to the “school principal,
the district director of [ESE], and the bureau chief of the Bureau of
Exceptional Education and Student Services electronically each month that
the school is in session.”240 This data should be reported to the Florida
Department of Education so it can analyze the data and figure out what
methods were most used and by what county.241 Parents or students can also
fill out a complaint form online about an incident that occurred at school, and
OCR will investigate it.242
Nevertheless, even with all these laws on documenting these abusive
incidents, a Florida disabled teen was continuously restrained using the
dangerous technique of prone restraint, and most of the documents were
either incomplete or missing.243 Prone restraint is when the student is forced
to put his face down for a period of time.244 Florida once banned school
personnel from using prone restraint techniques; however, that restriction
was later removed by legislators.245 This student was restrained at least
eighty-nine times over a fourteen-month period, which included twentyseven prone restraints.246 This student could not tell his parents because his
disability interfered with his ability to communicate.247 His parents
discovered the abuse that had occurred in school when the student’s
237.
See id. § 1003.573(1)(b)(8)(b).
238.
BUTLER, supra note 47, at 25–26 n.53.
239.
See id.; JESSICA BUTLER, THE AUTISM NAT’L COMM., MY STATE’S
SECLUSION & RESTRAINT LAWS: BRIEF SUMMARIES OF STATE SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT
LAWS AND POLICIES 15 (2013), available at http://www.autcom.org/pdf/MyStateRestraint
SeclusionLaws.pdf.
240.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(2)(b).
241.
See id. § 1003.573(2)(c).
242.
OCR Complaint Consent Form, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
ASSESSMENT SYS., https://ocrcas.ed.gov/cas.cfm (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
243.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 19.
244.
Mulay, supra note 47, at 330.
245.
Id. at 331, 332 & n.40.
246.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 17.
247.
Id. at 19.
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“outbursts became so debilitating that he had to be removed from the
school.”248 When his parents requested the logs the school used to document
restraint and seclusion, the “logs were incomplete or missing.”249 The
parent’s attorney believed that without all of the documentation completely
filled out—and the logs that were missing—“it was impossible to
substantiate the parents’ claims that the school had been indifferent to their
child’s suffering.”250 In this case, the disabled student had to be put into a
psychiatric facility as a direct result from the harm he suffered when teachers
put him in repeated restraint and seclusion.251 The court did not find the
school’s actions to be excessive, egregious, or a shock to the conscious
because the court “do[es] not take . . . psychological trauma [evidence] as
seriously as . . . physical injury” evidence.252
V.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS VIOLATES DISABLED
STUDENTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE FREE FROM EXCESSIVE
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND DISCRIMINATED AGAINST SOLELY DUE TO
THEIR DISABILITIES
A.

Procedural Due Process

A child with a disability should never be restrained or secluded in
school unless it is for the safety of others or for the child’s safety.253
Corporal punishment on disabled students will not give rise to the procedural
due process rights in the U.S. Constitution, unless the corporal punishment is
for disciplinary reasons, and it does not violate the common law privilege of
teachers being able to use reasonable force—but not excessive force—to
educate and discipline a child.254 Public and private schools use restraint and
seclusion methods to try to control disabled students.255
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
248.
Id.
249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 26.
252.
Id.
253.
BUTLER, supra note 47, at 1, 10.
254.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661, 676 (1977).
255.
See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 7.
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enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.256

This means that public schools and its representatives—like teachers,
aides, and specialists—cannot deprive any disabled child of his life or liberty
without the due process of the law.257 The Fourteenth Amendment further
implies that disabled children must have equal protection of the laws of the
United States, and no person can deprive them of the rights that they are
entitled to by being citizens of the United States.258 No state can “deprive [a]
person of life, liberty, or property [interest] without [the] due process of
law.”259 The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the argument
that any grave loss upon a person from the state is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.260 For there to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court looks toward the nature of the interest at issue.261
The test to determine if the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable is:
(1) whether the individual’s interest is an interest within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s life, liberty, or property interests; and (2) if the Fourteenth
Amendment life, liberty, or property interests are implemented, what process
of law is due.262
The liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment “encompass[es]
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”263 The State cannot
physically punish a person unless the punishment is in agreement with due
process of law.264
In Ingraham v. Wright,265 the Supreme Court held that corporal
punishment in public schools is associated with the constitutionally protected
liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment.266 This is because when a
school official, acting under color of state law, punishes a child for behavior
by restraining the child and physically hurting the child, the liberty interest of

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated.267 But it “h[e]ld that the traditional
common law remedies [were] adequate to afford due process” of law.268
The Supreme Court has held that corporal punishment restraining the
child’s freedom of movement violates the Fourteenth Amendment.269 The
first step of the test is satisfied when Florida special education teachers,
acting under color of state law, inflict corporal punishment on disabled
students in public school by forcibly restraining them against their will.270
The next step is to determine what process of law is due.271 To
determine what process is due, the Supreme Court applies the Mathews v.
Eldridge272 three-part test:
(1) [what is] the private interest that will be affected . . . ; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest . . . and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and . . . (3) the [state] interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.273

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when a state actor
inflicts corporal punishment on a child in school by restraining the child that
involves serious physical pain, it implicates the liberty interest of the
Fourteenth Amendment.274 The importance of the liberty interest is freedom
of movement, and it can be argued that it is not only the liberty interest at
stake, but the life interest is also implicated if the student restrained is
restrained too long or improperly.275 This is because when a school actor
restrains a child and inflicts excessive corporal punishment the child could
die, and there have been cases reported where children have died from
excessive corporal punishment.276
In Goss v. Lopez,277 the Court held that “a student must be given
[notice and] an . . . opportunity to be heard [at an informal hearing] before

267.
Id.
268.
Id. at 672.
269.
Id. at 674.
270.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 (holding that any corporal punishment inflicted
on a student in public school by a state actor implicates the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest).
271.
Id.
272.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
273.
Id. at 335.
274.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 676; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
275.
See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673–74.
276.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8–11.
277.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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[the student] is . . . suspended from public school.”278 At the very least, the
minimum due process requirements that are due when a state actor arbitrarily
deprives a person of a liberty interest are notice and an opportunity to be
heard.279 The suggestion from Goss and Ingraham for procedural due
process purposes is that, for a student to be suspended ten days or more, the
school must give the student notice and an opportunity to be heard.280
Nevertheless, for a school official to inflict serious pain and corporal
punishment on a student there is no requirement for notice or an opportunity
to be heard.281
The Ingraham Court distinguished Goss by stating:
Unlike Goss . . . , this case does not involve the statecreated property interest in public education. The purpose of
corporal punishment is to correct a child’s behavior without
interrupting his education. That corporal punishment may, in a
rare case, have the unintended effect of temporarily removing a
child from school affords no basis for concluding that the practice
itself deprives students of property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Nor does this case involve any state-created interest in
liberty going beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
freedom from bodily restraint and corporal punishment.282

The Ingraham Court held that the United States allows reasonable
corporal punishment as long as it is not excessive.283 This demonstrates that
a balance must be struck between the state’s interest of furthering
education—which sometimes requires reasonable corporal punishment—and
the student’s interest of personal security and freedom of movement.284 The
Court stated the prevalent rule, which is that teachers and administrators can
exert a reasonable amount of force for what they “‘reasonably believe[] to be
[required] for [the student’s] proper control, training, or education.’”285
The next part of the test is: What procedural safeguards are due?286
Florida has procedural safeguards in place if a student is punished by a
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 692 (White, J., dissenting); Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682; Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
See Ingraham, 430 U.S at 659 n.12; Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 n.43 (citation omitted) (citing Goss, 419 U.S.

283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 676.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 674.
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school teacher, and later it was found that the school teacher’s use of
corporal punishment was not reasonable but excessive.287 In such a case, tort
and penal law provides a procedural safeguard and an adequate remedy.288
For more severe types of abuse cases than paddling a student, there are
procedural safeguards in civil and criminal law when taken into
consideration with the openness of the school environment.289
In Ingraham, the uncontradicted evidence showed that a student was
paddled by a teacher and that such corporal punishment—and the pain
associated with it—in Dade County public schools was rare with the
exception of a few cases.290 Furthermore, paddling is normally inflicted in
response to direct conduct of the student, and there are usually other teachers
present.291 Thus, the risk that a teacher will paddle a student “without cause
is typically insignificant.”292 The Court held that a teacher can paddle a
student for disciplinary reasons, and this does not threaten “any substantive
rights nor condemns the child ‘to suffer grievous loss of any kind.’”293 The
Court would not hold that corporal punishment should be eliminated in
schools because it has a deep-rooted history in the United States that serves
an important educational interest; the elimination of corporal punishment
must occur by its own social policy, and not by a court’s ruling of a right to
due process.294 The Court held that it is not in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s liberty interest to not give notice and an opportunity to be
heard when there are traditional common law remedies.295
Before 2009, the schools were not monitoring or reporting restraint
and seclusion incidents on disabled children, and there were no procedural
safeguards in place.296 Now, every Florida school district needs to create a
plan of action on how to reduce restraint and seclusion, and have parental
consent to restrain or seclude a child.297 Even though all of these laws are in
place, school personnel and districts do not follow them and still restrain and
287.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 677.
288.
See id. at 677–78.
289.
Id. at 678.
290.
Id. at 677.
291.
Id. at 677–78.
292.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678.
293.
Id. at 678 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
294.
Id. at 681.
295.
Id. at 682. It is important to note that the Ingraham Court refused to
review Petitioner’s third argument for certiorari, which was that “the infliction of severe
corporal punishment upon public school students [is] arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to
achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 659 n.12.
296.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3–5.
297.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6) (2014).
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seclude children without consent; some do not even fill out the necessary
forms after the incident.298 School personnel are not giving notice to the
student’s parents or an opportunity to be heard at a hearing because schools
are trying to cover up how much they are abusing these students.299 Most of
the time when students are restrained or secluded, teachers will say it was
due to their aggressive behavior, when in reality, students had nonaggressive behavior and just had not followed a command.300 Most students
cannot control their actions because of their disability, and when they do not
follow their teacher’s instructions, they are trying to communicate something
other than I am not following directions.301 Not following a teacher’s
instructions and exhibiting non-aggressive behavior are not reasons to
restrain and seclude students, that is merely punishing them for their
disabilities.302
Parents of the disabled child must write a complaint containing “any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a FAPE to such child,” and the complaint must
present “an alleged violation that occurred not more than [two] years before
the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the
alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”303 Also, parents must
meet with the IEP board to discuss the problem in mediation.304 If mediation
does not work, an administrative due process hearing is given, then the
parents can appeal, and then they can file a civil action.305 Throughout the
entire process, the burden of proof is on the parents and disabled child to
show that the school district violated the student’s rights.306 It is still a
violation of procedural due process when a disabled student’s liberty is taken
away first and then the school provides them with an administrative hearing

298.
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 19.
299.
See id.
300.
See RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION INCIDENTS, DISABILITY RIGHTS FLA.
(2012),
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/IDEA_
State_Advisory_ppt_July_2012.pdf.
301.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 19; Roth, supra note 120; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8.
302.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8; Roth, supra
note 120.
303.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)–(B) (2012).
304.
See id. § 1415(e)(1)–(2).
305.
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.511, .514, .516 (2013); OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC.
PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 24, 29, 31.
306.
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005); Mulay, supra
note 47, at 341.
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afterwards, only if requested by the parents or the child.307 This makes it
seem that disabled students and parents are given their procedural due
process rights.308 Yet, it takes time for the parents and students to go through
this process before being able to file in court, while their child is still in
school being abused by the teacher.309 However, this makes the rights of
disabled children insurmountable when arguing a constitutional violation
because the burden in court is too high to reach.310 Despite all these laws to
aid disabled students, in practicing these laws, disabled students have an
uphill battle.311 In Schaffer ex rel. Shaffer v. Weast,312 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg argued that “policy considerations, convenience, and fairness”
justify the high burden that should be placed upon the defendant, the school
district, because they are in a far better position to show they had complied
with the statutory requirements.313 The procedural due process rights that are
due are to notify the parents that the school uses restraint or seclusion
techniques, the school should have the parents sign a consent form, and the
parents should have a due process hearing before an incident.314 Then, after
the incident occurs, the school should notify the parents within twenty-four
hours to let them know why it occurred.315 If the parents want to have a due
process hearing after, to see if it was truly necessary, they should be afforded
that right as well.316
B.

Substantive Due Process Rights

Excessive use of corporal punishment, “‘at least where not
administered in conformity with a valid school policy authorizing corporal
punishment . . . may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is
tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking behavior.’”317
“Many corporal punishment cases involve . . . traditional applications of
physical force, [like when] school officials, subject to an official policy, or in
307.
See Mulay, supra note 47, at 341.
308.
See id.
309.
See id. at 341, 348.
310.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., supra note 126, at 24; Mulay, supra note 47, at 348.
311.
See Mulay, supra note 47, at 341, 348.
312.
546 U.S. 49 (2005).
313.
Id. at 63–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
314.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5; see also FLA. STAT. §
1003.573(3)(a)(6) (2014).
315.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(1)(a).
316.
See id. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5.
317.
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588,
598 (11th Cir. 2010) (alternation in original) (quoting Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000)).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

196

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION

299

a . . . disciplinary setting,” spank or paddle a disorderly student.318 However,
the Eleventh Circuit in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board of
Education319 stated that it does not want to open the door to a floodgate of
litigation.320
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand substantive due
process rights because of the lack of preconstitutional history, and the need
for judicial restraint.321 The Fourteenth Amendment “‘protects individual
liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’”322 However, cases dealing with
abusive executive action have repeatedly emphasized that “‘only the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional
sense.’”323
In the context of disciplinary corporal punishment in the
public schools, we emphasize once more that the substantive due
process claim is quite different than a claim of assault and battery
under state tort law. In resolving a state tort claim, [the] decision
may well turn on whether “ten licks rather than five” were
excessive, so that line-drawing this refined may be required. But
substantive due process is concerned with violations of personal
rights of privacy and bodily security of so different an order of
magnitude that inquiry in a particular case simply need not start at
the level of concern these distinctions imply. As in the cognate
police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in school
corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need
presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to
the conscience. Not every violation of state tort and criminal
assault laws will be a violation of this constitutional right, but
some of course may.324

318.
Neal, 229 F.3d at 1072.
319.
229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
320.
Id. at 1076.
321.
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (citing
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543–44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
322.
Neal, 229 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (per curiam)).
323.
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588,
598 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
324.
Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (citations
omitted).
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Under Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney,325 to have a viable substantive
due process claim one must claim severe injury, the force to cause the injury
must be disproportionate to the need, and the action must be inspired by
malice.326 It must be brutal and inhumane abuse that shocks the
conscience.327 The Hall ex rel. Hall standard of shock the conscience is
followed in the Eleventh Circuit.328 The Due Process Clause is not triggered
“‘whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm,’” and it is not
meant to conform state causes of action into federal causes of action.329
In determining if a student’s allegations of corporal punishment rise
to the level of arbitrariness, and shock the conscience in violation of the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the student,
plaintiff, must allege: “(1) [a] school official intentionally used . . . excessive
[force] under the circumstances, and (2) the force used presented a
reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury.”330
T.W. ex. rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, Florida331
is a recent Eleventh Circuit case involving corporal punishment inflicted on a
disabled student in school.332 In this case, T.W. was a disabled fourteenyear-old student who had “separation anxiety disorder, major depressive
disorder, dysthymic disorder, receptive expressive language disorder, and
[was] eventually [diagnosed] with pervasive developmental disorder.”333
T.W. was able to communicate verbally, but his receptive communicative
abilities were impaired.334 His teacher, Kathleen Garrett, “completed two
courses on physical restraint techniques and was certified in crisis prevention
intervention.”335 Garrett abused T.W. over several months.336 The first
incident occurred when Garrett—who weighs over three-hundred pounds—
got annoyed at T.W.’s comments for not going into the cool down room, put
T.W. on the floor face first, sat on his buttocks, and put his hands behind his
back.337 The second incident was when he did not follow Garrett’s command
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
833, 848 (1998)).
330.
Cir. 2000).
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.; see also T.W., 610 F.3d at 602.
T.W., 610 F.3d at 603 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th
610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 595.
See T.W., 610 F.3d at 595–96.
Id. at 595.
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and started to walk away from her.338 Garrett tried to restrain T.W. while he
was standing, so T.W. began swinging his hands at her, which then led
Garrett to force him face down on the floor, and pull his right leg behind his
left leg for two to three minutes.339 Sabrina Mort, a witness and an aide to
Garrett who also observed this restraint, said “‘the strength that [Garrett]
took [T.W.] down with . . . was hard,’ and ‘[t]hey both probably got hurt that
day.’”340 “Mort testified that it was inappropriate for Garrett to pull T.W.’s
leg up in that manner.”341 “Mort [also] testified that, at least once a week,
Garrett would ‘pick and nag at [T.W.] until he would just get to the point
where he just [could not] take it anymore.’ Garrett often restrained her
students after doing something to upset or anger them.”342
The third incident occurred when T.W. did not listen to Garrett’s
instruction to stop scratching the insect bite on his arm, which was when
Garrett pushed T.W.’s arms down to prevent him from scratching.343 When
T.W. began screaming and cursing at Garrett, she pulled T.W. from the
table—without pushing the chair out first—causing his legs to hit the
table.344 She put his arms behind his back, forced him against the table, and
leaned on his back with all of her weight to keep him in this position.345
When Garrett held T.W. in this position, he told her it hurt him, but Garrett
would only release him once he said he would do his work.346 He then said
he would do his work, she released him, and he went back to scratching the
bite on his arm.347 “Garrett told T.W. to go to the cool down room, but he
refused.”348 She then forced him into the cool down room and shut the
door.349 “Mort heard T.W. scream[ing] ‘leave me alone,’ ‘stop it,’ and
‘[you are] hurting me,’” while furniture was being moved inside the cool
down room.350 Garrett came out, and minutes later, T.W. came out
screaming at Garrett that he would tell his mother what she did to him.351
“The next day, T.W.’s mother [wrote] a note to [the] school asking why

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
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T.W., 610 F.3d at 595–96.

199

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

302

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Garrett had twisted T.W.’s arm and shoved him against the wall in the cool
down room.”352
In the fourth incident, another aide, Jennifer Rodriguez, observed
T.W. standing when Garrett pulled his hands behind his back and escorted
him to the cool down room.353 Rodriguez testified that it is not appropriate
to put a student’s arms behind his or her back because it can cause
asphyxiation.354
The fifth time, which Mort testified to in court, was when Garrett put
T.W. in the cool down room, shut off the lights, and then blocked the exit by
sitting in front of it for more than five minutes.355 When T.W. was allowed
out of the cool down room, he started mumbling, and Garrett put her foot out
to purposefully trip him.356
On two separate occasions, T.W.’s mother observed bruises on his
arms and he told her that Garrett had hurt him.357 Dr. Upchurch, a
psychologist, “explained that ‘[t]he systemized application of harsh words
and actions towards the students in the class and towards [T.W.] himself
created an environment of danger and fear . . . , which resulted in his
exhibiting symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.’”358 Dr. Upchurch
also explained that, “[b]ecause T.W. was ‘one of the higher functioning
students in the class, . . . . [h]is inability to protect the [other students]
created a sense of guilt and powerlessness.’”359 Dr. Upchurch concluded that
T.W.’s aggravated stress and his feeling of not being safe at school caused
him to drop out.360 Dr. Danziger, another psychiatrist retained by T.W., said
Garrett probably “‘suffered from both sexual masochism and sexual sadism’
[because] Garrett’s verbal and physical abuse of her students was ‘consistent
with someone whose private sadistic sexual practices spilled over into the
classroom setting.’”361
It is important to note that the police arrested Garrett for child abuse
based on the four students’ allegations and the jury found her guilty on one
count, but the court withheld adjudication.362
T.W. claims that Garrett verbally and physically abused the disabled
students “and engaged in sadistic sexual behavior [that] supports an
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
T.W., 610 F.3d at 596.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
T.W., 610 F.3d at 597.
Id.
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inference that Garrett restrained T.W. out of malice and sadism, not for the
purpose of discipline.”363 The court stated that the key inquiry is not the
manner of the use of force, but if the use of force is directly related to the
student’s misconduct and whether it is used for disciplinary purposes.364 The
court found that, out of the five incidents that were testified to, only one
incident was not for the use of disciplinary purposes.365 The first incident
was related to discipline because Garrett said she would release him when he
followed her instructions, and she did.366 The second incident was related to
discipline because she told him that she would release him once he calmed
down, and she did.367 The third incident was related to discipline because
she said she would release him when he agreed to do his work, and she
did.368 The fourth incident was related to discipline because Garrett only
restrained T.W. on the way to the cool down room.369 The fifth incident,
however—when Garrett tripped T.W. on his way out of the cool down
room—was not related to disciplinary purposes.370 The court held that it
does not have to determine if Garrett’s use of force was elevated to a shock
the conscience level in the fifth incident because tripping a student, which
causes the student to stumble—without anything more—does not violate the
Constitution.371
The court then looked towards the other four incidents to see if
T.W.’s rights were violated because he was not free from excessive corporal
punishment.372 The first step is to have the plaintiff prove that the school’s
use of corporal punishment was excessive.373 To establish if the amount of
force was excessive, the court looks at the totality of the circumstances,
which encompasses three steps: (1) the need for using corporal punishment;
(2) the relationship between the need of corporal punishment and the amount
of punishment used; and (3) the degree of the inflicted injury.374 The court
held that the first four incidents resulted from attempts to “restore order,
maintain discipline, or protect T.W. from self-injurious behavior.”375 These
incidents of restraint were due to T.W. not following Garrett’s instructions,
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
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refusing to go to the cool down room, refusing to stop scratching an insect
bite, and what led to the fourth incident is unclear, but it occurred on the way
to the cool down room.376 T.W.’s argument was that the need for Garrett’s
use of force was non-existent because Garrett was the one who provoked him
to act out.377 The court noted that there was evidence that Garrett teased
T.W. until he became angry, but there was no evidence to assert Garrett
provoked him.378
T.W. also claimed that Garrett’s actions were purposely inflicted at
him and other students, and that Garrett engaged in sadistic sexual
behavior.379 The court stated that “‘[i]f the use of force was objectively
reasonable—that is, if it “was not excessive as a matter of law and was a
reasonable response to the student’s misconduct”—then the subjective intent
of the school official is unimportant.’”380 The court reasoned that by viewing
the four incidents objectively, even if force was used too soon, Garrett’s use
of force was not wholly unjustified.381
The next step is to consider if the need of force was proportionate to
the force exerted.382 The court found that Garrett’s use of force was not
necessary and was inappropriate, but also that Garrett’s “‘amount of force . .
. was [not] unrelated’ to the need to . . . use force.”383 This was because
Garrett only restrained or secluded him for a few minutes at a time, and even
though the force might have been inappropriate, it was directly related to
furthering the government’s goal of furthering education.384 All of Garrett’s
restraining and seclusions were so T.W. could calm down, stop being
disruptive, and do his work.385
The third factor looks at the extent and nature of T.W.’s injuries.386
The court found that T.W. only suffered minor injuries—a few bruises that
his mother saw.387 The court found Garrett’s conduct did exacerbate T.W.’s
developmental disability, behavioral problems, and caused him to have posttraumatic stress disorder.388 The court has never considered if substantive
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
(per curiam)).
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

T.W., 610 F.3d at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1337 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007)
T.W., 610 F.3d at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id. (alteration in original).
See id.
Id.
T.W., 610 F.3d at 601.
Id.
Id.
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due process can be violated by psychological injuries.389 The court looked at
the totality of the circumstances, including T.W.’s psychological problems,
and found that Garrett’s behavior was not arbitrary, egregious, or a shock to
the conscience.390 The court said it did “not condone the use of [excessive]
force [on] a vulnerable student . . . but no reasonable jury could [have]
conclude[d] that Garrett’s use of force was obviously excessive in the
constitutional sense.”391
The Supreme Court does not have a case on point of a student’s
substantive due process rights being violated due to excessive force of
corporal punishment.392 The lower courts have had to develop a test to
approach corporal punishment, and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits use the
Fourth Amendment approach, while the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use the substantive due process tests.393
When parents and disabled students finally get to the court system, they have
to satisfy the factors of the Hall ex rel. Hall test, they have to have evidence
because they have a high burden of proof; additionally, the disabled children
can have communication problems, and these behavioral problems, can limit
the student’s credibility.394 Looking at all of the factors, the court is not set
up for justice, and even if by some chance the parents and disabled student
win in court, the disabled student was still abused and that is something the
court cannot undo.395 The test that the Eleventh Circuit applies—the shock
the conscience standard—is too high of a burden for parents and disabled
students to meet.396 In T.W.’s case, the same techniques that Garrett used on
him killed another student, and that still did not violate substantive due
process rights.397 After what Garrett did to T.W., the Florida Administrative
Code rules—which have been in effect since August 7, 2008—prohibited
389.
Id.
390.
Id. at 602.
391.
T.W., 610 F.3d at 602.
392.
Lewis M. Wasserman, Corporal Punishment in K-12 Public School
Settings: Reconsideration of Its Constitutional Dimensions Thirty Years After Ingraham v.
Wright, 26 TOURO L. REV. 1029, 1098 & n.486 (2011); see also Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 610–11 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing substantive due process elements). Compare
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing a Fourth
Amendment violation instead of a due process violation), with Johnson ex rel. T.J. v.
Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2001).
393.
Wasserman, supra note 392, at 1098–99.
394.
Mulay, supra note 47, at 347–48; see also Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
395.
Mulay, supra note 47, at 348.
396.
See id.
397.
See T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla. 610 F.3d 588,
595 (11th Cir. 2010); M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1317,
1325 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Mulay, supra note 47, at 350 n.141.
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“[r]estraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical device,
behind his or her back,” “[m]ovement, hyperextension, or twisting of body
parts,” and “[a]ny reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life.”398 If T.W.’s case went
to the Eleventh Circuit today with these new procedures now in effect, the
Eleventh Circuit might hold that Garrett did violate T.W.’s substantive due
process rights by using excessive corporal punishment, and restricting his
freedom of movement by restraining him.399
In another case, M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole County School
Board400—involving the same teacher as in T.W.—the Middle District of
Florida generated a different outcome.401 M.S. ex rel. Soltys concerns a
disabled student who is mentally retarded, severely autistic, nonverbal, and
only say about ten to twenty words.402 M.S. is alleging that “Garrett
subjected M.S. to . . . physical, emotional, and verbal abuse” and that M.S.
observed other acts similar to what he experienced to fellow classmates.403
The way Garrett treated M.S. was what led to Garrett’s arrest in 2004 when
Mort and Rodriguez told the assistant principal about the way Garrett treated
some of the disabled students.404 The incident occurred when Garrett was
unhappy that M.S. was looking at a magazine instead of doing his work.405
M.S. refused to do his work, and pinched Garrett, which was normal when he
did not get his way.406 When this occurred, Garrett
“jerked him out of his desk so fast and flipped [his] body down on
the desk, had the one arm behind him, took the other arm and put it
behind him, started to lean down and with her left hand she held
his head down.” Garrett then pushed M.S.’s head down across the
desk while holding his hands behind his back until “his eyes were
bulging” and “his lips started turning . . . a purply light blue.”407
398.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.009(4), (6), (9) (2014); see also T.W.,
610 F.3d at 595.
399.
See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602 (inferring that from these now effective rules—
Florida Administrative Code rules 65G-8.009(4), (6), and (9)—the Eleventh Circuit might
have held differently because Garrett’s use of force was not in line with her duties as a
teacher, and it went beyond her duties to restrain him the way she did multiple times as well
with the other students).
400.
636 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
401.
Compare id. at 1326, with T.W., 610 F.3d at 602.
402.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
403.
Id.
404.
Id. at 1320.
405.
Id. at 1319.
406.
Id.
407.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1319–20 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5

204

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION

307

Mort, a school aide, told Garrett to release M.S. because he had
enough and Garrett finally released him.408 Upon releasing him, Garrett
physically assaulted Mort by pushing him against the door and telling him
“‘[t]his is my fucking class and [I will] run it the way I see fit.’”409
Other acts that Mort and Rodriguez testified to involved Garrett’s
behavior toward M.S.410 In Mort’s deposition, she recounted several
incidents of Garrett abusing M.S.411 “One incident [was] when Mort took
M.S. to [use] the restroom to change his clothes because he . . . wet his pants
[which was] common . . . due to his developmental disabilities and his lack
of toilet training.”412 Garrett followed M.S. and Mort, and when they reached
the restroom door she shut it and told M.S. “‘[y]ou will not piss [your pants]
in my class,’” and after every word she continuously struck M.S. “in the
back of the head with the [bottom] of her palm.”413 Mort said Garrett hit
M.S. hard, and the last strike was “‘so hard that his chin hit his knee.’”414 In
another instance like the one just mentioned, M.S. had to change his pants in
the restroom again, and Garrett “‘smacked him on the butt’” which was firm
enough to leave three fingerprint marks, which Mort saw when she changed
his clothes.415 Another incident that Mort relayed was that Garrett frequently
hit M.S. with her fist and elbow for a wide variety of reasons like making
him be quiet, to make him continue his school work, to stop M.S. from trying
to kiss her, and to stop him from laying down to go to sleep.416 At times,
these blows from Garrett were firm enough to make M.S.’s whole head
jerk.417 Rodriguez gave the same accounts as Mort did and some other
instances where Garrett abused M.S.418 M.S.’s parents said that before
enrolling him in this school, he was not an aggressive child; he played with
the neighbors and his parents, and even traveled to Europe with his
parents.419 But after being at this school with Garrett abusing M.S., he is
now more aggressive towards his siblings and even strangers.420 His parents
remember one incident when they drove him to school and M.S. had a panic

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
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attack; he started to cry and scream ‘“no school”’ repeatedly while trying to
get back into his parents car.421
M.S. and his parents allege that his Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights were violated due to being mentally and
physically abused by his teacher Garrett.422 “Embodied in the [Fourteenth
Amendment] right is the right to be free from excessive force at the hands of
a government official.”423 To establish if a governmental actor is liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983424 the court must look to the following four factors:
(1) the need for using corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the
need for corporal punishment and the amount of punishment used, and (3)
the degree of the inflicted injury, and (4) “whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”425 The shock the
conscience threshold is quickly reached when the victim is more vulnerable
to abuse and is defenseless.426
First, the court considered the need to use corporal punishment by
looking to M.S.’s normal conduct, which is pinching to get attention and an
inability to control bodily functions, versus Garret smashing M.S.’s head into
the desk and leaning on him, all three hundred pounds worth of Garrett,
“until his eyes bulged out [of his head] and his face turned blue.”427 The
court found that a jury could determine that there was no need for Garrett to
use corporal punishment for M.S.’s normal actions and for actions he could
not control like wetting his pants.428 The court then considered the
relationship between the need of corporal punishment and the amount of
421.
422.
423.
424.
Code states:

Id.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

Id.
425.
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
426.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
427.
Id. at 1324; see also T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty.,
Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir. 2010).
428.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
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punishment used, finding that a jury could determine that Garrett’s use of
corporal punishment and physical force was disproportionate to the
disciplinary actions needed.429
Next in the court’s analysis, was the extent of M.S.’s injury.430
Garrett’s sole argument was that M.S.’s injury did not meet the shock the
conscience threshold, and that there were no physical injuries.431 The court
rejected Garrett’s argument because a reasonable jury could have found—if
it accepted the plaintiff’s evidence—that M.S.’s injuries were physical,
mental, and emotional.432 “[E]ven though [M.S.’s] alleged injuries [were]
more difficult to quantify than . . . the average [corporal punishment] case,
that [did] not mean they [were] nonexistent.”433 M.S.’s mother noticed he
had bruising on multiple occasions but that it was due to his own selfinfliction.434 M.S.’s parents said they noticed behavioral changes in M.S.
after he was put in the school where Garrett was his teacher.435 M.S. was
also in the classroom with ten other students who were all autistic, and
observed Garrett abuse other disabled students verbally and physically.436
The court noted that this could have created an aggressive and abusive
environment.437 A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is determined on
a case-by-case basis.438 The degree of injury must be weighed with the need
to exert excessive physical force and the plaintiff’s vulnerability.439 There
are circumstances that call for extreme, immediate measures to ensure the

429.
Id. at 1323–24.
430.
Id. at 1324.
431.
Id.
432.
Id.
433.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
434.
Id.
435.
Id.
436.
Id. at 1324 n.6. The court noted that Garrett wanted it to disregard other
allegations of child abuse besides M.S. Id. The court concluded that it could not do that
because M.S. could have been affected by watching his classmates be abused by Garrett.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 n.6.
In a classroom of fewer than ten students, all of whom were autistic, the regular use
of unnecessary violence and the consistent barrage of verbal assaults could have
created a harmful and perhaps emotionally abusive environment. When that
environment is coupled with evidence of direct physical assault such as alleged
here, the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred is one for a jury.
Garrett’s direct abuse of one child was a different kind of abuse for another. An
absurd result might follow, particularly in this setting, if Garrett’s actions were
considered in a vacuum and Garrett benefitted from the fact that she mistreated all
of the children rather than confining her abuse to a single child.

Id.
437.
438.
439.
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safety of other students and those around them.440 Nonetheless, “school . . .
restraints used as aversive techniques to control behavior or impose negative
consequences should never be used on children.”441 Garrett physically
abused M.S. by slapping him on his buttocks so hard she left fingerprint
marks, slapping his head so that his head shook and hit his chin, and
slamming him into the desk so that he could not breathe—his face turning
blue and his eyes bulging out.442 Here, a jury could have determined that
Garrett maliciously used unnecessary and excessive physical force against a
helpless autistic child.443
Finally, the court considered “whether the force was [used] in good
faith” to maintain order and restore discipline to the room, or was inspired by
malice.444 The court found that Garrett could have needed to use some type
of physical restraint to maintain order in the room and restore discipline
when M.S. pinched her; however, the court found that the excessive force
Garrett used by slamming M.S. into the desk, leaning on him so he could not
breathe, and causing his eyes to bulge out of his head, was not needed to
restore order to the room.445 M.S. suffered severe physical and emotional
damages due to multiple abusive incidents.446 If Garrett only had this one
abusive incident with M.S. she might have escaped constitutional liability
under Hall ex rel. Hall.447 Nevertheless, this was evidence that there was not
only one incident of abuse, but multiple incidents, making a pattern of
abuse.448 If these incidents came out at trial, a jury could have found that
Garrett’s actions were not made in good faith to restore order to the
classroom, and that she had malicious intent.449
If at trial M.S. was found to have suffered a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Garrett would not be subject to qualified
immunity because she used excessive punishment on an autistic, helpless
child who could not communicate, which is prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.450 M.S. has “the right to be free from excessive and arbitrary

440.
Craig Goodmark, A Tragic Void: Georgia’s Failure to Regulate Restraint
& Seclusion in Schools, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 249, 256 (2010).
441.
Id.
442.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
443.
Id. at 1324.
444.
Id. at 1325.
445.
Id.
446.
Id.
447.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325; see also Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
448.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
449.
Id.
450.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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corporal punishment,” especially in a school milieu.451
This was
established under the precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States
in Ingraham and from the Eleventh Circuit in Neal ex rel. Neal.452 The court
denied Garrett’s motion for summary judgment because a jury could have
concluded that Garrett’s use of corporal punishment was excessive, and it
violated M.S.’s Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of movement and to
be free from corporal punishment.453
C.
The Rowley Court Set the Legal Test to Determine if a Child Has a
FAPE in School
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that a
FAPE is comprised of:
[E]ducational instruction specially designed to meet the unique
needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are
necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.
Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition
also requires that such instruction and services be provided at
public expense and under public supervision, meet the [s]tate’s
educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the
[s]tate’s regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP.
Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the
instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are
satisfied, the child is receiving a free, appropriate public education
as defined by the Act.454

Its holding gave special education providers a loophole to not
educate to the fullest extent possible because under the law, if they abide by
the student’s IEP, give them any special education instruction, and an aide—
plus anything else that the statute requires—the child is receiving a FAPE.455
Although it is a FAPE, nevertheless, it is not the best free public
education.456 The disabled child’s parents’ argument is that the goal of the

451.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
452.
Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.
2000); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678 (1977).
453.
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325–26; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
454.
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 188–89 (1982).
455.
See id. at 203.
456.
See id. at 189.
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EHA—what is now amended as IDEA457—is to provide FAPE to disabled
children who qualify, but it fails to provide an equal opportunity for
education.458 Mills and Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children both held
that handicapped children are required to receive access to “adequate,
publicly supported education,” not that handicapped children require “any
particular substantive level of education.”459 The Supreme Court of the
United States noted in a footnote that every need of disabled children cannot
be met, which is why the special education teachers and the parents make an
IEP, to see what services the student will receive.460 “‘If sufficient funds are
not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed . . .
then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no
child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom.’”461 The Supreme Court of
the United States stated that insufficient funding or even administrative
inefficiency of a school could not burden the exceptional disabled student
more than a normal child.462 This case purports that there is no equality in
education for disabled—or exceptional students, as called by IDEA—and
normal children.463 IDEA provisions provide that disabled children should
be in the least restrictive environment, which is being in a regular class with
other nondisabled students, along with an aide, if possible.464 This means
that a disabled child would be learning at the same rate of a nondisabled
child in school.465
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Center School
District v. Rowley466, the school would not provide a deaf child with a
qualified sign language interpreter in her classes.467 The parents and the
457.
DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, supra note 80, at 15; see also 20 U.S.C. §
1400 (2012).
458.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198; see also Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No 94-142, § 1401, 89 Stat. 773 (amended 1990).
459.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 193 (citing Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam) and Mills v. Bd. of Educ.
of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D. D.C. 1972)). The Supreme Court of the United States
agreed with both cases on how much education disabled children receive versus how much
education the disabled children need. See id. at 193 n.15.
460.
Id. at 193 n. 15, 194 n.16.
461.
Id. at 199 (quoting Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876).
462.
See id. at 193 n.15; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876.
463.
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
464.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 47, at 3.
465.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 47, at 3.
466.
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
467.
Id. at 184–85.
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student sued the School District of New York under EHA of 1975—amended
now as 20 U.S.C. § 1401—because the school district denied her a FAPE.468
The school district denied the student’s request because she was excelling in
all her classes and understanding the material without the help of a sign
language interpreter.469 The court applied a two-part test to determine if a
disabled child had a FAPE: (1) whether the state has complied with the
procedures required by EHA or IDEA; and (2) was the IEP reasonably
calculated to have the disabled student obtain educational value?470
The Rowley standard has been prominent in EHA cases—the
predecessor to IDEA cases—for over twenty-five years, and Congress has
still not expressed disagreement with it.471 If Congress did explicitly
disagree with the Rowley standard, it could change the FAPE definition.472
Yet Congress still has not amended the statutory FAPE definition, which
“weighs strongly against finding a congressional intent to alter the Rowley
standard,” of FAPE.473
Cases are brought under the Rowley standard by the parents and
disabled children arguing that being restrained and secluded is a denial of
their FAPE.474 Their argument is supported by a report which states that the
restraining or secluding of a disabled child takes away from their goals in the
IEP.475 It also distracts them from their education since they will not be
educated during the time they are restrained or secluded.476 It can also make
them anxious, and even develop more behavioral issues in the future.477

468.
20 U.S.C. § 1401; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
469.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
470.
Id. at 206–07.
471.
Alyssa Kaplan, Note, Harm Without Recourse: The Need for a Private
Right of Action in Federal Restraint and Seclusion Legislation, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 581,
590–91 n.60 (2010); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07.
472.
Kaplan, supra note 471, at 590 n.60; see also Rowley, 548 U.S. at 206–07.
473.
Kaplan, supra note 471, at 590 n.60 (quoting Mr. C. ex rel. K.C. v. Me.
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D. Me. 2008)); see also Rowley, 458 U.S.
at 206–07.
474.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Kaplan, supra note 471, at 589–90.
475.
See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SCHOOL IS NOT SUPPOSED TO
HURT: UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN 2009 TO PREVENT AND REDUCE RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION IN
SCHOOLS 27 (2010), available at http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/School-is-Not-Supposed-to-Hurt-NDRN.pdf.
476.
See id.
477.
See JESSICA BUTLER, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS & ADVOCATES,
UNSAFE IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE: ABUSE OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 1, 20, 25–26, 44
(2009), available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/collection/662B1866952D-41FA-B7F3-D3CF68639918/UnsafeCOPAAMay_27_2009.pdf.
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D.
Disabled Children and Their Parents Suing Schools Under the
Federal Statute IDEA Does Not Provide the Protection Most Disabled
Students Sought for in the Federal Court System
IDEA is what most litigants sue under when trying to protect the
rights of their disabled children.478 In the IDEA provisions, a school is
supposed to provide FAPE to disabled students.479 This is because IDEA is a
federal program that gives money to state and local agencies that comply
with the conditions in IDEA to aid disabled students in receiving a better
education.480 FAPE is supposed to tailor education services and provide
aides to disabled students, which help them learn better in a least restrictive
environment.481 With all of these provisions in IDEA to help disabled
children receive a better and free education, it would seem logical that this
statute would aid disabled students in vindicating their rights that have been
infringed.482 However, most parents of disabled children who were
restrained or secluded in school cannot immediately sue the school or anyone
involved.483 This is because through IDEA, one of the provisions is that all
administrative remedies have to be exhausted before a parent can file a suit
in court on their child’s behalf.484
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There should be a federal and state mandate from the Supreme Court
of the United States, U.S. Congress, and the Florida Legislature, that
expressly prohibits all restraint and seclusion techniques, except in
emergency circumstances where the disabled student is a threat to himself or
to others around him.485 The federal and state statutes should ban all:
1. Reactive strategies involving noxious or painful stimuli, as
prohibited by section 393.13(4)(g) [of the Florida Statutes];
2. Untested or experimental procedures;

478.
Mulay, supra note 47, at 340; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
479.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688,
694–95 (11th Cir. 1991).
480.
Greer, 950 F.2d at 694; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
481.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(i), (a)(5)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3.
482.
See Mulay, supra note 47, at 340.
483.
Id. at 341.
484.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)–(8), (g)(1); Mulay, supra note 47, at 341.
485.
See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.006(6)–(7) (2014); U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 2.
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3. Any physical crisis management technique that might restrict or
obstruct an individual’s airway or impair breathing, including
techniques whereby staff persons use their hands or body to place
pressure on the client’s head, neck, back, chest, abdomen, or
joints;
4. Restraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical
device, behind his or her back;
5. Physical holds relying on the inducement of pain for behavioral
control;
6. Movement, hyperextension, or twisting of body parts;
7. Any maneuver that causes a loss of balance without physical
support—such as tripping or pushing—for the purpose of
containment;
8. Any reactive strategy in which a pillow, blanket, or other item
is used to cover the individual’s face as part of the restraint
process;
9. Any reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life;
10. Use of any containment technique medically contraindicated
for an individual;
11. Containment without continuous monitoring and
documentation of vital signs and status with respect to release
criteria.486

Furthermore, all disabled students and special education teachers
should start using a positive reinforcement system instead of a negative
reinforcement system—like secluding or restraining children.487 All special
education teachers should be required to get certified and recertified every
five years, and do continuing education to learn more about working with
disabled children properly and effectively.488 The statutes should also restate
that all disabled students should be entitled to due process of law, and have a

486.
See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.009(1)–(11).
487.
See, e.g., JIM WRIGHT, INTERVENTION CENT., HOW TO: IMPROVE
CLASSROOM BEHAVIORS USING SELF-MONITORING CHECKLISTS 1–2 (2014), available at http://
www.interventioncentral.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
pdfs_blog/self_management_self_monitoring_behavior_checklist.pdf.
488.
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3).
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right to be free from bodily restraint and corporal punishment from a
governmental actor.489
The solution should be modeled after the U.S. Department of
Education’s solution, which states that no student should be restrained or
secluded unless the student is in imminent danger to cause physical harm to
himself or others.490 The U.S. Department of Education also proposes that
when a student has a history of dangerous and escalating behavior, and
teachers have previously restrained or secluded the child to restore order, “a
school [ought to make] a plan for (1) teaching and supporting more
appropriate behavior; and (2) determining positive methods to prevent
behavioral escalations that have previously resulted in the use of restraint or
seclusion.”491
To aid with this new positive behavior technique, the federal statute
and the Florida statute should also include a monitoring checklist, so students
can monitor their own progress.492 There are two checklists that students can
fill out with their teachers.493 The school can obtain sample checklists
online.494 It has been proven that students who have their own checklists that
target positive behavioral conduct and replacement behaviors—which
replace problem behaviors known to trigger restraint and seclusion—show
improvement in their general classroom conduct.495 The teacher can
customize each checklist for each disabled student with what each student
needs to work on throughout the day.496 The teacher can then conduct a
monitoring session for certain students, and as the school day progresses, the
student can check off what he thought he did correctly and what
improvements are needed.497 Then, this can be compared to the teacher’s
self-assessment through the student’s conduct, and the student can better
equate what is expected of him throughout the day.498
Researchers have also found that “[s]tudents are more likely to
achieve [success] when they are (1) directly taught school and classroom
routines and social expectations that are predictable and contextually
relevant; (2) acknowledged clearly and consistently for their displays of
positive academic and social behavior; and (3) treated by others with

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. STAT. § 393.13(g) (2014).
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
See Wright, supra note 487, at 1.
Id. at 3–5.
E.g., id. at 2.
See id. at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
Wright, supra note 487, at 1, 3–5.
See id. at 1.
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respect.”499 To do this the entire school needs to be invested in having a
positive behavioral support system, not just the students with behavioral
problems.500 The school should: Focus on preventing the problem behavior
by finding the underlying root to the behavioral problem and “review[]
behavioral data regularly” that they are required to report, so they can adopt
“procedures to the needs of all students and provid[e] additional academic
and social behavioral supports for students who are not making expected
progress.”501 There is no evidence that shows that school officials, teachers,
or aides who use restraining and secluding methods actually positively
benefit the child.502 There is also no evidence that shows that using
restraining and secluding methods reduce the occurrence of behavioral
outbursts.503 These behavioral outbursts are normally what cause others to
use these abusive methods on the disabled students in the first place.504 A
ban should be in place for all types of restraint and seclusion, and be replaced
with positive behavioral reinforcement techniques.505
VII.

CONCLUSION

Students with disabilities should not be abused when they go to
school by being restrained and secluded.506 Disabled students being
restrained and secluded in school violates their Fourteenth Amendment
procedural and substantive due process rights.507 When this occurs, school
personnel violate the students’ procedural due process rights because the
disabled students’ interests fall within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s life, liberty, or property interests; due process is the addition
of procedural safeguards which cost the school little to nothing.508 These
procedural safeguards should be: (1) notifying the parents of restraining or
secluding students before it occurs so they can sign a consent form; (2)
allowing the parents and student to have a due process hearing before an
incident occurs; and (3) after the incident occurs, letting the parents know
why it happened.509 Then, the parents and student can be afforded a due
499.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 2–3.
500.
Id. at 3.
501.
Id.
502.
Id. at 2.
503.
Id.
504.
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 15–16, 18–19.
505.
Id. at 8, 12, 15, 18; see also Wright, supra note 487, at 1.
506.
FLA. STAT. § 393.13(3)(g) (2014).
507.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
508.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); see also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
509.
See OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 1.
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process hearing to make sure the restraint or seclusion was necessary after
the incident.510
These procedural safeguards are required by the
reauthorization of IDEA in 2004, which requires the U. S. Department of
Education to create model forms for an IEP, prior written notice, and
procedural safeguards for restraint and seclusion of disabled students.511
Furthermore, disabled students’ substantive due process rights are
violated when: (1) there is a severe injury; (2) the force to cause the injury
was disproportionate to the need; and (3) the action was inspired by
malice.512 For a court to establish if a student’s allegations of corporal
punishment rise to a level of arbitrariness and the shock the conscience
standard—which would violate the student’s substantive due process
rights—the student or parents must allege:
“(1) a school official
intentionally used . . . excessive [force] under the circumstances, and (2) the
force used presented a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily
injury.”513 It also would aid them if they were able to prove that the teacher
has a pattern of abuse instead of one isolated incident.514 This would prove it
was done with malicious intent.515 If a student proves the above test, then the
court would rule that the student’s substantive due process rights were
violated because the teacher’s actions were not made in good faith to restore
order to the classroom, but were done with malicious intent.516 In most
cases, the teachers that abuse disabled students by restraining and secluding
them are not isolated incidents.517 Disabled students have suffered severe
injury from these techniques used in schools.518 Courts have held that
excessive corporal punishment used maliciously on disabled students
violates their substantive due process rights to be free from bodily restraint
and punishment.519

510.
See FLA. STAT. § 1003.573 (1), (3), (5) (2014); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
65G-8.012 (2014).
511.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 1.
512.
See Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
513.
Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th
Cir. 2000); see also T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. Of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588,
598 (11th Cir. 2010).
514.
See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
636 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
515.
See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
516.
See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
517.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7.
518.
Id. at 7, 10.
519.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977); T.W., 610 F.3d at 602;
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
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